一、多个时空


《纯粹理性批判》中的第一经验类比（Analogies of Experience）要求在现象中有一个恒定且唯一之物来表象意识中的时间本身。恒定，或永恒，因为作为总体的时间本身是始终在那的；惟一，因为只有一个时间。这个惟一且永恒的东西，即现象中的实体（Substance）。康德明确把这个实体与洛克的托子（Substratum）区分开来，认为实体是以各种方式显现于人的，而不是像托子那样不可知，也不显现。

我要说，洛克的托子的作用是保证物的个体化与同一性。这个作用在康德那儿，似乎是由物自体和先验范畴共同完成。先验范畴组织现象，在使意识对现象的认识成为可能的同时，也使同一的意识本身成为可能——对先验对象的构成即对自我的构成。而物自体在这个过程中究竟如何起作用，不详。康德的物自体与洛克的托子一样，是个让理论显得尴尬，却又不得不进行的假设。

尽管康德反复说现象中的实体不是洛克的托子，但这个实体究竟是什么，他又语焉不详。出于他对牛顿力学的接受，有人尝试将其理解为牛顿意义上的质量。我论证过，这样的解读将面临一个两难困境：如果实体是个体化了的质量，时间便不是惟一的；如果实体是现象世界中的总质量，基于二律背反的理由——这个总体无法成为经验对象——我们便无法经验到它。（详细论述见篇末附录）

若是跳出康德阐释，取前一个困境：时间不是惟一的，每个作为现象的物都意味着一个独立的时间体系，我们就科幻了：空间中的一个一个的物，奠基着意识中的一个又一个时间系，我们可以生活在不同的时空中，当我们经验不同的物。甚至，对应地说，我们总在成为另一个人，当我们来到不同的时空。

于是，我情愿把亨利的生活看作对康德的一次失败却有趣的解读。与其说他是一位时间旅行者，一位不停地穿越时空的超人或可怜人，不如说，他的意识中并没有一个绝对惟一的时间，他所来到并离开的每一个时空，都是一个独立自在的世界，尽管这些世界看上去很像，但哪个都不依赖于另一个——从理念的意义上说。


二、沉默，或消失


影片的前半部分，亨利的突然消失被解释为一种不治的遗传疾病。没有理由地，他时不时就去了另一个时空，赤身裸体地寻找可以穿上的衣服。仿佛常人来到一个新的环境，总是迫不及待地寻找一个身份，穿到自己身上。
亨利总会在一个无从预料的时刻消失，克莱尔生活在一个不确定的世界中。她的爱情是确定的，但她爱的人不确定地存在着。她的生活中弥漫着不确定性，而这恰好让她格外珍惜亨利在她身边的每一分钟。

克莱尔一次次怀孕又一次次流产，因为胎儿也有穿越症，莫名其妙地，便在某个时刻，出离了子宫。但克莱尔最后一次怀孕时，对亨利说，你每次消失都是因为感觉到了压力。所以，从现在开始，我要保持绝对地平静，这样胎儿就可以顺利出生了。
看到这里，我恍然大悟，原来亨利的穿越症是个隐喻，关于男人的隐喻：面对压力，便会沉默与回避，这不正是男人的本能反应么——而这在女人看来，仿佛爱人去了另一个时空，不知何时才能回来，甚至，会不会回来。

我查了查，电影改编自一位女造型艺术家的首部小说，写于一段失败的恋情之后。原来如此。

很多年前听到过一个说法：爱情，对男人来说，是挂在墙上的一幅画，你并不总是去看它；但对女人来说，则是房间里音乐，你想不听都不行。所以，男人需要时不时地呆在纯然属于自我的世界里，在沉默中成为自己。女人却要认为这是对她的疏远、对亲密的疏离，并因此而坐立不安，想方设法闯进那份铁一般的沉默。结果，要么把自己撞疼，要么把爱情撞碎。
这是对小儿女情态的描述。若成年点，便会更同情于另一个说法：人生在世，无非是男人讨慰藉，女人讨生活。人并不总是需要慰藉，尤其在得意之时。人却总在生活，就算你不想。


三、看着，却无法改变


在一次穿越中，亨利来到母亲身边，在地铁里，母亲在看报，他们作为陌生人简短却亲切的交谈了一会儿。亨利告诉母亲，他要结婚了，这个女孩让他感到安全。
克莱尔问他：你什么不去阻止那场车祸，既然你可以回到车祸发生之前。“我无法阻止。无数次我回到过去，回到母亲还在的时候，但每次我都无法改变发生着的一切。”——这话让人特别难过。我们并不能改变过去，就像不能重新雕刻一座已然完成的塑像。

不是么？很多时候，我们从自己当下的境遇中抽身而出，试图站在一个更开阔的角度，超脱地看现在的纠结、焦虑，或苦闷，并自嘲这些都没什么的。但当你身在当下，你知道未来的自己就坐在对面，笑着，看着自己，慈悲地。但你还是无法因此脱身而出。你仍然只能呆在你当下的处境中，无论是过分的快乐，还是仿佛无法挣脱的哀伤。

每一个时刻都是三维的，它包含着过去、现在，和未来这三个维度。我们在回忆中编辑时间，编辑自己，有意无意地遗忘一些，并把另一些反复摩挲。过往明明灭灭，像晴天里，随风晃动的百叶窗投在墙上的影子。每次回忆之后，我们都成为另一个人。
未来也是。未来无数次作为想象呈现于当下，各式各样地，仿佛清晰的回忆。回忆与憧憬，如同天平的两臂，对称着，平衡着，在现在这个支点上。所以，现在这个时刻，最重。


四、期限


有天聚会时，亨利中枪后痛苦挣扎的裸体突然出现在他们的门厅里。又消失了。克莱尔说，我从没见过四十岁之后的你。我见过的你总是很年轻。从这个时候起，死亡就成了他们中的另一个在场者，尽管它总是沉默着。

亨利穿越到未来，遇见了自己的已经十岁的女儿。女儿告诉他，他死于自己五岁那年。她们一直很想念他。那时他们的女儿还没出生。那时克莱尔还一如既往地希望与亨利白头偕老，就像她还没长大时那样，就像她长大之后第一次遇到亨利时那样，就像亨利死后，她仍然留着亨利所有的衣服，等着亨利回来那样。

于她而言，亨利是不会死的。他无非是走远了一下子回不来，他无非是在时空中迷了路，找不到一件让他温暖的衣服。

女儿五岁那年，亨利和克莱尔都已知道，亨利即将死去，中弹而死。期限降至，可能在任何一天，任何一个时刻。在它到来之前，所有相聚的时光都是铭刻，都是用最日常的方式来进行的一次祭奠，一次追忆。当这个期限还不确定，他们相爱着，仿佛一对最平凡的恋人；当这个期限已然确定，他们相爱着，装作不知道他们即将分离。

一个期限并不见得让期限到来之前的一切都显得美好。但，美好的东西都有一个期限。确定的期限，或不确定的期限。你不能试图挽留，那会犹如握紧手中的细沙，握得越紧，便流失得越快，宛如时间，从指缝间悄然流走。
这个期限是否到来，何时到来，都不是你能选择的。你能做的，仅仅是在它到来之前的每一刻，不让自己在未来后悔——克莱尔明白这些，并且，她做到了。

而，这不正是人生么。


——————
附录：On Understanding Substance as Mass

Introduction

In the First Analogy of Experience, Kant argues that there must be some permanently persistent substance in the appearances which represents the persistence of time. Given Kant’s endorsement of Newtonian physics, commentators such as Eric Watkins suggest that such permanently persistent substance can be understood as Newtonian mass. In this paper, however, I argue that we face a dilemma when we try to cash out the notion of substance in terms of Newtonian mass.
The paper proceeds in three steps. In the first section, I present the reason why there needs to be a permanently persistent substance in the appearances, and discuss why it seems to be compelling to conceive of the permanently persistent substance as Newtonian Mass. Then, in the second section, I argue that there are (only) two ways of conceiving of the permanently persistent substance as Newtonian mass, namely, to conceive of substance as individuated mass and to conceive of substance as the sum total of mass in the world of appearances. I show that there are textual indications as well as philosophical reasons to support each option. In the third section, however, I argue that both ways suffer from inescapable problems. Thus, conceiving of the permanently persistent substance in terms of Newtonian mass is not viable.

    
Section I. The Permanently Persistent Substance

In this section, I shall first present the reason why Kant thinks that there must be a permanently persistent substance in the appearances. I then discuss why it is compelling to conceive of such substance as Newtonian mass.
In the chapter “System of all principles of pure understanding,” Kant discusses what makes possible the applications of the categories, i.e. the pure concepts of understanding, to objects, i.e. appearances that are given to sensible intuitions. That is, he discusses what it is that makes the categories have objective validity. Kant’s claim is that the applications of the categories are only possible under certain conditions, and these conditions are spelled out by the principles. For instance, the applications of the relational categories (substance-accidents, cause and effect, and mutual interactions) are possible if they are applied to objects according to the principles of Analogies of Experience. In addition to the three specific principles that correspond to each of the three relational categories, Kant also provides a general principle overarching all three Analogies. The general principle is stated in the second edition as follows: “Experience is possible only through the representations of a necessary connection of perceptions” (B 218). Watkins provides a helpful interpretation of this general principle:
“The general idea is that each of the three relational categories represents a necessary connection that is required for experience of a single time and of objects existing and being temporally related to each other within a single time to be possible.” (My emphasis)
Since this paper is focused on the notion of substance in the first Analogy, I shall ignore the second and third Analogies. So I now turn to a close examination of the first Analogy.
The first Analogy, i.e. the principle of the persistence of substance, is stated in the second edition as follows: “In all change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature.” (B 224) Watkins summarizes Kant’s argument for the first Analogy as follows (which I take to be a correct interpretation):
Premise 1: Appearances, i.e. objects of experience, are made possible by time’s persistence.
Premise 2: We do not perceive time itself.
Therefore, In order to have experience of appearances, there must be some permanent substance in the appearances which can represent time or time’s persistence.
While the appearances, as the objects given to our intuitions, are changing, the substance in appearances always stays the same and is permanent. So, Kant calls the permanent substance “the substratum of everything real” (B 225). But, some clarifications about Kant’s use of the term “substratum” are needed to prevent potential confusions. Substratum in Kant’s text does not mean what Locke uses this term to mean, namely, the bearer of properties which is unchanging and about which we can have no knowledge. For, according to Locke, we can only know what is given to our senses, but since the underlying substratum cannot be given to our senses, we have no access to it and therefore cannot know it.
Kant, by constrast, does not think that there is any Lockean substratum in the world of appearances. For Kant, the fact that the states of the substance are changing and the substance stays the same does not mean the states are separable from the substance. Rather, the changing states of the substance are simply the ways in which the substance is given to us. Thus, we can know the substance, that is, we know the substance through its states. In order to avoid the Lockean implication of the term “substratum,” I shall only use “substance” to refer to the permanently persistent thing in the appearances despite Kant’s own use of “substratum” to talk about what is permanent in the appearances.
Since I have argued that Kant’s notion of substance is not the Lockean substratum, then what is the Kantian notion of substance? We need a positive account of what the substance is. It is obvious that such a permanently persistent thing cannot be captured by ordinary physical objects, no matter whether they are natural objects (say, rocks) or artifacts (say, ships), for neither artifacts nor natural objects always stay the same such that in principle they can never suffer changes. So, it seems no ordinarily construed physical things can be qualified as substance that is permanently persistent. On the other hand, it is very hard to imagine that anything non-physical could play the role the substance is supposed to play. For it is hard to imagine how a non-physical being could be given to our sensible intuition or could be spatiotemporally organized by our a priori intuitions. So, it is unlikely that Kant means something non-physical by “substance.” Thus, there are two constraints on spelling out what substance is. First, it is something physical. Second, as I have shown, the physical being that can be understood as substance cannot be ordinarily individuated physical things such as planet or rock.
In order to meet the above two conditions, Watkins suggests that, given Kant’s commitment to Newtonian science, it is likely that Kant has Newtonian mass in mind when he talks about the substance, since no matter how a physical object changes, its mass always stays the same. Since Newtonian mass is physical and is not an ordinarily individuated object, it seems quite compelling that the substance, which is permanently persistent, just is Newtonian mass. According to common sense, Newtonian mass is understood to be underlying objects such that we cannot directly perceive mass but can only perceive mass through the way it is given to our intuition, namely, through the perception of the objects that have mass. Thus, mass is neither unknowable nor directly perceivable, which seems to fit the description of the substance perfectly.
Moreover, there are many textual indications that suggest the identification of substance with mass. Let me note two examples. First, recall the general principle overarching the three specific Analogies, namely, “In all change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature.” (B 224) It seems that “quantum” is most naturally to be understood as mass, for mass seems to be the only thing in nature that is neither increased nor diminished on Newtonian physics.
The other indication is Kant’s example to illustrate his claim that “he <a philosopher> thus assumed that as incontrovertible that even in fire the matter (substance) never disappears but rather only suffers an alteration in its form.” (B 288, my emphasis):
“A philosopher was asked: How much does the smoke weigh? He replied: If you take away from the weight of the wood that was burnt the weight of the ashes that are left over, you will have the weight of the smoke.” (B 288)
We can see that here Kant explicitly identifies substance with matter. And it is quite plausible to think that “matter” is just another way of saying “mass”. That is, “mass” seems to be the theoretical analog of the term “matter.” This hypothesis is supported by the example of the weight of smoke. For, in the example, the way to calculate the weight of smoke just is to calculate the mass (multiplies the gravitational constant).
However, despite the compelling reasons for the identification of substance with mass, in the next sections, I shall argue that the substance cannot be understood as Newtonian mass, for when we try to work out the details of understanding the substance as mass, we face an unavoidable dilemma.


Section II. Some Mass or the Sum Total of Mass

In this section, I shall argue that there are two ways of conceiving of substance as Newtonian mass, and then show that both ways have some support from the text and are to some extent philosophically plausible. So, both ways deserve detailed considerations. But, in the next section, I shall argue that both ways face insurmountable problems.
In identifying substance with mass, we need to settle an ambiguity: Is the mass meant to be some mass, say the mass of a rock which is 7 kilograms (a randomly chosen weight), or to be the sum total of mass in the world of appearances which is a very large but nonetheless definite amount? Since both some mass and the sum total of mass are permanently persistent, we cannot tell which way of identifying is more plausible with respect to the permanent persistence of substance. So, we must appeal to some other philosophically and/or textually interesting points to ground a preference in choosing one over the other.
Let us first consider identifying the substance with some or individuated mass. First, the first Analogy is the principle according to which the relational category substance-accident is to be applied. Kant defines accidents to be “the determinations of a substance that are nothing other than particular ways for it to exist.”(B 229) Many commentators interpret the relation to be between object and its properties or states. Thus it makes more sense to think that the mass, which is the underlying bearer of properties, is the individuated mass of some object, instead of the sum total of mass in the world of appearances. For instance, in the example of the weight of smoke, Kant seems to conceive of substance as the matter, i.e. mass, of an individual object. Moreover, if we conceive of substance as the sum total of mass in the world of appearances, it is very hard to imagine how substance can be the bearer of properties or what kind of properties of which substance is the bearer.
One might argue that, on the interpretation according to which substance is the sum total of mass, even though we could imagine no properties of which substance is the bearer, we can still conceive of substance as the bearer of (changing) states, i.e. the successive states of the world of appearances. I reply that Kant cannot accept such an idea because the states of the world are not objects of possible experience, for it is at least empirically true that no one could have the whole world of appearances as his object of experience. I will return to this point later on in the paper and use it to argue that conceiving of substance as the sum total of mass is untenable given Kant’s theoretic commitments.
The above discussion is about reasons to prefer the identification of substance with some mass. I now turn to the reasons to prefer the identifications of substance with the sum total of mass. There are some textual evidences in the first Analogy that suggest this latter identification. For instance, the following passage:
“…here the issue is only appearances in the field of experience, the unity of which would never be possible if we were to allow new things (as far as their substance is concerned) to arise. For then everything would disappear that alone can represent the unity of time, namely the identity of the substratum in which alone all change has its thoroughgoing unity. This persistence is therefore nothing more than the way in which we represent the existence of things (in appearances).” (B 229/A186, my emphasis)
In this passage, Kant seems to identify the permanent persistent substance that represents the persistence of time with the unity of appearances, which seems to be the sum total of mass in the whole world of appearances. Let me argue for my understanding of this passage that it indicates that Kant identifies substance with the sum total of mass. I shall argue by reductio: Suppose Kant identified substance with individuated mass in the above passage. Then, it would make no sense to think that the arising of new substance could make the representation of the unity of time impossible. For the arising of new substance in no sense affects the substance, i.e. the mass, of the original objects. Let me use an example to illustrate. Suppose there is a rock whose mass is 7 kilograms and there arises a new object out of nothing, whose mass is 5 kilograms. Insofar as the rock’s mass remains the same, whether or not there are new masses arising out of nothing does not affect the unity of the rock’s mass, which is 7 kilograms. Therefore, in this passage, Kant conceives of substance as the sum total of mass in the whole world of appearances.
So far I have shown that there are compelling reasons to identify substance with some mass or with the sum total of mass respectively. In the next section, I shall argue that there are also devastating reasons to each identification such that either way we go, we face unsolvable problems.


Section III. One Single Time and the Limit of Possible Experience

I now turn to the problems from which the each identification suffers. In this section, I shall argue that these problems make both identifications untenable. Let us first consider the identification of substance with individuated mass (i.e. some mass). I argue that the reason why individuated mass cannot be identified with substance is that individuated mass cannot represent the oneness of time. Recall Kant’s argument for the principle of the first Analogy: in order to have experiences of objects as temporal, we must identify a permanently persistent substance that can represent time in objects. While the states of the substance change, the substance persists so that the substance can represent time that persists. It is important to notice that time, which is supposed to be represented by substance in appearances, is one single time. But, individuated mass cannot represent one single time. For there are many individuated masses, for instance, the mass of a rock which is 7 kilograms, the mass of a cup which is 0.5 kilogram, and the mass of a table which is 3 kilograms, each of which is permanently persistent and undergoes changes. If one of them can represent time, any other also can. In that case, we do not have one single time. Rather, we have many times or time-series, each of which is persistent.
Let me explain in details why multiply individuated masses cannot represent on single time. If these individuated masses can represent one single time, there must be some one single thing that is shared by these individuated masses that serves to represent the singularity of time. Whatever this shared thing is, it is not any of these individuated masses. Therefore, individuated mass cannot present one single time. However, on the other hand, time has be to singular. Here is a passage in the first Analogy which explains why time has to be one single time rather than a plurality of times:
“Substances (in appearances) are the substrata of all time-determinations. The arising of some of them and the perishing of others would itself remove the sole condition of the empirical unity of time, and the appearances would then be related to two different times, in which existence flowed side by side, which is absurd. For there is only one time, in which all different times must not be placed simultaneously but only one after another.” (B 232/A189)
One might argue that it does not matter how many individuated masses can represent time, it only matters that there is an individuated mass that represents time. Insofar as there is such a substance, which is permanently persistent, it suffices to represent one single time. I reply that, in that case, we still do not know which individuated mass is suppose to be the representer of the one single time in appearances. For there is not reason to think that the mass of one object is more suitable to represent time than the mass of another object is, insofar as both of the individuated masses are permanently persistent. Any choice of one over the other is arbitrary. But the unity or singularity of time is not arbitrary, for there can only be one time-series which persists, and any other time-series or temporal relations are just temporal parts of this unique time-series. Thus, I conclude that individuated mass cannot be the representer of time in appearances.
I now turn to argue that the sum total of mass cannot represent time either. The idea of my argument is to make use of Kant’s solution to the Antinomies to show that the permanently persistent substance that represents time in the appearances cannot be the sum total of mass because the sum total of mass is not an object of possible experience. Let me lay out my argument in detail.
In “The Antinomy of Pure Reason” chapter, Kant presents four pairs of arguments concerning four cosmological ideas about the world-whole, namely, whether there is a beginning of time, whether there is indivisibly simple substance, whether there is a first cause, and whether there is a necessary existent. As Allen W. Wood argues, the four antinomies share a general form, namely, the thesis of each antinomy claims that there must be a first member of the conditioning-conditioned chain, while the antithesis of each antinomy claims that there is no first member of such a chain and that the chain goes back into infinity. Kant argues that there are valid arguments for each of the four theses as well as valid arguments for each of the four antitheses, so we need a solution to such contradictions.
Kant’s solution to the contradictions, as Wood argues, relies on his doctrine of transcendental idealism. As for the first two antinomies, Wood argues
The mathematical antinomies are generated by mathematical principles that apply to things only insofar as they are given in sensible intuition…But these [the first two] series of conditions are never given to intuition as a whole...The theses are false because the principles of possible experience make it impossible for objects corresponding to the cosmological ideas of a first event, a largest extent of the world or a simple substance, ever to be given to intuition.”
Thus, the reason why Kant thinks that the claims made by the theses of the first and second antinomies are false is that neither the beginning of time nor the spatial boundary of the world or an indivisible substance can ever be given to our sensible intuition. If something cannot be given to our sensible intuition, according to Kant, we cannot have experience of it. Let me call this principle the object-of-sensible-intuition principle, namely, if something cannot be given to our sensible intuitions, then it cannot be object of our possible experience. And we can apply this principle to an object to determine whether that object can be object of possible experience. That is, if the object in question can be given to our sensible intuition, then the object can be object of our possible experience, but if the object cannot be given to our sensible intuition, then it cannot be object of our possible experience.
Now, let me apply the object-of-sensible-intuition principle to the idea of the sum total of mass. We can see that the sum total of mass cannot be given to our sensible intuition, so, the sum total of mass cannot be object of our possible experience. For the world of appearances seems to mean the whole universe or cosmos (because everything in the universe stands in causal relations to each other), there is no way for all of the mass in the whole universe to be given to our sensible intuition. Actually, we do not even know whether there are spatial boundaries of the universe, so we do not even know whether the sum total of mass in the all universe is finite. Thus, the sum total of mass cannot be object of possible experience. So, the sum total of mass cannot be that which represents time in appearances. For the reason there must be a permanently persistent substance in appearances which represents time is to make our temporally connected representations of objects possible. But, if the sum total of mass cannot be object of experience, it cannot make our experience of object possible. Thus, the permanently persistent substance in appearances cannot be the sum total of mass.
One might object that in the antinomies, the cosmological ideas at issue are condition-condition series. (B 436/A410) But the sum total of mass is not a series. Rather, it is an aggregate about which the question of conditioning and conditioned does not arise at all. Thus, Kant’s remarks on the antinomies have no bearing on whether the idea of the sum total of mass has any objective validity or significance. Moreover, the first two antinomies concern whether the conditioning-conditioned series go on into infinities. And it seems that it is impossible for us to experience infinity, for no matter what we experience it is finite insofar as we have experienced it. But, the quantum of the sum total of mass seems to be a definite and finite amount. By virtues of what can we claim that the sum total of mass cannot be object of experience? Is this “cannot” an empirical cannot, or an In-Principle cannot? If the answer is the former, the empirical “cannot” does not seem to be strong enough to show that the sum total of mass cannot be experienced, because we cannot know or predict whether in the future empirical sciences and technologies will make the sum total of mass possible object of experience. If the answer is the latter, at least further explanations of why the sum total of mass, which is a finite and definite amount, cannot be object of possible experience in principle are needed.
To the first objection I have two replies. First, in the first antinomy, Kant also discusses whether there is boundary or the largest extent of space. It is not obvious that there is a spatial series in the sense that it is obvious that there is a temporal series in which one moment succeeds its previous moments. However, according to Kant, we can think of the space acquiring its quantum through repeatedly or successively adding spatial units to the previous spatial units. (A 428/B 456) That is, the way of conceiving of space as a spatial series depends on the way of conceiving of time as a temporal series, which is naturally serial. Then, by the same token, we can also think of the sum total of mass acquiring its quantum by successively adding massive units to previous massive units. Thus, if the object-of-sensible-intuition principle applies to the idea of the boundary of space, it should also apply to the idea of the sum total of mass of the whole world of appearances.
Second, the fact that Kant applies the object-of-sensible-intuition-principle to the first two (or three) cosmological ideas to solve the contradictions does not mean that the principle can only be employed to deal with the antinomies. If the principle is applicable to other ideas, we can also use the principle to deal with other ideas. Since the object-of-sensible-intuition principle is derived from transcendental idealism, which is an important element in the whole Critique, there is no reason why the principle cannot be applied to other ideas than cosmological ideas. Thus, it is legitimate to use the object-of-sensible-intuition principle to show that the sum total of mass of whole world of appearances cannot be object of possible experience. So, the sum total of mass cannot be what represents time in appearances.
My reply to the second objection has two steps. First, it needs to be clarified that, although the first two antinomies concern whether the conditioning-conditioned series are infinite, Kant’s solution by the object-of-sensible-intuition principle does not rely on the whether the series are infinite. The principle only concerns whether the things to which the cosmological ideas refer can be given to our sensible intuition. It does not concern whether the things are infinite. It seems true that infinity cannot be object of sensible intuition. But this does not mean that all finite things can be given to our sensible intuition. Actually Kant rejects the claim that all finite things can be given to our sensible intuition. For Kant thinks the thesis of the first antinomy is false, because the beginning of time or the boundary of space cannot be given to our sensible intuition so that it cannot be object of possible experience.
The second step of my reply is to spell out in which sense of “cannot,” the sum total of mass cannot be object of possible experience. It seems to me that the distinction between empirical “cannot” and In-Principle “cannot” is hard to cash out in the context of Critique. For, in the Critique, any legitimate claim to knowledge entails that the object of which the knowledge is can be experienced. Thus, it seems that the empiricality of the “cannot” entails the In-Principality of the “cannot”.
However, concerning the claim that we cannot predict whether in the future empirical sciences and technologies will make the sum total of mass possible object of experience, what would Kant say? Would Kant agree that future sciences and technologies might or could transform a transcendent idea into an idea which refers to object of possible experience? I do not think he would. For Kant thinks his Critique settles metaphysical questions once and for all by theoretical reason, which is static or a-historical. Future discoveries made by sciences and technologies should be able to do no damage to the doctrines in Critique. Moreover, it should be odd to Kant’s ear that progresses made by empirical sciences could have any bearings on the doctrines in the Critique, which he builds up from scratch employing only pure reason, which is absolutely a-historical.
Thus, I conclude that the above arguments show that identifying substance with the sum total of mass in the world of appearance is not tenable. Since I showed earlier in this section that identifying substance with individuated mass is not tenable either, I conclude that the general strategy of identifying substance with mass is untenable.


Section IV. Concluding Remarks

In this paper, I showed that a seemingly very promising way of understanding the permanently persistent substance discussed in the first Analogy, namely, conceiving of substance as Newtonian mass, is untenable. Then, I wonder whether there are other promising ways of providing a positive account of substance or actually it is the case that the notion of substance in the first Analogy is itself untenable. At this stage, maybe I could follow Kant’s stance on the things of themselves, namely, they exist, but we can have no knowledge about the way of their existence. But, at the same time, we need to have this minimal conviction that they exist. Similarly, concerning substance, we can have no knowledge about what the permanently persistent substance is, but we need to have the minimal conviction that it exists in the world of appearances and it serves to represent time.

第五集刚开始就是介绍这火山是世界上仅有的几座能够看到熔岩的火山，这次的旅行应该能成为他们这一辈子难忘的经历吧，机会真的很难得。任务是要飞机贴近岩浆面，这真的厉害了，温度高的飞机能承受么？这应该也是史上第一次吧~想想就刺激啊，虽然这趟旅行充满着未知以及危险，但...  (展开)

      目前我只撑到了第九集！但是我内心已经有N只草泥马奔过来奔过去了！！！看到自己喜欢这么多年到现在还会不时重温的书被改成了这个样子简直是毙了狗了！我不是稻米，顶多算个伪稻米，因为我对三叔不是真爱，但是！我对盗墓笔记这本书是真爱！追了这么多年还是放不下里面的有些坑！就算抛开我书迷的身份，作为一个普通的观众，我也觉得这部剧让人忍不下去了！

       首先，作为一个书迷看来，真的是槽点无数啊啊啊啊啊，算了，想到哪儿写到哪儿好了。盗墓改成护宝，这点我能理解，但是能不能别动不动就上交给国家好吗！你以为你特工呢在神不知鬼不觉的情况下就送到了文物局，难道没有监控吗，编剧是不是以为别人都跟他一样傻！？开头一段追逐就不想多说了，特效不特效的先不说，至少要符合点逻辑啊，特么那么一块地方，一眼就能看到哪儿哪儿有个啥，胖子竟然说炸车趁乱逃走，逃你妹啊逃，除非你跳崖，不然你两条腿跑得过阿宁的车！？还是以为他们会集体失明眼瞎啊我去！还有天真那么娇俏的单手撑下巴挺胖子说话我恨不得一巴掌拍过去，我天真没这么娘炮！
       新加的俩人物恨不得分分钟拿小哥的黑金古刀砍死算了。本来书的后面三叔不知道哪根筋抽了为了迎合腐女可以官方麦麸，结果现在的剧更是搞笑了，编剧到底有没有看过原著啊擦，特么是不是以为天真跟小哥就是一对啊擦，脑子里装的是屎吗！第一次见面英雄救美是个什么鬼！拜托，有点脑子好吗！
  中间省去3C各种做作各种撒泼不说，省去三叔跟天真各种打闹撒娇耍花枪【特么我三叔是个有脾气的人好吗！这么逗比没电正经气质的到底是闹哪样！】好不容易要下地了，特么给红牛的植入也太特么简单粗暴了吧，嗨少吃饭前要拍照我特么分分钟以为下一秒他要发朋友圈啊擦！
       小哥的黑金古刀连胖子都拿不起来好吗！天真以为自己是谁啊，分分钟就拿起来了，还有那一脸温柔的说这是我为你点的猪肝，配上那莫名其妙的BGM，呕~~~恨不得拿猪肝糊他一脸！
       终于下地了，简直给编剧脑洞跪了，古墓里信号真不错啊，还能视频通话呢！移动联通都不如编剧脑洞强大啊擦！还有潘子，刚认识胖子，就能舍己救人这崇高的敬意啊。最特么搞笑的是在盗墓这么紧张的情况下，编剧还给我们演了一出甄嬛传！特么拍不出来能不能不拍，这脑洞突破天际了好吗！！！
       三叔是个很有威望的人，竟然在墓里被胖子各种挤兑呛声还无言以对，我也无言以对了......
       最特么不能忍的终于来了，天真可以对阿宁各种关怀仁爱，阿宁可以对属下各种义气深情，结果一群人爬出去之后就放火了！！！特么竟然放火了！！！放！！！火！！！了！！！我真的是毙了狗了，心疼我小哥，为了那些傻逼玩意各种放血打血人，这些被他救了几次的人竟然连问都不问一句就放火了！！！特么天真你的圣母情怀你！特么能关爱一个三千年的粽子，特么我小哥是死人吗！！！狼心狗肺的一群东西！！！
    我暂时只能撑到这里了，听说后面的点天灯已经成了嗨少和3C的主场而小哥只是个出现了17S的背景，我已经不想看下去了，免得破坏了我心里的那个铁三角，看到这里已经气得肺疼了，不敢想象最喜欢的那一幕被肢解的景象。编剧你真的可以去屎一屎了！以前还没有这种感觉，现在很多改编的剧的原著还好我也不是很喜欢，所以不会有啥感觉。第一次亲身体会到自己那么喜欢那么关心的一部书被改得她亲娘都不认识，我......更多的不是愤怒，而是悲哀，为我喜欢的吴邪、张起灵、吴三省这些角色悲哀。原来自己喜爱的角色被毁是这种感觉，我已经说不出别的什么了。

   关于角色
   
    首先毁得彻底的是吴邪，不仅编剧改得人物性格莫名其妙，一点小三爷的魅力都没有，演员的演绎也是一坨屎。【我不怕他的粉丝来喷，再多人喷我我还是要说他毁了我的小三爷！演技跟一坨屎一样！亏我以前还觉得他的屠苏扮相不错！】
    然后就是吴三省。完全崩坏，我三叔不是这样的，绝壁不是。
    其他人被这俩一比还看得下去了，虽然阿宁人设也崩了，但是人物的表现至少整体没有出现逻辑上的前后不一致。胖子台词要加强，虽然胖子话多，但是也不是这种背台词的感觉。潘子人设不对，剧里没有表现得唯三叔马首是瞻的感觉。最好笑的是在古墓里连胖子都顾忌无邪这到底是为毛啊为毛！无邪这时候有毛线本事让胖子都听他的话！！！捧人捧成这样还能再LOW点吗！干嘛不干脆让他带着大家下地得了！我是男一我怕谁嘛！最后是小哥，我是真心喜欢小哥这个角色，剧里的表现还可以，跟其他人一比是业界良心，就是还欠缺点内心沧桑的感觉，这点还有待加强。
   
   奉劝这剧的编剧别再拿观众当傻子！拿别人当傻子的人最后只会自己变成傻子！！！

    于小鱼丢了公司十万块钱万念俱灰的时候，一定想不到这个和她关系紧张的“同居者”龙夏会倾其所有帮她渡过难关，不是冤家不聚头的巧合，让两个人的相遇充满了戏谑，但还没来的及同命相连，就已经肝胆相照了，所以，第二天一大早佟大为举着一张欠条一张收据跑进屋子里的时候，完全有令人感动到落泪的震动。佟大为这个暖男典范，继续在荧幕中诠释好男人形象。

    但是，对于龙夏这个角色，佟大为这次却是尽力将身上的棱角藏起来，以最朴实最真诚的态度，开始同一屋檐下的一段新生活，没有高富帅的身份背景，也不是什么多才多艺的小能手——代价是必须直面生活。和荧屏外的观众一样，要恋爱要结婚，柴米油盐水电房租，都成了佟大为所饰演的龙夏必须去全力应付的现实困境。

    更多时候，龙夏需要对面的是情感与婚姻的反思和考量，佟大为这次所塑造的角色，是一个对朋友仗义疏财，可以领两千工资但能借给朋友三千，对女朋友倾家荡产，可以把祖传的戒指押出去只为一个并不熟悉的女孩犯错而埋单。也正是这种热心和不计较，让他在爱情里失意收场，眼睁睁看着女友因为他的“不上进”就此分道扬镳。

    然而，一个在前女友口中死活不肯捞外快的人，开始为了生活去，去替朋友谈业务要提成，内心一定是有过挣扎的，佟大为对这种小纠结的把握十足到位，整个讨价还价的过程，表现的有点小无赖，又有点小无辜还有点小聪明的神情，让客户舒坦兄弟舒坦了之后，也让电视机前的观众跟着舒坦起来，这是个不会“装”的演员，自然的不露一丝痕迹。

    当然，在内心深处还是留有前女友出走的阴影，当初女友因为和公司的高管约会，让佟大为的感情受挫，所以才有了和王丽坤迅速闪就的婚姻关系，以致后来王丽坤在和骆达华“走近”以后，才会旧病复发，将已婚小男人的猜忌和算计诠释的真实且真切，当初倾其所有的暖男，成了愤慨的“护婚使者”，紧紧守护自己的婚姻与真爱。

    故事越临近收官，龙夏这个人物对情感对婚姻想的也越来越明白，在这个凡事都想要个结果的时代，思考的过程，越发显得重要起来，因为太多背井离家的人混迹都市，为的就是能有一个安慰的生活，家庭、事业、婚姻、责任……种种之前摸不准头脑的事情，开始接踵而至，需要独自面对，佟大为也算是冲在了前头，替这批适龄者们踩出一条“前车之鉴”，用一种看似无为却用心至深的生活观价值观，带领观众，进行了一次婚前婚后的观摩考察。

    想明白了，不是毕业了，而是可以开始好好生活了。

偶然在B站上面刷到了片段，中午吃饭时就找时间看了看，跟《租个女友回家过年不同》，这次是租男友hhhhhhhhhhhhhh 不明白两个男主明明好像也不缺钱用，为啥要去给人家当男友?女主一出场，一直在浮夸地叫，让我一度以为是不是我点错了，好几次都差点看不下去??；女主就因为一张...  (展开)

當初看「女王的教室」時是一個都不認識，不過現在回頭重看時，卻看到了很多熟面孔，夏帆、志田未來、原沙知絵、半海一晃這些後來我都算認識的人，再看一次覺得這部日劇還是很好看的，也或許是我之前並沒有認真地從頭看到尾，很多小細節都忽略了，加上這麼多已經認識的演員，擺在一起出眼感覺格外親切

以前我很討厭子役小演員，大概是從小看台灣戲劇長大的影響，當時都覺得這些孩子演得好假喔～所以以前每次看到男女主角幼年時期的戲劇，都希望趕快把這個地方演完直接看長大，這樣的影響一直持續著，直到看「女王的教室」時還是這樣覺得；為什麼不演高中生，要演小學生呢？不過這樣先入為主的討厭，還是沒影響我看這一部「女王的教室」。直到現在重新再看了一遍，才這樣覺得；裡面的24個孩子表現得好極了，真的很好，換了個心情來看，整個感覺完全不同了。

不能不這樣稱讚；這一部「女王的教室」在教育類戲劇中是很獨特的，題材與訴求、核心思想與價值都很別樹一幟，即使不提這些劇情方面的編排，整個班級的任何一個人物也都安排得很好，雖然在故事中還是有主要的幾位學生挑故事的大樑，但是其餘的同學戲份雖少也都沒閑著，一個表情一句台詞都能很輕易地看出他們的代表性格，感覺得出編劇遊川和彥花了很多心思在營造一個班級的感覺，試圖要讓觀眾認為這真的是一個班級，而不是幾個人帶頭的一個小團體，而難得的是在這樣的鋪排之下，不會讓觀眾有主客易位、混淆不清的錯亂感，主要故事還是那幾個角色來推動，而其他人也能在自己的位置上適時地等待表現，雖稱不上是場面宏大、面面俱到，但是絕對可圈可點。

我就是在這一部日劇認識了天海並且喜歡上她！其實；當初看到第二集時，我就覺得這個滿口現實理論的真矢老師；可能不像表面上看起來的模樣，當然不是我未卜先知，只是在她對真鍋由介說的話中感覺到的。那些像是嘲諷、冷笑的像針一樣的話語，聽在當事人的耳中一定非常的難受，可以說是直擊由介的心裏，挖出了他不想讓人看見的傷口。可是為什麼我總覺得這不太像是單純地說難聽的話？總像有著關懷的心意。

從最初第二集到五六這兩集，我其實大概心中有了個底，真矢應該不是真的魔鬼。我總覺得；是的，救助溺水、急救傷勢，本來就是老師該做的，你可以說她怕被指責瀆職，這也是沒有錯的，這是職責也是責任，但是在這幾個片段中，我總是有種這樣的感覺；這個老師是在演戲、是在裝的，她像是極力隱藏自己的本意，用冷酷的言語、嚴肅的外表製造這樣的假象，但還是可以尋跡得到她的關懷，只在那偶爾出現的情緒波動中隱匿不住。

我是這樣開始喜歡天海的，我很訝異一個演員能做到這樣的表現，應該說是開了眼界，演員演者，演的是另外一個人也，而天海扮演的這個角色，是本人還要再隱藏、還要再去扮演自己塑造出來的形象，而更難得的是；她演的不單只是魔鬼老師真矢，而是用魔鬼外衣把自己包裝起來的真矢，如果光演魔鬼，只是冷酷，沒血沒淚的形象，那就不是完全的真矢，只是被真矢裝扮出的一個外在形象，真正的真矢，要外在、絕大部分地表現出這樣的冰冷無情，但不能忘了隨時不小心散逸無法完全掩藏的那種溫柔關切

很奇妙的是；我不是由劇情而聯想到這樣的安排，而是就天海在幾個片段的表現而感覺出來的，所以我一直這樣說；「天海祐希不愧是我心目中的女王」，因為每次看她的表現總讓人讚嘆，天海給我的感覺不是演什麼像什麼，而是演了什麼角色，就覺得天海就是那個角色！
是的，天海祐希，妳不愧是我心目中的女王！

这篇剧评可能有剧透 其实这部剧我一开始是先去看了动漫才过来看的，因为动漫里说是一部妖怪室友的剧，其实讲的也是人生中一些小的道理吧。 不过番剧里面是男主，电视剧改编成了女主。 被妖怪教做人的女主好有意思啊，用搞笑+鬼畜的表演传达对女性的关怀和鼓励嗯，在女主遇到困扰的时候，上新一个妖...  (展开)

这篇剧评可能有剧透 我都无语了。昨天看了两眼，瞎了感觉。 真的真的真的把一个游戏改的面目全非。 段承轩的人设啊，崩了啊，还是霸道总裁+演员？exo me？言楚非有出镜么？女主除了会“啊啊啊”还会个啥。叶巧的演技诶呦我的妈。还是柳梦甜最讨喜。方潇潇演的起码真。奥兰多怎么会参演这东东。。。...  (展开)

曾经听过一个笑话，说是俄罗斯的孩子都是扔在西伯利亚的山里和熊一起长大的，这练就了他们的战斗天性......而这次你将要看到的就是一部具有俄罗斯血统的合拍动画片！俗话说，“没有比较就没有杀戮”，在对比完最近那部国产动画片《丑小鸭历险记》和《超能太阳鸭》的预告片后，感叹颇多，同样都是讲鸭子的故事，为什么差距这样大......

 

在国际局势中经常吵架拌嘴的中美俄三个大国，这次在《超能太阳鸭》中玩了一次深度合作。

这部动画片在诞生初，就和一直让人尴尬国产动画片（《大鱼海棠》不算，毕竟十二年一遇.....）划清了界限。好莱坞的特效、中国风的场景设置、中俄混搭风的人物形象，配合一个国际通用的“屌丝逆袭”故事组成，给了电影一个基本的质量保证。正确的价值观，并配以积极欢乐的故事表达，是一部暑期动画电影最基本的要求。这种混搭组合带来的新鲜感，你可能还是第一次体会。

 

超能太阳鸭和火影忍者间不得不说的故事

仔细研究了这部动画片的故事后，发现竟和火影忍者玩的一个套路！我们的主人公龙威和火影里的旋涡鸣人几乎有着一样的成长背景。一个是岛主的儿子，一个是曾经火影的儿子，并且在成长初期都是喜欢捣乱、贪玩的疯孩子，在大家眼里，是典型的“吊车尾”。但随后他们的身世之谜被慢慢揭开，一个是关于族群命运的天选之子，另一个是封印着上古神兽的人柱力，并且他们都逐渐认识到自己的重要性，必须要担负起保卫家园的重任，在这一过程中，他们收获了友情和族人的信任，并最终完成由吊车尾到英雄/火影的蜕变！

 



 

有意思的是，超能鸭里龙威在释放自己的太阳之力时，肚子上的那封印跟鸣人的那个九尾封印是如此的相似，那天在本地UME影院里，还看到一个奇怪的印有这个图案的道具，以为火影又出新剧场版了....后来才知道是《超能太阳鸭》的宣传品。既能够让你在观影中回忆起曾经看火影时的青春岁月。又能让孩子们在龙威的进化过程中，体会到努力和责任！

 



（注意那幅正在卖萌的王栎鑫和SNH48后面图案，总感觉旋涡鸣人要跳出来）

 

 

野心勃勃，大小通吃？

相对于大部分国产动画片偏重低龄受众群，这次合拍片《超能太阳鸭》似乎是要走全龄化路线，在前期的宣传中，既推出各种可爱呆萌的人气玩偶，又让王栎鑫、SNH48、uniq的金圣柱等偶像明星悉数登场。以学生党为主体的年轻群体看来也是本片想要挖掘的受众，加上带着孩子进影院的父母们，整个动画涉及的年龄层次便更加丰富，这也是好莱坞动画片一贯的策略，让更多的人走进影院看动画，是票房得以保证和相关衍生产品得以铺开销售渠道的关键！与国外合作拍片，不仅是为了让自己看起来“高大上”，而是通过这种合作学习取经，最终催生属于我们自己的优秀动画片。当然，也不要一部动画片拍十二年（《大鱼》粉息怒）......

 



（《超能太阳鸭》看来并不打算完全走低龄化动画路线，SNH48一出，宅男们颤抖吧！）

 

暑期电影市场向来热闹，各个电影公司都紧紧瞅着消费者的钱包。但在那些谈情说爱，打打杀杀，装神弄鬼的类型片外，真正能供家长选择，能够让自己和孩子一起观影的动画片却少之又少。《超能太阳鸭》可能跟迪士尼的动画大片比，在特效制作，角色丰富程度和故事原创性上还差些火候，但要满足你和孩子们度过一个愉快而惬意的亲子时光，足够了。

如果不是前段时间看张艾嘉上康熙，我还不知道这一年她拍了部这个电影，更不知道这电影的名字是一改再改，最后改成了——《我们这一家》？

最近几年看奶茶，总会有点忍不住的小心酸。明知道她就是这个样子，还是会觉得她是在故作坚持。三十好几了，她还在电影开始扮演初出社会的菜鸟律师，脸上的细纹掩盖不住，想起她和陈升的故事，这个女人，还在等待吗？
上次张艾嘉上康熙，虽已是外婆，看起来却青春活泼，浑身上下都洋溢着幸福。总觉得她跟奶茶是有点相似的，为什么两人的命运却完全不同？

其实我是喜欢奶茶刘若英的。好几年了，我一直都是淡淡的喜欢。我始终希望她能找到一个像《20，30，40》的结局那样的一个好男人。

关于她和古天乐——从《生日快乐》开始。
《生日快乐》那样的故事，感觉看书比看电影好。两人的年纪已经不适合扮演大学生了，而且上次感觉两人的肤色差别太大了，有点不适应这样的搭配，但这次还是手痒的买下来。不期待，但却想看。
真是奇怪的心理。

因为我固执的认为，古天乐演黑道大哥还是可以的。虽然其实差点，但肤色很接近嘛！

故事其实很老套，一个黑道大佬有了个女儿后便开始彻底的变化——可以理解，无论是否黑道，哪一个男人做了爸爸后都会有这样的心理，尤其是有个女儿。
虽然一开篇便是大佬的葬礼，但看到最后五分钟，我仍然相信这个好爸爸绝不可能死。作为一个黑道大佬，他也许早就该死了；作为一个不算合格的丈夫，他也早该千刀万剐了；作为一个儿子，他也没争气到哪里去；但作为一个爸爸——他就该活着，并且活得很长寿。
唉，因为他还真是一个好爸爸。

电影没有太多张艾嘉的风格，不是我喜欢的《心动》那样的电影。也许这是她新的尝试，不能说不好，只是还没有感动到我。当奶茶第一次出现在电影里的时候，我忍不住想，她会一直以这种青春少女的打扮贯穿整部电影吗？这会雷死我的——她怎么能再扮演这种年龄的女孩？！
还好，还好，很快她便成了妈妈，她不再有一惊一诧的表情，她把头发剪短，穿丝绸的套装，优雅坚强。最后，在丈夫的葬礼上，哭得眼睛红肿——其实，这才是我愿意看到的她的样子。不是不希望她漂亮，希望她自然，真实。


题外话：我不喜欢看配音版的港片，所以上次看《生日快乐》看得很纠结，因为我一看到古天乐的口型与他的声音不符合我就很烦，结果这一次奶茶亲自上阵全程粤语对白，看得我也是相当郁闷——很怪，灰常的怪。那怎么办涅？以后这两个人的搭配，在我心里该怎么平衡？

总体来说称不上一部好电影
　　喜欢剧本，道具，音乐，一些光线的设计也不错~
　　
　　但是布景和演技都不敢恭维，给人假的感觉
　　
　　个人认为剧本讲述的贴近生活，曾几何时，大家不在梦想与现实中徘徊着，矛盾着，最后得出结论：不得不继续生活，微笑面对……
　　
　　王朔的这个本子反映了生活……需细品

说句题外话：刚刚从这部电影中发现，老徐的牙齿怎么那么不齐阿~呵呵~牙齿不好，也不知道去整整形~只是客观发表一下，毫无个人感情
老徐的众fans们表扁我，我也挺喜欢老徐的~^_<

刚看过预告的原著党此刻内心是崩溃的！！！我相信每一个看过原著的人此刻内心都是崩溃的！！每个人内心都在质问自己，这是我看的那个男神嘛？？？我怕看了个假小说！！！没错，假的小说！！！预告片什么鬼？？？看过预告片的原著党我此刻已经心态爆炸了！！耽美电竞文，改编成电视剧！肯定不存在cp撒糖，顶多也就暧昧友情向！！可以的！！中国大环境如此！！但是，导演，编剧，你们是煞笔嘛？？？你们都不看原著嘛？？？改编的什么鬼？？？游戏背景你们不懂？？？中国古风武林游戏背景，OK？？？你们还是中国人嘛？？不知道什么叫中国古风武林游戏背景？？？智障吗？？好的，投资商的建议，你们必须要听，给钱的是大爷！！！可是！！！人设什么鬼？？？！！！那中二杀马特是什么鬼！！！！川神是什么杀马特少年？？？！！拜托，搞清楚好嘛，原著里没有杀马特中二人设好嘛！！！川神的母亲是商业女强人，父亲是桃李满天下的教授！！这样背景下的川神，跟你们演绎出来的简直南辕北辙！！肖神跟川神是对手！！那也只是比赛场上的对手！他们是惺惺相惜！原著里没有反派，华夏俱乐部的经理跟川神是好聚好散！没有你死我活！原著里的电竞联盟是干净的，大家都在为争夺冠军而努力着，没有黑帮火拼！！原著里龙吟战队不存在被收购！！刘川自己的背景就很强大，不缺钱！！入股的股东明教也是家里开公司很有钱的人！！龙吟不存在面临被收购！！川神的个性和能力，也不会让龙吟面临被收购的局面！！川神家里人虽然不支持，但也是强烈抵制！！大学毕业后的川神做什么，他的家人并没有抵制说不可以！！不论是哪个角度来分析，龙吟都不会存在被收购的局面！！编剧你是智障吧！！这改的面目全非！！还打架，群殴！打手！！！！你以为是黑帮火拼嘛？？？仿佛我看了个假小说！！！蝶妈说就当是看个新剧！！这剧改的亲妈都不认识了！！也是卧槽了！！！微微一笑很倾城被改编，原著党哭死了！那是演员演技不给力，总体还算好的！！看看我们家男神，特么的人设都改了！！！剧情已经是一匹奔腾的野马，拉不回来了！！

下载的版本里附带有一些没有被用上的镜头。
李警官在监视珍妮时，发现她被路边小杂碎骚扰，下车替她赶走坏人，并且送她回家，这一段与之前小庄救珍妮的情节如出一辙，包括在珍妮惶恐不安的时候握住她的手，告诉她坏人都已经走了。如果吴宇森原本的意图是想发展出两人对珍妮的暧昧情感的话，应该也是很有意思的一段，但是放在电影里副线会稍微嫌多了一些。
但是如此相似的两个人，在情感和价值观上的重叠其实是很容易理解的。他们本质上都是完美主义者，都向往绝对的美好、正义和光明，因此他们会惺惺相惜，他们会一起保护一个弱小美丽的女人，他们会无视这个世界的表象规则来势汹汹的向恶势力进行反击。只因为他们都是“念旧”的人，他们对这个世界有自己的原则和底线。
小庄曾经希望他死后能够把自己的眼角膜换给珍妮，但是极具戏剧性的是他的双眼也被打伤了，如同电影最初他伤到珍妮一样。电影将珍妮满脸鲜血痛苦挣扎的镜头与小庄的身影重叠在一起，就好像是一个人。他呼唤珍妮的名字，希望能找到珍妮，只可惜他们的双眼都是看不见的，最终，相互呼唤的两个人尽管近在咫尺，却连手都没有抓住，这也许是电影本身对小庄的惩罚和救赎，他死前的愿望没有被达成，他最想抱在怀里的人不在他身边，但另一方面他死了，他在这个更加残忍冷酷的世界里光鲜的退场了，没有“像狗一样”，他是骄傲的、英雄式的。在他死后，李警官也一定会治好珍妮的眼睛，照顾好珍妮。
在这部男人片里我并不认为小庄与珍妮之间的感情是普通的男女之爱，我觉得那更多的是一个男人对他心目中美好事物的追求和保护，是他心中的一片净土。

颜值不是最重要的，可是这部剧颜值最高的女人是女主的妈，颜值最高的男人是女主的爸，剩下的简直辣眼睛……尤其是女主哥哥，脸还是歪的……剧组到底是多穷？
颜值就算了。万一剧情好呢？结果剧情也脑残，女主简直倒霉，亲爸养父通通癌症，亲妈自杀，养兄居然喜欢自己，而自己抢了妹妹的男朋友还一副不怪我我不是抢你的我没错的姿态，她妹简直倒霉。
然后被亲爸老公骗走3000万。
然后和妹妹男朋友不到半年就结婚了……妹妹都没原谅她
这么鬼扯的电视剧，好想说，编剧你脑子有病吧！！！