这篇剧评可能有剧透 我的墙头又多了王安宇一个，虽然酷爱小甜剧，但蒋正寒这个人设是为数不多现实生活我的理想型！努力善良有责任有担当又有趣，痞帅痞帅的外表更是让人毫无抵抗力！在家里出事了的时候，上高中的他就主动扛起家庭的担子，在自己被陷害到快进入绝境的时候，查清了真相，他仍然愿意...  (展开)

真正的王子不会让公主伤心。如果让她伤心了呢？那他就是王八蛋。
在片中出现了两次的台词。
其实根本就没有王子，也没有公主，只有巫婆。
《公主复仇记》的结尾有点出人意料。裸照居然是阿娇自己上传的。从小父亲跟她说，她是个人渣磁石，每一个男朋友都不是好人。她的确不快乐。看到甩了她的男友和另一个女孩在一起那么快乐，她更加不快乐，就导演了一出好戏。
她告诉那个女孩，男友上传了她的裸照，她名誉受损，工作也丢了，她必须潜入男友家中，删掉电脑中的那些照片，否则，伤害就可能会继续。
那个女孩相信了她，配合她，和一个男人玩起了捉迷藏的游戏。一起经历了那么多，偷钥匙，骑机车去海边，经常一起谈心……最后照片删除了，两个人也成了朋友。
在这部电影里，吴彦祖的角色似乎被刻意模糊，两个女孩的形象被浓墨重彩。她们的眼泪，她们的欢笑，她们的沉默，都非常鲜明而且动人。因为她们成了朋友，她们知道了，这个男人曾经重复着同一句话，跟她们两个——我是一个消防队员，但现在我在这个世界上，只想救一个人，那就是你——这句话让她们爱上了这个男人。
陶红说，因为爱上了同一个男人，我们有了共同的话题。其实我还以为她要说，我们爱上了同一个男人，说明我们有很多共同的地方，就成了朋友。这句话却指明，此时这个男人不过是个话题，明显只是个配角，不如女性情谊来得重要，当她们知道当初吸引自己的那句话，其实这个男人会跟每个女人说，她们就明白了，那个人也不是王子，世界上根本没有王子。就像也没有公主，只有披着公主外衣的巫婆，扮得楚楚可怜，其实可以为了复仇而不择手段。
可是知道了这一切以后，陶虹没有责怪阿娇，她笑了。或许这个复仇的姐妹，带她发现了生命中的一段真相，而这个姐妹也不过是个受害者。她曾经躲在床下，阿娇躲在柜子里，亲历了这个男人和另一个女人在一起。角色在轮换，谁是谁非，非彼非此，下一次又会是哪一个女人呢，跟他、她上演这出好戏？
导演自始至终，没有把阿娇处理成一个坏女人，而是很客观地表现她的痛苦，焦虑。她的作为虽然令人不齿，但她不过是个普通的女孩子，她流着泪说，不明白为什么两个人好的时候，什么都可以做，裸照都可以拍，分手了却要做出伤害对方的事。说到底，她只是要拿回属于自己的东西。
她们两个人还一起探讨过为什么那个男人喜欢拍裸照，原来他以前曾经和现在很红的kelly拍拖，但是因为没有照片，没有证据，kelly什么都不承认。可是有过那样一个女朋友又能怎么样呢？两个人觉得也没什么。
好像一个男人生命里的一段结，影响了他的人生，影响着他的每一段恋情，在两个女人那里，可以这样被话语轻轻消解。世界其实原本简单，女性的直觉直指事物的本质，不过是相逢一笑泯恩仇，何必耿耿于怀呢？
她们看着这个男人，像看着尘世里的一棵树，无限悲悯，看见他的错，原谅他的错，或者本来就没什么原不原谅。
《王子复仇记》里有一句著名的台词，生存还是死亡？现在的人已经没精力去考虑那样的问题。《公主复仇记》里说，没有公主也没有王子，把一切还原到事物本来的样子，别要求太高，保有足够的苍凉与自觉，不自欺也别欺人。
彭浩翔最喜欢的大卫?波德威尔的那句话，尽皆过火，尽是癫狂。娱乐大众，便是要这样握住火候。但《公主复仇记》的确有着公主般的气质，克制而不过火——这火候你满意可否。

这篇影评可能有剧透 非影评 有感而写。(就权当观后感吧) 还记得2017年时微博上曾有人PO出一段《精灵宝可梦：就决定是你了》的美版预告。这段影院偷录的预告成功炸出了一个热点“皮卡丘说话了”期待了一年，终于等到了国内资源。全片97分钟，情怀满满，可以说是“泪中带笑笑中含泪”。如果说之前的...  (展开)

中肯地说，这是一部制作精良的动画片，墓地、花瓣桥、亡灵之地等景色非常美。今年刚去过西班牙的我对影片中出现的“hola”、“gracias”等西语词汇感到亲切。整体虽然套路得毫无惊喜，但作为老少皆宜的商业片也无可厚非。 让我感到不适的是影片中的两条设定： ①必须有人在阳...  (展开)

真的看完就想说两个字“带劲”电影的节奏真的很快八十七分钟的电影没有一个镜头是多余的 全篇一气呵成 虽然文戏的篇幅基本上可以忽略不计但是几位主要演员的角色塑造还是较为丰满的！?
首先是于荣光饰演的“教授”一出场和“朱标”的对手戏就是高潮 教授在电梯中以唱京剧的模式调侃警察 看得出“教授”是一个目中无人 狂妄自大的家伙 （个人感觉是老于主动加上去的 才更加的表现出了这个人物的性格）电影也并没有一直将教授表现的像一个“神鬼战士”电影最后在飞机上 对着一直像橡皮糖一样粘着他的阿标时他说到“我怀疑前世是不是杀了你爸妈”在增加笑点的同时也完善了这个角色的性格！然后是假扮警察的“小鸟”他拦下“朱标”过一会警察的瘾展现出来他为人浮夸 做事情轻浮 本来是干违法的事情 他却表现的云淡风轻 还有心思去开玩笑！?
而正派人物“五小强”做事古板老派爱吹牛的大丹 爱好枪械 为人仗义圆滑的麦兜 外表柔弱实则洒脱潇洒的apple 遵守警局法规一身正派的饭焦 还有办事冲动但是一心破案的阿标 电影的叙事节奏相当快 但是依然将角色的形象性格塑造的十分到位！完美的弥补了文戏的不足（当然了 我感觉导演也从来没有想表达过文戏）电影中也有不少元素调剂紧张的气氛 大战前殴打一番上司 或者 通过打电话来表现一下亲情元素 戏份不多 但却精辟?
1996年但是赶上了香港电影黄金年代的末期也算是最后的顶点时期吧 现在也许在也不会有这样的片子了 尊敬消逝的港片！

写在前面的话 这是一部非满岛光不可，但却不可只看满岛光的电影。 首先有一个基本前提，你知道满岛光是一名专业演员，是那种把自身放在角色之后的演员。所以这里没有小雀，没有蜂矢，没有洋子，只有奄美大岛上那个热情似火的冲绳女子——户枝老师。 其次这是一部剧情片，是一部...  (展开)

《青蛙王国之冰冻大冒险》是继第一部青蛙王国蛇蛙大战之后的又一部精彩战斗的故事，可以说，这部电影将冒险故事和励志传奇凝结在一起，宣扬的是青春正能量。这部动画电影是要走一个冒险系列的风格。主角小雨点是一个崇尚自由的勇敢蛙，不怕挑战，敢于冒险，还有一种爱自嘲的逗比性格。除去动画本身的内容故事而言，这部动画在制作上采用3D效果，突显故事内容丰富，剧情连贯，特效效果高超，画面效果流畅，是一部比较好的国产动画。

一、多个时空


《纯粹理性批判》中的第一经验类比（Analogies of Experience）要求在现象中有一个恒定且唯一之物来表象意识中的时间本身。恒定，或永恒，因为作为总体的时间本身是始终在那的；惟一，因为只有一个时间。这个惟一且永恒的东西，即现象中的实体（Substance）。康德明确把这个实体与洛克的托子（Substratum）区分开来，认为实体是以各种方式显现于人的，而不是像托子那样不可知，也不显现。

我要说，洛克的托子的作用是保证物的个体化与同一性。这个作用在康德那儿，似乎是由物自体和先验范畴共同完成。先验范畴组织现象，在使意识对现象的认识成为可能的同时，也使同一的意识本身成为可能——对先验对象的构成即对自我的构成。而物自体在这个过程中究竟如何起作用，不详。康德的物自体与洛克的托子一样，是个让理论显得尴尬，却又不得不进行的假设。

尽管康德反复说现象中的实体不是洛克的托子，但这个实体究竟是什么，他又语焉不详。出于他对牛顿力学的接受，有人尝试将其理解为牛顿意义上的质量。我论证过，这样的解读将面临一个两难困境：如果实体是个体化了的质量，时间便不是惟一的；如果实体是现象世界中的总质量，基于二律背反的理由——这个总体无法成为经验对象——我们便无法经验到它。（详细论述见篇末附录）

若是跳出康德阐释，取前一个困境：时间不是惟一的，每个作为现象的物都意味着一个独立的时间体系，我们就科幻了：空间中的一个一个的物，奠基着意识中的一个又一个时间系，我们可以生活在不同的时空中，当我们经验不同的物。甚至，对应地说，我们总在成为另一个人，当我们来到不同的时空。

于是，我情愿把亨利的生活看作对康德的一次失败却有趣的解读。与其说他是一位时间旅行者，一位不停地穿越时空的超人或可怜人，不如说，他的意识中并没有一个绝对惟一的时间，他所来到并离开的每一个时空，都是一个独立自在的世界，尽管这些世界看上去很像，但哪个都不依赖于另一个——从理念的意义上说。


二、沉默，或消失


影片的前半部分，亨利的突然消失被解释为一种不治的遗传疾病。没有理由地，他时不时就去了另一个时空，赤身裸体地寻找可以穿上的衣服。仿佛常人来到一个新的环境，总是迫不及待地寻找一个身份，穿到自己身上。
亨利总会在一个无从预料的时刻消失，克莱尔生活在一个不确定的世界中。她的爱情是确定的，但她爱的人不确定地存在着。她的生活中弥漫着不确定性，而这恰好让她格外珍惜亨利在她身边的每一分钟。

克莱尔一次次怀孕又一次次流产，因为胎儿也有穿越症，莫名其妙地，便在某个时刻，出离了子宫。但克莱尔最后一次怀孕时，对亨利说，你每次消失都是因为感觉到了压力。所以，从现在开始，我要保持绝对地平静，这样胎儿就可以顺利出生了。
看到这里，我恍然大悟，原来亨利的穿越症是个隐喻，关于男人的隐喻：面对压力，便会沉默与回避，这不正是男人的本能反应么——而这在女人看来，仿佛爱人去了另一个时空，不知何时才能回来，甚至，会不会回来。

我查了查，电影改编自一位女造型艺术家的首部小说，写于一段失败的恋情之后。原来如此。

很多年前听到过一个说法：爱情，对男人来说，是挂在墙上的一幅画，你并不总是去看它；但对女人来说，则是房间里音乐，你想不听都不行。所以，男人需要时不时地呆在纯然属于自我的世界里，在沉默中成为自己。女人却要认为这是对她的疏远、对亲密的疏离，并因此而坐立不安，想方设法闯进那份铁一般的沉默。结果，要么把自己撞疼，要么把爱情撞碎。
这是对小儿女情态的描述。若成年点，便会更同情于另一个说法：人生在世，无非是男人讨慰藉，女人讨生活。人并不总是需要慰藉，尤其在得意之时。人却总在生活，就算你不想。


三、看着，却无法改变


在一次穿越中，亨利来到母亲身边，在地铁里，母亲在看报，他们作为陌生人简短却亲切的交谈了一会儿。亨利告诉母亲，他要结婚了，这个女孩让他感到安全。
克莱尔问他：你什么不去阻止那场车祸，既然你可以回到车祸发生之前。“我无法阻止。无数次我回到过去，回到母亲还在的时候，但每次我都无法改变发生着的一切。”——这话让人特别难过。我们并不能改变过去，就像不能重新雕刻一座已然完成的塑像。

不是么？很多时候，我们从自己当下的境遇中抽身而出，试图站在一个更开阔的角度，超脱地看现在的纠结、焦虑，或苦闷，并自嘲这些都没什么的。但当你身在当下，你知道未来的自己就坐在对面，笑着，看着自己，慈悲地。但你还是无法因此脱身而出。你仍然只能呆在你当下的处境中，无论是过分的快乐，还是仿佛无法挣脱的哀伤。

每一个时刻都是三维的，它包含着过去、现在，和未来这三个维度。我们在回忆中编辑时间，编辑自己，有意无意地遗忘一些，并把另一些反复摩挲。过往明明灭灭，像晴天里，随风晃动的百叶窗投在墙上的影子。每次回忆之后，我们都成为另一个人。
未来也是。未来无数次作为想象呈现于当下，各式各样地，仿佛清晰的回忆。回忆与憧憬，如同天平的两臂，对称着，平衡着，在现在这个支点上。所以，现在这个时刻，最重。


四、期限


有天聚会时，亨利中枪后痛苦挣扎的裸体突然出现在他们的门厅里。又消失了。克莱尔说，我从没见过四十岁之后的你。我见过的你总是很年轻。从这个时候起，死亡就成了他们中的另一个在场者，尽管它总是沉默着。

亨利穿越到未来，遇见了自己的已经十岁的女儿。女儿告诉他，他死于自己五岁那年。她们一直很想念他。那时他们的女儿还没出生。那时克莱尔还一如既往地希望与亨利白头偕老，就像她还没长大时那样，就像她长大之后第一次遇到亨利时那样，就像亨利死后，她仍然留着亨利所有的衣服，等着亨利回来那样。

于她而言，亨利是不会死的。他无非是走远了一下子回不来，他无非是在时空中迷了路，找不到一件让他温暖的衣服。

女儿五岁那年，亨利和克莱尔都已知道，亨利即将死去，中弹而死。期限降至，可能在任何一天，任何一个时刻。在它到来之前，所有相聚的时光都是铭刻，都是用最日常的方式来进行的一次祭奠，一次追忆。当这个期限还不确定，他们相爱着，仿佛一对最平凡的恋人；当这个期限已然确定，他们相爱着，装作不知道他们即将分离。

一个期限并不见得让期限到来之前的一切都显得美好。但，美好的东西都有一个期限。确定的期限，或不确定的期限。你不能试图挽留，那会犹如握紧手中的细沙，握得越紧，便流失得越快，宛如时间，从指缝间悄然流走。
这个期限是否到来，何时到来，都不是你能选择的。你能做的，仅仅是在它到来之前的每一刻，不让自己在未来后悔——克莱尔明白这些，并且，她做到了。

而，这不正是人生么。


——————
附录：On Understanding Substance as Mass

Introduction

In the First Analogy of Experience, Kant argues that there must be some permanently persistent substance in the appearances which represents the persistence of time. Given Kant’s endorsement of Newtonian physics, commentators such as Eric Watkins suggest that such permanently persistent substance can be understood as Newtonian mass. In this paper, however, I argue that we face a dilemma when we try to cash out the notion of substance in terms of Newtonian mass.
The paper proceeds in three steps. In the first section, I present the reason why there needs to be a permanently persistent substance in the appearances, and discuss why it seems to be compelling to conceive of the permanently persistent substance as Newtonian Mass. Then, in the second section, I argue that there are (only) two ways of conceiving of the permanently persistent substance as Newtonian mass, namely, to conceive of substance as individuated mass and to conceive of substance as the sum total of mass in the world of appearances. I show that there are textual indications as well as philosophical reasons to support each option. In the third section, however, I argue that both ways suffer from inescapable problems. Thus, conceiving of the permanently persistent substance in terms of Newtonian mass is not viable.

    
Section I. The Permanently Persistent Substance

In this section, I shall first present the reason why Kant thinks that there must be a permanently persistent substance in the appearances. I then discuss why it is compelling to conceive of such substance as Newtonian mass.
In the chapter “System of all principles of pure understanding,” Kant discusses what makes possible the applications of the categories, i.e. the pure concepts of understanding, to objects, i.e. appearances that are given to sensible intuitions. That is, he discusses what it is that makes the categories have objective validity. Kant’s claim is that the applications of the categories are only possible under certain conditions, and these conditions are spelled out by the principles. For instance, the applications of the relational categories (substance-accidents, cause and effect, and mutual interactions) are possible if they are applied to objects according to the principles of Analogies of Experience. In addition to the three specific principles that correspond to each of the three relational categories, Kant also provides a general principle overarching all three Analogies. The general principle is stated in the second edition as follows: “Experience is possible only through the representations of a necessary connection of perceptions” (B 218). Watkins provides a helpful interpretation of this general principle:
“The general idea is that each of the three relational categories represents a necessary connection that is required for experience of a single time and of objects existing and being temporally related to each other within a single time to be possible.” (My emphasis)
Since this paper is focused on the notion of substance in the first Analogy, I shall ignore the second and third Analogies. So I now turn to a close examination of the first Analogy.
The first Analogy, i.e. the principle of the persistence of substance, is stated in the second edition as follows: “In all change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature.” (B 224) Watkins summarizes Kant’s argument for the first Analogy as follows (which I take to be a correct interpretation):
Premise 1: Appearances, i.e. objects of experience, are made possible by time’s persistence.
Premise 2: We do not perceive time itself.
Therefore, In order to have experience of appearances, there must be some permanent substance in the appearances which can represent time or time’s persistence.
While the appearances, as the objects given to our intuitions, are changing, the substance in appearances always stays the same and is permanent. So, Kant calls the permanent substance “the substratum of everything real” (B 225). But, some clarifications about Kant’s use of the term “substratum” are needed to prevent potential confusions. Substratum in Kant’s text does not mean what Locke uses this term to mean, namely, the bearer of properties which is unchanging and about which we can have no knowledge. For, according to Locke, we can only know what is given to our senses, but since the underlying substratum cannot be given to our senses, we have no access to it and therefore cannot know it.
Kant, by constrast, does not think that there is any Lockean substratum in the world of appearances. For Kant, the fact that the states of the substance are changing and the substance stays the same does not mean the states are separable from the substance. Rather, the changing states of the substance are simply the ways in which the substance is given to us. Thus, we can know the substance, that is, we know the substance through its states. In order to avoid the Lockean implication of the term “substratum,” I shall only use “substance” to refer to the permanently persistent thing in the appearances despite Kant’s own use of “substratum” to talk about what is permanent in the appearances.
Since I have argued that Kant’s notion of substance is not the Lockean substratum, then what is the Kantian notion of substance? We need a positive account of what the substance is. It is obvious that such a permanently persistent thing cannot be captured by ordinary physical objects, no matter whether they are natural objects (say, rocks) or artifacts (say, ships), for neither artifacts nor natural objects always stay the same such that in principle they can never suffer changes. So, it seems no ordinarily construed physical things can be qualified as substance that is permanently persistent. On the other hand, it is very hard to imagine that anything non-physical could play the role the substance is supposed to play. For it is hard to imagine how a non-physical being could be given to our sensible intuition or could be spatiotemporally organized by our a priori intuitions. So, it is unlikely that Kant means something non-physical by “substance.” Thus, there are two constraints on spelling out what substance is. First, it is something physical. Second, as I have shown, the physical being that can be understood as substance cannot be ordinarily individuated physical things such as planet or rock.
In order to meet the above two conditions, Watkins suggests that, given Kant’s commitment to Newtonian science, it is likely that Kant has Newtonian mass in mind when he talks about the substance, since no matter how a physical object changes, its mass always stays the same. Since Newtonian mass is physical and is not an ordinarily individuated object, it seems quite compelling that the substance, which is permanently persistent, just is Newtonian mass. According to common sense, Newtonian mass is understood to be underlying objects such that we cannot directly perceive mass but can only perceive mass through the way it is given to our intuition, namely, through the perception of the objects that have mass. Thus, mass is neither unknowable nor directly perceivable, which seems to fit the description of the substance perfectly.
Moreover, there are many textual indications that suggest the identification of substance with mass. Let me note two examples. First, recall the general principle overarching the three specific Analogies, namely, “In all change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature.” (B 224) It seems that “quantum” is most naturally to be understood as mass, for mass seems to be the only thing in nature that is neither increased nor diminished on Newtonian physics.
The other indication is Kant’s example to illustrate his claim that “he <a philosopher> thus assumed that as incontrovertible that even in fire the matter (substance) never disappears but rather only suffers an alteration in its form.” (B 288, my emphasis):
“A philosopher was asked: How much does the smoke weigh? He replied: If you take away from the weight of the wood that was burnt the weight of the ashes that are left over, you will have the weight of the smoke.” (B 288)
We can see that here Kant explicitly identifies substance with matter. And it is quite plausible to think that “matter” is just another way of saying “mass”. That is, “mass” seems to be the theoretical analog of the term “matter.” This hypothesis is supported by the example of the weight of smoke. For, in the example, the way to calculate the weight of smoke just is to calculate the mass (multiplies the gravitational constant).
However, despite the compelling reasons for the identification of substance with mass, in the next sections, I shall argue that the substance cannot be understood as Newtonian mass, for when we try to work out the details of understanding the substance as mass, we face an unavoidable dilemma.


Section II. Some Mass or the Sum Total of Mass

In this section, I shall argue that there are two ways of conceiving of substance as Newtonian mass, and then show that both ways have some support from the text and are to some extent philosophically plausible. So, both ways deserve detailed considerations. But, in the next section, I shall argue that both ways face insurmountable problems.
In identifying substance with mass, we need to settle an ambiguity: Is the mass meant to be some mass, say the mass of a rock which is 7 kilograms (a randomly chosen weight), or to be the sum total of mass in the world of appearances which is a very large but nonetheless definite amount? Since both some mass and the sum total of mass are permanently persistent, we cannot tell which way of identifying is more plausible with respect to the permanent persistence of substance. So, we must appeal to some other philosophically and/or textually interesting points to ground a preference in choosing one over the other.
Let us first consider identifying the substance with some or individuated mass. First, the first Analogy is the principle according to which the relational category substance-accident is to be applied. Kant defines accidents to be “the determinations of a substance that are nothing other than particular ways for it to exist.”(B 229) Many commentators interpret the relation to be between object and its properties or states. Thus it makes more sense to think that the mass, which is the underlying bearer of properties, is the individuated mass of some object, instead of the sum total of mass in the world of appearances. For instance, in the example of the weight of smoke, Kant seems to conceive of substance as the matter, i.e. mass, of an individual object. Moreover, if we conceive of substance as the sum total of mass in the world of appearances, it is very hard to imagine how substance can be the bearer of properties or what kind of properties of which substance is the bearer.
One might argue that, on the interpretation according to which substance is the sum total of mass, even though we could imagine no properties of which substance is the bearer, we can still conceive of substance as the bearer of (changing) states, i.e. the successive states of the world of appearances. I reply that Kant cannot accept such an idea because the states of the world are not objects of possible experience, for it is at least empirically true that no one could have the whole world of appearances as his object of experience. I will return to this point later on in the paper and use it to argue that conceiving of substance as the sum total of mass is untenable given Kant’s theoretic commitments.
The above discussion is about reasons to prefer the identification of substance with some mass. I now turn to the reasons to prefer the identifications of substance with the sum total of mass. There are some textual evidences in the first Analogy that suggest this latter identification. For instance, the following passage:
“…here the issue is only appearances in the field of experience, the unity of which would never be possible if we were to allow new things (as far as their substance is concerned) to arise. For then everything would disappear that alone can represent the unity of time, namely the identity of the substratum in which alone all change has its thoroughgoing unity. This persistence is therefore nothing more than the way in which we represent the existence of things (in appearances).” (B 229/A186, my emphasis)
In this passage, Kant seems to identify the permanent persistent substance that represents the persistence of time with the unity of appearances, which seems to be the sum total of mass in the whole world of appearances. Let me argue for my understanding of this passage that it indicates that Kant identifies substance with the sum total of mass. I shall argue by reductio: Suppose Kant identified substance with individuated mass in the above passage. Then, it would make no sense to think that the arising of new substance could make the representation of the unity of time impossible. For the arising of new substance in no sense affects the substance, i.e. the mass, of the original objects. Let me use an example to illustrate. Suppose there is a rock whose mass is 7 kilograms and there arises a new object out of nothing, whose mass is 5 kilograms. Insofar as the rock’s mass remains the same, whether or not there are new masses arising out of nothing does not affect the unity of the rock’s mass, which is 7 kilograms. Therefore, in this passage, Kant conceives of substance as the sum total of mass in the whole world of appearances.
So far I have shown that there are compelling reasons to identify substance with some mass or with the sum total of mass respectively. In the next section, I shall argue that there are also devastating reasons to each identification such that either way we go, we face unsolvable problems.


Section III. One Single Time and the Limit of Possible Experience

I now turn to the problems from which the each identification suffers. In this section, I shall argue that these problems make both identifications untenable. Let us first consider the identification of substance with individuated mass (i.e. some mass). I argue that the reason why individuated mass cannot be identified with substance is that individuated mass cannot represent the oneness of time. Recall Kant’s argument for the principle of the first Analogy: in order to have experiences of objects as temporal, we must identify a permanently persistent substance that can represent time in objects. While the states of the substance change, the substance persists so that the substance can represent time that persists. It is important to notice that time, which is supposed to be represented by substance in appearances, is one single time. But, individuated mass cannot represent one single time. For there are many individuated masses, for instance, the mass of a rock which is 7 kilograms, the mass of a cup which is 0.5 kilogram, and the mass of a table which is 3 kilograms, each of which is permanently persistent and undergoes changes. If one of them can represent time, any other also can. In that case, we do not have one single time. Rather, we have many times or time-series, each of which is persistent.
Let me explain in details why multiply individuated masses cannot represent on single time. If these individuated masses can represent one single time, there must be some one single thing that is shared by these individuated masses that serves to represent the singularity of time. Whatever this shared thing is, it is not any of these individuated masses. Therefore, individuated mass cannot present one single time. However, on the other hand, time has be to singular. Here is a passage in the first Analogy which explains why time has to be one single time rather than a plurality of times:
“Substances (in appearances) are the substrata of all time-determinations. The arising of some of them and the perishing of others would itself remove the sole condition of the empirical unity of time, and the appearances would then be related to two different times, in which existence flowed side by side, which is absurd. For there is only one time, in which all different times must not be placed simultaneously but only one after another.” (B 232/A189)
One might argue that it does not matter how many individuated masses can represent time, it only matters that there is an individuated mass that represents time. Insofar as there is such a substance, which is permanently persistent, it suffices to represent one single time. I reply that, in that case, we still do not know which individuated mass is suppose to be the representer of the one single time in appearances. For there is not reason to think that the mass of one object is more suitable to represent time than the mass of another object is, insofar as both of the individuated masses are permanently persistent. Any choice of one over the other is arbitrary. But the unity or singularity of time is not arbitrary, for there can only be one time-series which persists, and any other time-series or temporal relations are just temporal parts of this unique time-series. Thus, I conclude that individuated mass cannot be the representer of time in appearances.
I now turn to argue that the sum total of mass cannot represent time either. The idea of my argument is to make use of Kant’s solution to the Antinomies to show that the permanently persistent substance that represents time in the appearances cannot be the sum total of mass because the sum total of mass is not an object of possible experience. Let me lay out my argument in detail.
In “The Antinomy of Pure Reason” chapter, Kant presents four pairs of arguments concerning four cosmological ideas about the world-whole, namely, whether there is a beginning of time, whether there is indivisibly simple substance, whether there is a first cause, and whether there is a necessary existent. As Allen W. Wood argues, the four antinomies share a general form, namely, the thesis of each antinomy claims that there must be a first member of the conditioning-conditioned chain, while the antithesis of each antinomy claims that there is no first member of such a chain and that the chain goes back into infinity. Kant argues that there are valid arguments for each of the four theses as well as valid arguments for each of the four antitheses, so we need a solution to such contradictions.
Kant’s solution to the contradictions, as Wood argues, relies on his doctrine of transcendental idealism. As for the first two antinomies, Wood argues
The mathematical antinomies are generated by mathematical principles that apply to things only insofar as they are given in sensible intuition…But these [the first two] series of conditions are never given to intuition as a whole...The theses are false because the principles of possible experience make it impossible for objects corresponding to the cosmological ideas of a first event, a largest extent of the world or a simple substance, ever to be given to intuition.”
Thus, the reason why Kant thinks that the claims made by the theses of the first and second antinomies are false is that neither the beginning of time nor the spatial boundary of the world or an indivisible substance can ever be given to our sensible intuition. If something cannot be given to our sensible intuition, according to Kant, we cannot have experience of it. Let me call this principle the object-of-sensible-intuition principle, namely, if something cannot be given to our sensible intuitions, then it cannot be object of our possible experience. And we can apply this principle to an object to determine whether that object can be object of possible experience. That is, if the object in question can be given to our sensible intuition, then the object can be object of our possible experience, but if the object cannot be given to our sensible intuition, then it cannot be object of our possible experience.
Now, let me apply the object-of-sensible-intuition principle to the idea of the sum total of mass. We can see that the sum total of mass cannot be given to our sensible intuition, so, the sum total of mass cannot be object of our possible experience. For the world of appearances seems to mean the whole universe or cosmos (because everything in the universe stands in causal relations to each other), there is no way for all of the mass in the whole universe to be given to our sensible intuition. Actually, we do not even know whether there are spatial boundaries of the universe, so we do not even know whether the sum total of mass in the all universe is finite. Thus, the sum total of mass cannot be object of possible experience. So, the sum total of mass cannot be that which represents time in appearances. For the reason there must be a permanently persistent substance in appearances which represents time is to make our temporally connected representations of objects possible. But, if the sum total of mass cannot be object of experience, it cannot make our experience of object possible. Thus, the permanently persistent substance in appearances cannot be the sum total of mass.
One might object that in the antinomies, the cosmological ideas at issue are condition-condition series. (B 436/A410) But the sum total of mass is not a series. Rather, it is an aggregate about which the question of conditioning and conditioned does not arise at all. Thus, Kant’s remarks on the antinomies have no bearing on whether the idea of the sum total of mass has any objective validity or significance. Moreover, the first two antinomies concern whether the conditioning-conditioned series go on into infinities. And it seems that it is impossible for us to experience infinity, for no matter what we experience it is finite insofar as we have experienced it. But, the quantum of the sum total of mass seems to be a definite and finite amount. By virtues of what can we claim that the sum total of mass cannot be object of experience? Is this “cannot” an empirical cannot, or an In-Principle cannot? If the answer is the former, the empirical “cannot” does not seem to be strong enough to show that the sum total of mass cannot be experienced, because we cannot know or predict whether in the future empirical sciences and technologies will make the sum total of mass possible object of experience. If the answer is the latter, at least further explanations of why the sum total of mass, which is a finite and definite amount, cannot be object of possible experience in principle are needed.
To the first objection I have two replies. First, in the first antinomy, Kant also discusses whether there is boundary or the largest extent of space. It is not obvious that there is a spatial series in the sense that it is obvious that there is a temporal series in which one moment succeeds its previous moments. However, according to Kant, we can think of the space acquiring its quantum through repeatedly or successively adding spatial units to the previous spatial units. (A 428/B 456) That is, the way of conceiving of space as a spatial series depends on the way of conceiving of time as a temporal series, which is naturally serial. Then, by the same token, we can also think of the sum total of mass acquiring its quantum by successively adding massive units to previous massive units. Thus, if the object-of-sensible-intuition principle applies to the idea of the boundary of space, it should also apply to the idea of the sum total of mass of the whole world of appearances.
Second, the fact that Kant applies the object-of-sensible-intuition-principle to the first two (or three) cosmological ideas to solve the contradictions does not mean that the principle can only be employed to deal with the antinomies. If the principle is applicable to other ideas, we can also use the principle to deal with other ideas. Since the object-of-sensible-intuition principle is derived from transcendental idealism, which is an important element in the whole Critique, there is no reason why the principle cannot be applied to other ideas than cosmological ideas. Thus, it is legitimate to use the object-of-sensible-intuition principle to show that the sum total of mass of whole world of appearances cannot be object of possible experience. So, the sum total of mass cannot be what represents time in appearances.
My reply to the second objection has two steps. First, it needs to be clarified that, although the first two antinomies concern whether the conditioning-conditioned series are infinite, Kant’s solution by the object-of-sensible-intuition principle does not rely on the whether the series are infinite. The principle only concerns whether the things to which the cosmological ideas refer can be given to our sensible intuition. It does not concern whether the things are infinite. It seems true that infinity cannot be object of sensible intuition. But this does not mean that all finite things can be given to our sensible intuition. Actually Kant rejects the claim that all finite things can be given to our sensible intuition. For Kant thinks the thesis of the first antinomy is false, because the beginning of time or the boundary of space cannot be given to our sensible intuition so that it cannot be object of possible experience.
The second step of my reply is to spell out in which sense of “cannot,” the sum total of mass cannot be object of possible experience. It seems to me that the distinction between empirical “cannot” and In-Principle “cannot” is hard to cash out in the context of Critique. For, in the Critique, any legitimate claim to knowledge entails that the object of which the knowledge is can be experienced. Thus, it seems that the empiricality of the “cannot” entails the In-Principality of the “cannot”.
However, concerning the claim that we cannot predict whether in the future empirical sciences and technologies will make the sum total of mass possible object of experience, what would Kant say? Would Kant agree that future sciences and technologies might or could transform a transcendent idea into an idea which refers to object of possible experience? I do not think he would. For Kant thinks his Critique settles metaphysical questions once and for all by theoretical reason, which is static or a-historical. Future discoveries made by sciences and technologies should be able to do no damage to the doctrines in Critique. Moreover, it should be odd to Kant’s ear that progresses made by empirical sciences could have any bearings on the doctrines in the Critique, which he builds up from scratch employing only pure reason, which is absolutely a-historical.
Thus, I conclude that the above arguments show that identifying substance with the sum total of mass in the world of appearance is not tenable. Since I showed earlier in this section that identifying substance with individuated mass is not tenable either, I conclude that the general strategy of identifying substance with mass is untenable.


Section IV. Concluding Remarks

In this paper, I showed that a seemingly very promising way of understanding the permanently persistent substance discussed in the first Analogy, namely, conceiving of substance as Newtonian mass, is untenable. Then, I wonder whether there are other promising ways of providing a positive account of substance or actually it is the case that the notion of substance in the first Analogy is itself untenable. At this stage, maybe I could follow Kant’s stance on the things of themselves, namely, they exist, but we can have no knowledge about the way of their existence. But, at the same time, we need to have this minimal conviction that they exist. Similarly, concerning substance, we can have no knowledge about what the permanently persistent substance is, but we need to have the minimal conviction that it exists in the world of appearances and it serves to represent time.

看到不少人对这部片子的高评价表示不解。谈一谈个人的认识。
梅兰芳先生表演艺术的功底、造诣没有话说，世界一流的。这四个剧目，也都是梅先生久演不衰的拿手戏，而且很有代表性。《断桥》是昆曲。《宇宙锋》和《贵妃醉酒》都是骨子老戏，也都是梅先生推陈出新、不换形而移步的杰作，而前者是大青衣戏，后者偏花旦。《霸王别姬》是梅先生原创的新戏，也突出体现了梅先生革新装扮、发展京剧舞蹈的成绩。
四个人物，各自的身份、气质、性格、情感，梅先生拿捏得十分准确。白娘子的执念、为难，赵艳蓉的坚贞、睿智，虞姬的深情、忧虑，杨玉环的雍容、苦闷，都表现得很到位而自然，绝没有一点矫揉造作。
梅先生曾被誉为“美的化身”。看影片里他的镜头，确实几乎帧帧可入画。
拍摄此片时，梅先生已是年过花甲的老人。尽管面容、身材、嗓音等都还保持得不错，垂暮之态终究难掩。
梅先生在艺术风格上追求中正平和，拍此片时大概格外谨慎，加之拍电影本就缺乏舞台演出的连贯、流畅与现场互动，整体效果略有拘束、平滞之病。像《贵妃醉酒》，梅先生另有一版1956年访日的实况录像传世，相比影片，就要生动得多。
配演、乐队，基本都是梅先生的老搭档、老班底，也是高水平。《霸王别姬》的霸王，是个遗憾。世间已无杨小楼，广陵绝响不复。刘连荣规矩方正，但创造力不足，加上个头偏矮，演霸王确不甚理想。据说有外宾看梅、刘合演《霸王别姬》后的观感是：“虞姬爱霸王，霸王不爱虞姬。”当时曾有提议，由杨小楼传人孙毓堃演霸王。梅先生照顾老搭档的情感，没有答应。若能实现，效果或胜之。
不少观众对《断桥》的许仙也感到难以接受。昆曲《断桥》的许仙，小市民气息还很浓厚。后来田汉本《白蛇传》把这一点大大冲淡，使之更为可爱了。习惯了新本《白蛇传》中许仙设定的观众，返回头去看老本，自然很难适应。另外，俞振飞先生当时也已年过半百，容貌不复青春亮丽，也是难逃的自然规律。
戏曲与电影是两种差异极大的艺术形式。最大限度记录戏曲表演的精华与充分发挥电影艺术的特长之间存在十分尖锐的矛盾。每一部戏曲影片都在二者间做着艰难的调和。这部影片，顾名思义，总体上还是舞台记录的目的更优先一些。
拍这部影片时，我国的彩色片摄制刚起步不久，技术条件还很有限，色彩包括声音都不是那么理想，也在很大程度上影响了观看体验。没有字幕，对于不熟悉这些剧目的观众，也是一大问题。另，通行的版本中，《霸王别姬》舞剑一段有较严重的音画不同步。
总的来说，这部片子的艺术价值还是非常高的，值得为之花费力气，穿越那些种种美中不足造成的欣赏障碍。尤其是作为一个中国人，不能亲自体会到这部片子的美好滋味，是非常可惜的。

(以下内容不是影评，没有剧透）

盼星星盼月亮，终于盼到了这一天。

7月11号，我兜里揣着奥斯卡电影院的两张优惠券，揣了一天都找不到一个合适的人一块去看，姑娘不合适，姑娘她们不懂，至少我身边目前的姑娘不行，她们只会被日韩人造无精液男生感动得鼻涕泡一大把，她们只会对选秀节目上的SB小白脸惊声尖叫然后狂摁手机发送短信，她们怎么会明白我们这帮人打小就郭敬明般45度角仰望天空神游宇宙悲伤逆流成河的博大情怀？

别误会，我不是郭小4的粉丝。我们45度角仰望天空是在憧憬着某一天某个外星人啪的一下撞碎我们家窗户玻璃飞了进来，我们悲伤逆流成河是因为外星人从来都没有撞碎过我们家窗户玻璃。

于是我找老杨，老杨最合适了，老杨跟我是一代人，都是从手柄+黑白电视机-街机游戏厅-录像厅-网吧里混大的一代，可惜丫正在几十里外我们那个大学里面辛勤做园丁呢，暑假也不让过，为了祖国的教育事业老杨就眼睁睁的看着这边汽车人飞来飞去，一个人独自在那边心痛不已，何其惨兮。

然后我又找小乔，本来小乔兴致勃勃，完了最后一听奥斯卡离他们家太远，怕晚上回去晚了老婆开骂，就又退了。

你知道，相对于冰冷的汽车人，现在老婆对他更有吸引力。

于是公映当天我没去成，一直拖、拖、拖，拖到昨天下午，妈的，老子自己去看！

完了昨天下午我跟一帮幼儿园的小朋友一起，在奥斯卡里面的超市买了一堆亲亲虾条啊什么什么薯片啊什么什么锅巴啊，然后又排了半天长队，看了个下午场。

很意外的是，进去之后才发现：汽车人竟然能通吃6岁到60岁之间这么大一个年龄段的所有观众。

满场啊，爆满！

我左边，一对近30岁的夫妇带着一个6岁左右的小男孩；右边，一对60岁左右的老头老太太带着一个跟我年纪差不多的哥们儿，或者是那哥们儿带他们两个老人；我前面，是一群中学生小姑娘，唧唧喳喳，在学校习惯了吧，看电影都坐整齐一排的；我后面，是四个幼儿园小朋友，电影放到中间的时候一个小朋友说叔叔您能坐低点么，您挡着我们了，哎呀一下让我不好意思的啊，听见了么，叔叔！我他妈现在是叔字辈的！

我心里算了一下，嘿，按年龄算我还真是在中间呢。

我亲爱的朋友你们是否知道，从6岁到60岁的观众，同去看一个电影，这是一个多么牛逼闪闪的场面啊！

片子咱就不聊了吧，虽然是国语配音+广电总局剪切，但是在我们小时候老师常给我们讲21世纪高科技尤其是计算机技术会迅猛发展这句话已经成为现实，老师没骗我们，你瞧这美国的派拉蒙+梦工厂两大牛逼电影公司无与伦比的CG水平再加上奥斯卡电影院杜比环绕立体声配置，已经极大满足了儿时我所有的梦想，当电影上汽车人齐聚地球后汇合在小男孩周围“齐齐卡卡酷酷”集体变形的时候，背景音乐响起，突然间我心中生出无限感动，泪水一下就冲了上来，强忍着，差一点哥们儿我就在电影院里哭了起来… =_=凸

说真的，突然间我就明白了今年春节的时候，我给我妈看我从网上下载下来的那部《八九点钟的太阳》时，她眼中闪现出来的晶莹的泪花。

我已经给导演打了100分！去他妈的剧情！去他妈的广告！去他妈的BUG！去他妈的意识形态！全世界适龄儿童大龄儿童超龄儿童联合起来，汽车人万岁！

齐齐卡卡酷酷！
　　
好了，不跟你们聊了，我得回去翻翻箱子找找我那套凤凰座青铜圣衣呢，然后再练练小宇宙，我那套圣衣得拿出来好好洗洗晒晒，再抛抛光、打打蜡，哎哟，好多年我都没穿过了。

联合国军再一次干涉他国内政，殖民地人民奋起反抗帝国主义侵略者，哈哈哈。 目前是2016年最好的战争片，简介有些出入，片中雇佣军属于比利时控制的公司，没有法国什么事。爱尔兰人的战斗只是 雅多维尔事件的一小部分，感觉影片给夸大了，拍的有点像国产的神剧，敌人被扫到一大...  (展开)

“我选爸爸，因为妈妈懂得照顾自己，可是，爸爸需要人照顾。”

“有一天我一定会打败你，我一定会成为冠军”

“我不愿意你为我这么丢人。”

初一或者初二的寒假，一个假期，让我完全迷失在这部TVB剧中。到现在还记得，某个冬日的傍晚，自己一个人在家，无意中在电视上看到这部剧，从此彻底沉浸在张无忌与赵敏的爱恨中不能自拔。彼时我尚未听说过金庸，更不知“倚天屠龙记”为何物。只知，赵敏女装出场的那一瞬间，明艳不可方物；张无忌低低地唤“敏敏”的时候，眼神中承载了那样多不可言说的深情。好吧，那就爱吧。
那个寒假，我不知道自己除了“敏敏”和“无忌哥哥”还认得什么。跟姐姐说起的时候一定是连声音中都写满了爱慕与痴情，以至于她带着微微审视的目光笑着说，哟，你爱上张无忌了。
是啊，那个时候我是爱上吴启华演绎的张无忌了。我天生就对这样眼神深情声音充满磁性的男人没有半点抵抗能力。
唉。那个时候，真真是完全的沉迷啊。日日夜夜，想的就是里面经典的对白。忍俊不禁的，深情的，惹人心酸的。他说，芷若，我不能再瞒你。我对蛛儿，是愧疚；对小昭，是怜惜；对你，是敬重；而对敏敏，才是刻苦铭心的相爱。刻骨铭心的相爱。刻骨铭心。我花了好几年，也没能明白，刻骨铭心的爱，到底有多深，多痛。
那些经典的场景。昏暗的灯光下，她微微侧着头，灯光刚好照出眼中抹不去的痛，她说，你要杀我？！脸上满是难以置信。她说，你杀啊，杀啊……语气不是歇斯底里，而是虚弱的，仿佛，她被伤得如此之重，以至于都没有力气再把话说完。而那个混蛋张无忌（每次看到那里的时候我都格外狠他！！）居然真的忍心对她下手！！混蛋！！
但其实，他的眼中，又何尝不满是伤痛与不忍呢。那个晚上，他在曾经与她共饮的花园中自酌，眼泪流啊流啊流不尽……是不是因为比较亲近，所以反而更容易相信他人的挑拨离间？
接近结局，山洞中，周芷若终于承认恶行，他却没有责怪她，反而轻言软语安慰——一切都被她看在眼里。她发怒，他追出去，她说，张无忌你好偏心你知不知道？当初以为我是凶手就对我要杀要砍的，还捅了我一刀呢！现在看人家楚楚可怜，就安慰还来不及！他说，其实芷若也是有苦衷的，我们不能全怪她——这下可好，醋坛子彻底打翻——她更怒，是啊，人家为了你守身如玉，到现在还是处子之身嘛，你当然——我再也不想见到你了！
哈，发现我不知什么怪癖好，就是喜欢看这种小两口闹矛盾的情节——前提是知道这小打小闹没有导致两人最后悲剧结局……总会有一种酸酸的感觉。生理上的，大约在从心口到胃部的位置，会很酸。仿佛是，上帝从天上浇下一盆醋。
知道我为什么喜欢TVB版的小昭胜过其他版的吗？因为TVB版的小昭曾经对张无忌说，是谁让公子才下眉头，又上心头；曾经对黛绮丝说，没用的，公子心里真正喜欢的人，是赵姑娘。就这两句话，让并不漂亮的她成为我心中永远无法超越的小昭。
那些情节啊。那些场景啊。八成又是永远忘不掉的了。
为什么喜欢赵敏，我曾今告诉我自己，是因为我跟她一样敢爱敢恨。后来我发现，不，是因为我不能像她那样敢爱敢恨。我羡慕她。甚至，我嫉妒她。那样勇敢的一个女子。我，恐怕永远都不能了。

在大中华生活了30年，从点开这部片子之前，一直认为承载着中华包容的涵养。
神影之《超级保镖》
中午看了这部神影，比之手撕鬼子、甩手榴弹炸飞机的神剧更刺激，更过瘾。
主角碗豆脸，奢靡浮肿的眼睛我忍了～匹诺曹的表情，擎天柱的肢体，e神浮夸的演技，我忍了～喉癌晚期的配音，我忍了～东施效颦《中南海保镖》我也忍了，人家定位是部动作片，拳拳到肉，血淋淋的打斗至少也挺有视觉感观。但从点开影片那一刻起，三道黑线刷在脸上，我就是一手贱！
暴风评分8.6 VIP 一般收费的国产电影在暴风能上8.5分是比较不错的，同档李连杰、范冰冰的《封神》惨淡到只有5分，评分是我点开的主要原因。
列序手贱是怎么炼成的：
1.影片的封面就整个《第一滴血》的海报，长发，头扎，赤裸上身，就差把铁链换成M60了，好吧，用兰博做噱头不算你抄袭。
2.影片开头又开启了星爷《少林足球》模式，×！腰马合一，腿翘这么高，不怕扯着蛋吗！就是哪只冰激凌太可怜了。
3.影片中间我居然看到《泰坦尼克》在船头的经典场面，碗豆～咱没小李的帅就别过家家了成吗？
4.碗豆一脸便秘的说他的鞋子50斤……每只。我化学不太好，但我想知道地球上用什么金属做成的鞋底能有50斤！你是把大黄蜂拆了融成的吗？好吧，一双鞋100斤我信了，可穿100斤的鞋居然比100码狂飙的汽车跑的都快，这是在挑战万有引力吗！
5.在主角光环的笼罩下，肯定有属性加成：闭气功！能龟缩在土里几小时不死，中华武术博大精深，对这咱只能膜拜，但挖的那坑足有一米宽，2米长，2米深，而且为了烘托豌豆的悲壮，还下起了大雨，然后把主角埋了，4个平方的湿土，刚度娘～8吨……亲～你没听错！主角轻易的就掀起盖在身上8吨的土，暴怒的钻了出来，比玩植物大战僵尸还刺激！
该上班走了～就看到这，本来是想挑战一下对烂片忍耐力的新高度，对不起～我又失败了～

正如长胜所说，媚娘错在太过聪明，有时死了也不知道是怎么回事或许也是一种幸福，不过殷媚娘却永远做不成这种人，因为她冷静，她太聪明，她洞悉一切，只能先下手为强，但是再聪明，再冷静的人，也会受伤，她说过，爱情，可以是相爱，也可以是伤害。其实殷媚娘这种人比较真实，而桃花那种圣母，感觉有点不太可能存在。最后结局太出人意料，不过很温暖很感人。