(首发于公众号:霧風誌,欢迎关注~)
《柔美的细胞君》根据同名人气漫画改编,《半之半》李尚烨导演,金高银、安普贤、朴珍荣主演。
讲述金柔美的恋爱与成长故事,豆瓣8.5分。目前第一季已经结束,第二季预计明年
(首发于公众号:霧風誌,欢迎关注~)
《柔美的细胞君》根据同名人气漫画改编,《半之半》李尚烨导演,金高银、安普贤、朴珍荣主演。
讲述金柔美的恋爱与成长故事,豆瓣8.5分。目前第一季已经结束,第二季预计明年上半年播出。
《柔美的细胞君》是韩国首部动画与真人结合的电视剧,播出后被大赞特效做得好、细胞形象100%还原漫画,甚至更可爱~
Q:相良最后打火机扔下去的时候说的那句『你们根本不是一个层级的对手』该怎么理解?
我觉得应该这么解读
三桥泼的根本不是汽油
他只是在赌命,赌的就是少东家不敢开枪
警察看的严一点,就不敢闹事的黑社会,怎么可能有两败俱伤的勇气
所以打火机扔下去以后什么都不会发生,而少东家也会明白他是真的输了
连命都不要的高中生
Q:相良最后打火机扔下去的时候说的那句『你们根本不是一个层级的对手』该怎么理解?
我觉得应该这么解读
三桥泼的根本不是汽油
他只是在赌命,赌的就是少东家不敢开枪
警察看的严一点,就不敢闹事的黑社会,怎么可能有两败俱伤的勇气
所以打火机扔下去以后什么都不会发生,而少东家也会明白他是真的输了
连命都不要的高中生 和 只会恃强凌弱的黑社会
-----------------------
2018.12.25
纠结气味的话
我化学知识都还给老师了
不过应该能够模仿出类似气味吧
最后,一张截图奉上
这集忽悠莫娘要回归这么久,没有一点正经的套路说不过去啊。
首先花生在公交车上遇到的那个女人绝对有问题,这点Mary肯定注意到了,孩子哭的时候Mary哄完回来,花生在遮挡了一下亮的屏幕,Mary肯定注意到了。而且莫娘知道花生是Sherlock的弱点,他出轨这件事情肯定不会没有人知道。我猜想Marry和Sherlock此时是知道这一点的。这是莫娘的一个行动。
在这个大背景
这集忽悠莫娘要回归这么久,没有一点正经的套路说不过去啊。
首先花生在公交车上遇到的那个女人绝对有问题,这点Mary肯定注意到了,孩子哭的时候Mary哄完回来,花生在遮挡了一下亮的屏幕,Mary肯定注意到了。而且莫娘知道花生是Sherlock的弱点,他出轨这件事情肯定不会没有人知道。我猜想Marry和Sherlock此时是知道这一点的。这是莫娘的一个行动。
在这个大背景下来是猜想整场是Sherlock最后是故意帮助mary在假死。
首先通知花生和Mary来的时候,短信是不一样的。给Mary的时候,他写,the curtain rises,the last act. Its not over.我猜想这里在暗示着Mary,会有动作。对于花生只是发了一个地点,说明需要花生来就好了,这个戏没有他的表演,只要见证。
其次,Mary在收到短信中没有说是水族馆啊,但是她第一个说水族馆,说明之前通过气了,然后她第一个冲出去又说不能这样走,明显是一个诱使问题,让花生待下来。这样才能把戏演要出来。
看到20集,总体来说还可以,但部分细节不合理和逻辑漏洞明显,故事的完整性和意义也欠缺。下面分析下对主要人物和病例的印象
YT: 承继了第一部的身份继续医改,但是第二部,感觉柔和人性化多了,和Yan也很甜,同时战斗力也差了一些,几次在帮助违反医法局规定的同事问题上不如叶晴果断有手段。感觉在向第一部的院长身份上走。安仔演技一如既
看到20集,总体来说还可以,但部分细节不合理和逻辑漏洞明显,故事的完整性和意义也欠缺。下面分析下对主要人物和病例的印象
YT: 承继了第一部的身份继续医改,但是第二部,感觉柔和人性化多了,和Yan也很甜,同时战斗力也差了一些,几次在帮助违反医法局规定的同事问题上不如叶晴果断有手段。感觉在向第一部的院长身份上走。安仔演技一如既往的好,角色性格上的限制,人设魅力不如第一部好。
叶晴,明显第二部力捧最突出的一个角色,处处塑造出强势,聪明,神秘,女版第一部的YT,几次冲突问题的处理上确实更会玩弄权术,逐渐与YT的团队亦敌亦友,但是医改方案一拿出来大家就笑了,毫无逻辑没有说服力。叶杨之争一开始还君子协定,后来这个人设也崩了。胡定欣演这一类事业型心机女也很多次了,感觉没什么突破
唐明 -没有第一部角色重要和出彩,是来做叶杨之间棋子兼谈三角恋的,但这个角色基本延续了病人第一这个信念,依然很有魅力。马明算交到功课。如果说人设的缺点,似乎好几次手术前都要苏怡来打气,并向她保证我是唐明,一定可以救活这个病人,有点感情用事了。
苏怡 -人设太多无语的地方,是来和自己以及唐明闹别扭的
Yan-看的出这个角色的成长,可以在脑神经外科独当一面了,与YT也很甜很可爱,唯一的问题,女医生每天在医院这样披头散发三寸高跟鞋,真的可以?
李文信-我认为白2最讨喜又出彩的一个角色,同款可以比较下星空下的仁医郑嘉颖,都是幽默搞笑有魅力的人设,大叔的魅力,陈豪很熟练,信手拈来。缺点是角色承接上没有过渡,比如好朋友刚死就玩Band妙语如珠,看不出太多复杂的内心戏, 当然也可能是剪接的问题。
下面是几个病例
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关于病例有一些逻辑漏洞和不完整。看多了港剧式的大团圆,对白2最深印象是好多次都没有按完美的套路走。
1.李文信与父亲,感觉父子戏可以再稍微多点篇幅的,李彪病危抢救,文信不去现场,选择抢救另一个病人,这边父亲心跳停止,那边病人心脏复苏,同时交替的手术镜头,似乎在说明什么,又不太明白,一视同仁?在救人中得到解脱?如果是亲自救回父亲,或者感情的交代上更完整一点,是否更好?感觉意尤未尽。
2.肺衰竭女孩,这个病例莫名其妙,大哥不肯捐肺救妹妹,就得被安排去死? 之前不肯也是说家里负担很重,结果死就死了,也没有交代孤儿寡母多凄惨,同意捐献那里还有后来嫂子探病那里可以再多一点交代。铺垫了女孩那么渴望活着,唐明苏怡和全科的同事那么努力,两位院长那么忙活,居然换了肺都死了,主题想表达什么呢?同药改有关系?感觉看的有点压抑,似乎手术案例只是为了给主角们创造戏剧性冲突解决问题加戏用的,而不管病例本身是否合理有意义。女孩死了,没有任何后续解释为何会发生败血症,大哥的肺排斥?所以不能强求的意思吗?
3.脑中枪战地医生, 这个也很迷,又一个与主题无关给主角纯加戏的案例,Ryan为什么不肯做手术?没有解释。他来过又无声无息地走了,一个默默奉献的战地医生,还是为了顶替李文信,这么多年李竟然没有找过他?他已经有签署过拒绝抢救的保证书,等于有自杀倾向,不问清原因,突然同意做手术也没有怀疑,重症病房没有巡夜的护士?病人可以自己拔掉心脏监视仪一夜不被发现,第二天一早大家先发现。。。医院和李文信这里也太不小心了吧。最终Rayn一个人孤零零毫无解释的死去,好人没好报? 再次被剧集想表达的主题迷惑了。
4.半夜的急诊室,主任和副主任可以一起去找一个锁在车里的小女孩,另一个副主任李文信不值班在陪朋友然后回家睡觉,有急诊病人送来怎么办?
........................
前面几个案例就还好,和特殊病症以及药改有关,后面的病例感觉有点放飞了,还是编剧编不出来了?
总的感觉,权斗多过医疗,一些剧情的发展同病例不知想表达什么且与主题关系不大,失败的手术太多,为了不完美而不完美,看的一头雾水。
演员表演都是没的说的,感觉还是剧本的问题。
看完再来更新。
作者 | 奚佑
一直以来都存在着某种误解:我们的职业剧拍得难看,病根在于“悬浮”。
其实不是。
前段时间,有部律政题材电视剧《女士的法则》播出,江疏影、刘敏涛担
作者 | 奚佑
一直以来都存在着某种误解:我们的职业剧拍得难看,病根在于“悬浮”。
其实不是。
前段时间,有部律政题材电视剧《女士的法则》播出,江疏影、刘敏涛担纲主演。江刘二人在观众心里都算得上实力派演员,这部剧讲述了两位女律师齐心协力查明真相的故事,声称要彰显女性力量。
才能あってもなくても輝いていた、踠き倒した十年間。不管有才能还是没有,都闪耀过;踯躅前行最终放手的十年。
才能あってもなくても輝いていた、踠き倒した十年間。不管有才能还是没有,都闪耀过;踯躅前行最终放手的十年。
英国王室的八卦一直是腐国人民生活的调味品,也一直出现在各类影视剧中,银行大劫案恰是由上世纪70年代最令人震惊的“王室艳照”事件改编而来。事件发生的地点也恰在贝克街,看的时候恍惚间以为夏洛克会跳出来。
发生丑闻,王室的第一个动作当然是要处理干净,不留下痕迹以免坏了王室形象。几个贼误打误撞拿到照片,拿到照片之后才发现卷入了一场漩涡,这比抢劫本身所带来的的恶果更加难
英国王室的八卦一直是腐国人民生活的调味品,也一直出现在各类影视剧中,银行大劫案恰是由上世纪70年代最令人震惊的“王室艳照”事件改编而来。事件发生的地点也恰在贝克街,看的时候恍惚间以为夏洛克会跳出来。
发生丑闻,王室的第一个动作当然是要处理干净,不留下痕迹以免坏了王室形象。几个贼误打误撞拿到照片,拿到照片之后才发现卷入了一场漩涡,这比抢劫本身所带来的的恶果更加难以想象。影片进行到一半,劫匪顺利洗劫完银行。看的时候总觉得进度条不会这么快,真正的好戏还在后头。劫匪拿到照片逃之夭夭之后,各方的表现颇为有看点。有军情六处的人继续跟踪,被发现秘密的国会议员到处斡旋试图减小事情对自己的影响,地头蛇出动攻击夺回账本,迈克X发现间谍恼羞成怒狗急跳墙。当然最后,各方达成和解,尘归尘,土归土。劫匪归还照片,拿到新身份重新生活,卷入其中的议会高层、地头蛇、迈克X交给法律惩罚。
影片根据真实事件改编,事实往往更加黑色幽默,100位银行存款用户并未认领丢失的财物,也导致银行无法赔偿。到2054年这一批照片才能最终解密,国会实行的D-A notice 也在此次事件中第一次发挥效力。
天下乌鸦一般黑,无论哪国的警察,特务机构都只是巨大的国家机器,一部分的职能是用来掩盖高层的秘密,以确保不明真相的群众见到的是“无暇”的领导者,自古以来莫不如是,也因此“谣言”约等于“遥遥领先的预言”。翻看40年前的英伦,亦或是如今的小道消息,历史总是在重演。历史是真实的也更加黑色幽默。
以下是我以拉拉简视角写的一小段随感
“你为什么写下这些信,并且装上信封写好地址?是否因为你内心的某个部分也渴望将信发出去,而不仅仅是止于幻想?”
(Can you admit that some part of you doesn’t want everything in your l
以下是我以拉拉简视角写的一小段随感
“你为什么写下这些信,并且装上信封写好地址?是否因为你内心的某个部分也渴望将信发出去,而不仅仅是止于幻想?”
(Can you admit that some part of you doesn’t want everything in your life to be a fantasy?“)
有时候你需要将你的感受讲出来”。
(You’ve gotta tell people how you feel when you feel it.)
生活大爆炸无处不在,在每个人的身上都重复发生着大大小小的惊喜,Oh,不,这或许是惊吓。
好吧,事实证明,的确如此。
躺在绿色装饰盒里五封情书不知道何时变成了你写给我的的纸条。
机缘巧合中寄出的信将我和Petter重新拉回到了一条线上。
要知道,每一个男孩拿着信找到我,我的头脑都会发生大爆炸并做出一些超乎理智的事情。
比如说,我看到Josh拿着情书来找我,我便马上扑倒Petter并以一个kiss掩饰尴尬。
O!M!G!这真的是太疯狂了!
鬼知道故事的下一秒会发生什么!!!
我们成了契约情侣,我透明的生活似乎陆陆续续地被刷上了油彩。
好吧!我承认,滑雪party是一个戏剧般的存在。
于Petter ,于Gen,于拉拉简。
或许你也明白,我知道你跨越半个城市去买韩国酸奶并不只是因为你是酸奶的狂热爱好者。或许这只是一个假设。(我想你应该知道)
Yeah!我必须感谢那些寄出去的信,不然我也不可能遇到我的Petter。那渴望也只能是存在于我小小房间里的幻想。
Oh,right!“我们可以互相吐真言真的是太酷了!”(It's so cool how we can talk to each other about real stuff.")
你写的纸条上总是带着不经意爱心,我之前也总是不经意地将其遗忘,或是不曾留意。
好在,有一天, 我突然发现了。
我从没想过会在长曲棍球场上发生的爱情会和运动场上的一样值得让人羡慕。
大家喜爱这部片子,大概就是情怀+武打+温情
里面和尚们虽然“互坑”,但真到了对方伤心的时候,其他人都会不惜一切代价对方高兴
师叔对小红的爱,不惜去做替身演员,也让我很感动。
怀念一下这些剧照
大家喜爱这部片子,大概就是情怀+武打+温情
里面和尚们虽然“互坑”,但真到了对方伤心的时候,其他人都会不惜一切代价对方高兴
师叔对小红的爱,不惜去做替身演员,也让我很感动。
怀念一下这些剧照
“狼羊和平都能实现,还有什么不可以呢”,这是这部动漫一直以来想告诉我们的。喜羊羊与灰太狼绝对在我记忆中是不可或缺的一部分,不会唱喜灰主题曲的人真的存在吗?我也很高兴在我的成长过程中看到这群小羊的成长,毕竟懒羊羊都喊出了“让我们不再懒惰”,哈哈,所以到底是谁陪伴谁,也已经不重要了。
这就是子供向吗?让我在火车上一路燃爆!无论是
“狼羊和平都能实现,还有什么不可以呢”,这是这部动漫一直以来想告诉我们的。喜羊羊与灰太狼绝对在我记忆中是不可或缺的一部分,不会唱喜灰主题曲的人真的存在吗?我也很高兴在我的成长过程中看到这群小羊的成长,毕竟懒羊羊都喊出了“让我们不再懒惰”,哈哈,所以到底是谁陪伴谁,也已经不重要了。
这就是子供向吗?让我在火车上一路燃爆!无论是正反派的性格塑造(其实也都已经明白这部动漫自始至终没有正反派之分)、每个人行为背后的过往支撑、还是从个人成长走向团队精神的塑造,这部动漫不可谓不成熟,有孩子成长必须抓住的所有品质的诠释。但是也无法称之为完美,因为合理之处总还有一丝不合理,奇迹也发生太过频繁,不过我们看得很开心就是。画风总体还是过去的味道,但是该热血也能一秒燃起来,催泪时刻也丝毫不缺,同时不显做作,这就是创作团队的成长啊。不要忘了那群小羊背后,是那些大叔阿姨在为我们创作着梦想!
还有喜灰两人的关系,我愿称之为纯白少年与黑衣大叔的绝美爱情(bushi)!“功夫会吗”“你没看过守护者3吗”,同系列的联动哈哈。这一拨人真的无所不能啊啊。寒来暑往,沧海桑田,那群小羊和那只狼始终在那。最后,一半是热血,一半是怀旧。
碟中谍系列转眼已经来到第二十二个年头,带来六部让影迷们津津乐道的作品。电影的情节恐怕很多人和我一样走出电影院就已经忘得差不多了,但是系列的每一部都能留下让人印象深刻,难以忘怀的爆点,这很难得。今天辣椒就顺着记忆来盘点一下六部碟中谍的精彩瞬间。
碟中谍系列转眼已经来到第二十二个年头,带来六部让影迷们津津乐道的作品。电影的情节恐怕很多人和我一样走出电影院就已经忘得差不多了,但是系列的每一部都能留下让人印象深刻,难以忘怀的爆点,这很难得。今天辣椒就顺着记忆来盘点一下六部碟中谍的精彩瞬间。
《覆面系NOISE》改编自福山辽子创作的同名漫画。动画由Brain's Base制作(简称脑基社,曾制作:《无头骑士异闻》,《萤火之森》,《夏目友人帐》,《永生之酒》,《春物》),于2017年4月11日在TOKYO MX首播。全12话
《覆面系NOISE》讲述了,喜爱唱歌的少女仁乃,与青梅竹马及初恋对象桃,以及擅长
《覆面系NOISE》改编自福山辽子创作的同名漫画。动画由Brain's Base制作(简称脑基社,曾制作:《无头骑士异闻》,《萤火之森》,《夏目友人帐》,《永生之酒》,《春物》),于2017年4月11日在TOKYO MX首播。全12话
《覆面系NOISE》讲述了,喜爱唱歌的少女仁乃,与青梅竹马及初恋对象桃,以及擅长作曲的少年柚子,分别在幼年时就经历了离别,并且立下约定“总有一天,会以歌声为记号找到仁乃……”,坚信这一点,自闭女孩仁乃持续着歌唱。而在高中入学那一天,以声音为媒介,他们终于相遇了,并且开始了三角虐恋以及一言不合就唱歌的高中生活?
啊,音乐系+三角恋+天降和竹马的对决,典型的女性向番剧,但是却犯了女性向番剧的大忌:人物不讨喜。女主仁乃是一个集矫情,中二,疯癫和偏执于一身的行走大炸弹,情绪不定期暴走,外加脑回路槽点满满……
你以为这就完了,不!动漫里这样的人设多了去了,最后只要本性善良有颜无黑料,一般也不会不讨喜到哪里去,女主不讨喜的真正原因,是她近乎没有自我的沉浸在对桃的感情里,每次看到她为了桃不顾一切的伤害其他人,就???刚开始看还挺可爱的,后期颇有种离开爱情不能活的自私自闭少女的感觉,看得人着急。(虽然但是,偶尔也会被仁乃帅到!每次一开口沙织姐姐的嘶吼都能让人一哆嗦)。
还有因为“我陷入麻烦不能连累你,我配不上你,只能装作不爱你“的桃……这两人凑一起让整个故事的爱情线变的很日式青春——指日漫中常见的细腻复杂狗血又牵扯众多的青春爱情走向(你也是白学家?),这么看来这两人也算是绝配了,就是可怜了夹在中间的柚子。
时刻警惕多角恋。
除此之外,画风很复古(眼睛大,人物纤细),配音也算是豪华,说是音乐番但是音乐风格还是比较挑受众,脑基社制作画面还算精美,推荐喜欢白学的朋友去看看,普通朋友还是退了吧。
“幻想作品的基础价值不在于堆砌新奇设定,而在于用基本的、通俗的事例最大限度地提供关于人和世界各种可能性的思考。从这一点上来看,《灵笼》做到了。”
作者 “幻想作品的基础价值不在于堆砌新奇设定,而在于用基本的、通俗的事例最大限度地提供关于人和世界各种可能性的思考。从这一点上来看,《灵笼》做到了。” 作者 王不画,漫画行业资深逃兵 山峰就在那里,每个冒险家都有不同的攀登方式。 《灵笼》,2019年播出的原创网络幻想动画,作为这两年内讨论度最高的国漫之一,截至下半季完结,在B站收获了2.4亿播放量,追番人数590万,弹幕404万条,评论超过50000条。 当年 我问她: “巴别塔”导演 既然是想送给世人这样一个美丽的礼物,那为何要用如此隐晦的方式?完全可以简单一点 这样接受的人会多一点。哪怕因此牺牲自己水准。可这样是否也有另类的伟大。 她手搭在我肩上,“慈祥”地说:“你觉得这部电影很难懂吗?......其实你可以再多看看一些别的电影.....”原话记不得了 大概内容就是如此。 那年,大概08或09,甚或07 当年 我问她: “巴别塔”导演 既然是想送给世人这样一个美丽的礼物,那为何要用如此隐晦的方式?完全可以简单一点 这样接受的人会多一点。哪怕因此牺牲自己水准。可这样是否也有另类的伟大。 她手搭在我肩上,“慈祥”地说:“你觉得这部电影很难懂吗?......其实你可以再多看看一些别的电影.....”原话记不得了 大概内容就是如此。 那年,大概08或09,甚或07。北大,满眼春光或是玉兰花。从人满为患的教室出来,刚接受完戴爷两小时每句话都高浓度极其抽象让你直接颅内高潮的电影课程。 她讲课从来不看稿 善用极其复杂而精致的长句,且内容包罗万象每句都是制高点且充满了哲学意味,360全方位拂动你的人生观世界观价值观知识量,让它们轻舞飞扬。她的话,是真正的出口成章。可以直接拿去印书打印,你还得熬夜看很久才能看懂的那种...... 从此之后 我开始看“蓝白红”三部曲 “霸王别姬”,仅豆瓣mark过的电影快一千部。 也懂得了曾经的问题虽然出发点是好的,可实际上一切好的作品到了某个境界就该独立存在,仅仅作为一个美好的事物而存在。为能看懂的人准备。为能欣赏的人而准备。而不该是“教化”,或者刻意去具备这样的功能。万万不能。实际上也没必要。 当然 也不排除她当时实际上也一时间无法回答我这个傻妞的问题哈哈哈哈。因为我现在才发现当年其实我想问的并非是一个电影学术问题,而是一个哲学问题....But那时真的很困扰。困扰到些许生气。 Anyway,想说,戴锦华 中国最优秀的学者和教授。 这是另一个我真正多年念念不忘的人。 伟大的人。 伟大的女性。 “奇葩的人”。 又是真正“正常的人”。 生而为人 太宰治说:“我很抱歉”。 生而为人 有人满眼是大海 满脑是天才。满嘴是珠玉。满身是星光。 戴爷 我爱你!???? 为了你这样的人 我怎么都能舍弃的了北京? 大师没有远去 她就是今日大师。
《纯粹理性批判》中的第一经验类比(Analogies of Experience)要求在现象中有一个恒定且唯一之物来表象意识中的时间本身。恒定,或永恒,因为作为总体的时间本身是始终在那的;惟一,因为只有一个时间。这个惟一且永恒的东西,即现象中的实体(Substance)。康德明确把这个实体与洛克的托子(Substratum)区分开来,认为实体是以各种方式显现于人
《纯粹理性批判》中的第一经验类比(Analogies of Experience)要求在现象中有一个恒定且唯一之物来表象意识中的时间本身。恒定,或永恒,因为作为总体的时间本身是始终在那的;惟一,因为只有一个时间。这个惟一且永恒的东西,即现象中的实体(Substance)。康德明确把这个实体与洛克的托子(Substratum)区分开来,认为实体是以各种方式显现于人的,而不是像托子那样不可知,也不显现。
我要说,洛克的托子的作用是保证物的个体化与同一性。这个作用在康德那儿,似乎是由物自体和先验范畴共同完成。先验范畴组织现象,在使意识对现象的认识成为可能的同时,也使同一的意识本身成为可能——对先验对象的构成即对自我的构成。而物自体在这个过程中究竟如何起作用,不详。康德的物自体与洛克的托子一样,是个让理论显得尴尬,却又不得不进行的假设。
尽管康德反复说现象中的实体不是洛克的托子,但这个实体究竟是什么,他又语焉不详。出于他对牛顿力学的接受,有人尝试将其理解为牛顿意义上的质量。我论证过,这样的解读将面临一个两难困境:如果实体是个体化了的质量,时间便不是惟一的;如果实体是现象世界中的总质量,基于二律背反的理由——这个总体无法成为经验对象——我们便无法经验到它。(详细论述见篇末附录)
若是跳出康德阐释,取前一个困境:时间不是惟一的,每个作为现象的物都意味着一个独立的时间体系,我们就科幻了:空间中的一个一个的物,奠基着意识中的一个又一个时间系,我们可以生活在不同的时空中,当我们经验不同的物。甚至,对应地说,我们总在成为另一个人,当我们来到不同的时空。
于是,我情愿把亨利的生活看作对康德的一次失败却有趣的解读。与其说他是一位时间旅行者,一位不停地穿越时空的超人或可怜人,不如说,他的意识中并没有一个绝对惟一的时间,他所来到并离开的每一个时空,都是一个独立自在的世界,尽管这些世界看上去很像,但哪个都不依赖于另一个——从理念的意义上说。
二、沉默,或消失
影片的前半部分,亨利的突然消失被解释为一种不治的遗传疾病。没有理由地,他时不时就去了另一个时空,赤身裸体地寻找可以穿上的衣服。仿佛常人来到一个新的环境,总是迫不及待地寻找一个身份,穿到自己身上。
亨利总会在一个无从预料的时刻消失,克莱尔生活在一个不确定的世界中。她的爱情是确定的,但她爱的人不确定地存在着。她的生活中弥漫着不确定性,而这恰好让她格外珍惜亨利在她身边的每一分钟。
克莱尔一次次怀孕又一次次流产,因为胎儿也有穿越症,莫名其妙地,便在某个时刻,出离了子宫。但克莱尔最后一次怀孕时,对亨利说,你每次消失都是因为感觉到了压力。所以,从现在开始,我要保持绝对地平静,这样胎儿就可以顺利出生了。
看到这里,我恍然大悟,原来亨利的穿越症是个隐喻,关于男人的隐喻:面对压力,便会沉默与回避,这不正是男人的本能反应么——而这在女人看来,仿佛爱人去了另一个时空,不知何时才能回来,甚至,会不会回来。
我查了查,电影改编自一位女造型艺术家的首部小说,写于一段失败的恋情之后。原来如此。
很多年前听到过一个说法:爱情,对男人来说,是挂在墙上的一幅画,你并不总是去看它;但对女人来说,则是房间里音乐,你想不听都不行。所以,男人需要时不时地呆在纯然属于自我的世界里,在沉默中成为自己。女人却要认为这是对她的疏远、对亲密的疏离,并因此而坐立不安,想方设法闯进那份铁一般的沉默。结果,要么把自己撞疼,要么把爱情撞碎。
这是对小儿女情态的描述。若成年点,便会更同情于另一个说法:人生在世,无非是男人讨慰藉,女人讨生活。人并不总是需要慰藉,尤其在得意之时。人却总在生活,就算你不想。
三、看着,却无法改变
在一次穿越中,亨利来到母亲身边,在地铁里,母亲在看报,他们作为陌生人简短却亲切的交谈了一会儿。亨利告诉母亲,他要结婚了,这个女孩让他感到安全。
克莱尔问他:你什么不去阻止那场车祸,既然你可以回到车祸发生之前。“我无法阻止。无数次我回到过去,回到母亲还在的时候,但每次我都无法改变发生着的一切。”——这话让人特别难过。我们并不能改变过去,就像不能重新雕刻一座已然完成的塑像。
不是么?很多时候,我们从自己当下的境遇中抽身而出,试图站在一个更开阔的角度,超脱地看现在的纠结、焦虑,或苦闷,并自嘲这些都没什么的。但当你身在当下,你知道未来的自己就坐在对面,笑着,看着自己,慈悲地。但你还是无法因此脱身而出。你仍然只能呆在你当下的处境中,无论是过分的快乐,还是仿佛无法挣脱的哀伤。
每一个时刻都是三维的,它包含着过去、现在,和未来这三个维度。我们在回忆中编辑时间,编辑自己,有意无意地遗忘一些,并把另一些反复摩挲。过往明明灭灭,像晴天里,随风晃动的百叶窗投在墙上的影子。每次回忆之后,我们都成为另一个人。
未来也是。未来无数次作为想象呈现于当下,各式各样地,仿佛清晰的回忆。回忆与憧憬,如同天平的两臂,对称着,平衡着,在现在这个支点上。所以,现在这个时刻,最重。
四、期限
有天聚会时,亨利中枪后痛苦挣扎的裸体突然出现在他们的门厅里。又消失了。克莱尔说,我从没见过四十岁之后的你。我见过的你总是很年轻。从这个时候起,死亡就成了他们中的另一个在场者,尽管它总是沉默着。
亨利穿越到未来,遇见了自己的已经十岁的女儿。女儿告诉他,他死于自己五岁那年。她们一直很想念他。那时他们的女儿还没出生。那时克莱尔还一如既往地希望与亨利白头偕老,就像她还没长大时那样,就像她长大之后第一次遇到亨利时那样,就像亨利死后,她仍然留着亨利所有的衣服,等着亨利回来那样。
于她而言,亨利是不会死的。他无非是走远了一下子回不来,他无非是在时空中迷了路,找不到一件让他温暖的衣服。
女儿五岁那年,亨利和克莱尔都已知道,亨利即将死去,中弹而死。期限降至,可能在任何一天,任何一个时刻。在它到来之前,所有相聚的时光都是铭刻,都是用最日常的方式来进行的一次祭奠,一次追忆。当这个期限还不确定,他们相爱着,仿佛一对最平凡的恋人;当这个期限已然确定,他们相爱着,装作不知道他们即将分离。
一个期限并不见得让期限到来之前的一切都显得美好。但,美好的东西都有一个期限。确定的期限,或不确定的期限。你不能试图挽留,那会犹如握紧手中的细沙,握得越紧,便流失得越快,宛如时间,从指缝间悄然流走。
这个期限是否到来,何时到来,都不是你能选择的。你能做的,仅仅是在它到来之前的每一刻,不让自己在未来后悔——克莱尔明白这些,并且,她做到了。
而,这不正是人生么。
——————
附录:On Understanding Substance as Mass
Introduction
In the First Analogy of Experience, Kant argues that there must be some permanently persistent substance in the appearances which represents the persistence of time. Given Kant’s endorsement of Newtonian physics, commentators such as Eric Watkins suggest that such permanently persistent substance can be understood as Newtonian mass. In this paper, however, I argue that we face a dilemma when we try to cash out the notion of substance in terms of Newtonian mass.
The paper proceeds in three steps. In the first section, I present the reason why there needs to be a permanently persistent substance in the appearances, and discuss why it seems to be compelling to conceive of the permanently persistent substance as Newtonian Mass. Then, in the second section, I argue that there are (only) two ways of conceiving of the permanently persistent substance as Newtonian mass, namely, to conceive of substance as individuated mass and to conceive of substance as the sum total of mass in the world of appearances. I show that there are textual indications as well as philosophical reasons to support each option. In the third section, however, I argue that both ways suffer from inescapable problems. Thus, conceiving of the permanently persistent substance in terms of Newtonian mass is not viable.
Section I. The Permanently Persistent Substance
In this section, I shall first present the reason why Kant thinks that there must be a permanently persistent substance in the appearances. I then discuss why it is compelling to conceive of such substance as Newtonian mass.
In the chapter “System of all principles of pure understanding,” Kant discusses what makes possible the applications of the categories, i.e. the pure concepts of understanding, to objects, i.e. appearances that are given to sensible intuitions. That is, he discusses what it is that makes the categories have objective validity. Kant’s claim is that the applications of the categories are only possible under certain conditions, and these conditions are spelled out by the principles. For instance, the applications of the relational categories (substance-accidents, cause and effect, and mutual interactions) are possible if they are applied to objects according to the principles of Analogies of Experience. In addition to the three specific principles that correspond to each of the three relational categories, Kant also provides a general principle overarching all three Analogies. The general principle is stated in the second edition as follows: “Experience is possible only through the representations of a necessary connection of perceptions” (B 218). Watkins provides a helpful interpretation of this general principle:
“The general idea is that each of the three relational categories represents a necessary connection that is required for experience of a single time and of objects existing and being temporally related to each other within a single time to be possible.” (My emphasis)
Since this paper is focused on the notion of substance in the first Analogy, I shall ignore the second and third Analogies. So I now turn to a close examination of the first Analogy.
The first Analogy, i.e. the principle of the persistence of substance, is stated in the second edition as follows: “In all change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature.” (B 224) Watkins summarizes Kant’s argument for the first Analogy as follows (which I take to be a correct interpretation):
Premise 1: Appearances, i.e. objects of experience, are made possible by time’s persistence.
Premise 2: We do not perceive time itself.
Therefore, In order to have experience of appearances, there must be some permanent substance in the appearances which can represent time or time’s persistence.
While the appearances, as the objects given to our intuitions, are changing, the substance in appearances always stays the same and is permanent. So, Kant calls the permanent substance “the substratum of everything real” (B 225). But, some clarifications about Kant’s use of the term “substratum” are needed to prevent potential confusions. Substratum in Kant’s text does not mean what Locke uses this term to mean, namely, the bearer of properties which is unchanging and about which we can have no knowledge. For, according to Locke, we can only know what is given to our senses, but since the underlying substratum cannot be given to our senses, we have no access to it and therefore cannot know it.
Kant, by constrast, does not think that there is any Lockean substratum in the world of appearances. For Kant, the fact that the states of the substance are changing and the substance stays the same does not mean the states are separable from the substance. Rather, the changing states of the substance are simply the ways in which the substance is given to us. Thus, we can know the substance, that is, we know the substance through its states. In order to avoid the Lockean implication of the term “substratum,” I shall only use “substance” to refer to the permanently persistent thing in the appearances despite Kant’s own use of “substratum” to talk about what is permanent in the appearances.
Since I have argued that Kant’s notion of substance is not the Lockean substratum, then what is the Kantian notion of substance? We need a positive account of what the substance is. It is obvious that such a permanently persistent thing cannot be captured by ordinary physical objects, no matter whether they are natural objects (say, rocks) or artifacts (say, ships), for neither artifacts nor natural objects always stay the same such that in principle they can never suffer changes. So, it seems no ordinarily construed physical things can be qualified as substance that is permanently persistent. On the other hand, it is very hard to imagine that anything non-physical could play the role the substance is supposed to play. For it is hard to imagine how a non-physical being could be given to our sensible intuition or could be spatiotemporally organized by our a priori intuitions. So, it is unlikely that Kant means something non-physical by “substance.” Thus, there are two constraints on spelling out what substance is. First, it is something physical. Second, as I have shown, the physical being that can be understood as substance cannot be ordinarily individuated physical things such as planet or rock.
In order to meet the above two conditions, Watkins suggests that, given Kant’s commitment to Newtonian science, it is likely that Kant has Newtonian mass in mind when he talks about the substance, since no matter how a physical object changes, its mass always stays the same. Since Newtonian mass is physical and is not an ordinarily individuated object, it seems quite compelling that the substance, which is permanently persistent, just is Newtonian mass. According to common sense, Newtonian mass is understood to be underlying objects such that we cannot directly perceive mass but can only perceive mass through the way it is given to our intuition, namely, through the perception of the objects that have mass. Thus, mass is neither unknowable nor directly perceivable, which seems to fit the description of the substance perfectly.
Moreover, there are many textual indications that suggest the identification of substance with mass. Let me note two examples. First, recall the general principle overarching the three specific Analogies, namely, “In all change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature.” (B 224) It seems that “quantum” is most naturally to be understood as mass, for mass seems to be the only thing in nature that is neither increased nor diminished on Newtonian physics.
The other indication is Kant’s example to illustrate his claim that “he <a philosopher> thus assumed that as incontrovertible that even in fire the matter (substance) never disappears but rather only suffers an alteration in its form.” (B 288, my emphasis):
“A philosopher was asked: How much does the smoke weigh? He replied: If you take away from the weight of the wood that was burnt the weight of the ashes that are left over, you will have the weight of the smoke.” (B 288)
We can see that here Kant explicitly identifies substance with matter. And it is quite plausible to think that “matter” is just another way of saying “mass”. That is, “mass” seems to be the theoretical analog of the term “matter.” This hypothesis is supported by the example of the weight of smoke. For, in the example, the way to calculate the weight of smoke just is to calculate the mass (multiplies the gravitational constant).
However, despite the compelling reasons for the identification of substance with mass, in the next sections, I shall argue that the substance cannot be understood as Newtonian mass, for when we try to work out the details of understanding the substance as mass, we face an unavoidable dilemma.
Section II. Some Mass or the Sum Total of Mass
In this section, I shall argue that there are two ways of conceiving of substance as Newtonian mass, and then show that both ways have some support from the text and are to some extent philosophically plausible. So, both ways deserve detailed considerations. But, in the next section, I shall argue that both ways face insurmountable problems.
In identifying substance with mass, we need to settle an ambiguity: Is the mass meant to be some mass, say the mass of a rock which is 7 kilograms (a randomly chosen weight), or to be the sum total of mass in the world of appearances which is a very large but nonetheless definite amount? Since both some mass and the sum total of mass are permanently persistent, we cannot tell which way of identifying is more plausible with respect to the permanent persistence of substance. So, we must appeal to some other philosophically and/or textually interesting points to ground a preference in choosing one over the other.
Let us first consider identifying the substance with some or individuated mass. First, the first Analogy is the principle according to which the relational category substance-accident is to be applied. Kant defines accidents to be “the determinations of a substance that are nothing other than particular ways for it to exist.”(B 229) Many commentators interpret the relation to be between object and its properties or states. Thus it makes more sense to think that the mass, which is the underlying bearer of properties, is the individuated mass of some object, instead of the sum total of mass in the world of appearances. For instance, in the example of the weight of smoke, Kant seems to conceive of substance as the matter, i.e. mass, of an individual object. Moreover, if we conceive of substance as the sum total of mass in the world of appearances, it is very hard to imagine how substance can be the bearer of properties or what kind of properties of which substance is the bearer.
One might argue that, on the interpretation according to which substance is the sum total of mass, even though we could imagine no properties of which substance is the bearer, we can still conceive of substance as the bearer of (changing) states, i.e. the successive states of the world of appearances. I reply that Kant cannot accept such an idea because the states of the world are not objects of possible experience, for it is at least empirically true that no one could have the whole world of appearances as his object of experience. I will return to this point later on in the paper and use it to argue that conceiving of substance as the sum total of mass is untenable given Kant’s theoretic commitments.
The above discussion is about reasons to prefer the identification of substance with some mass. I now turn to the reasons to prefer the identifications of substance with the sum total of mass. There are some textual evidences in the first Analogy that suggest this latter identification. For instance, the following passage:
“…here the issue is only appearances in the field of experience, the unity of which would never be possible if we were to allow new things (as far as their substance is concerned) to arise. For then everything would disappear that alone can represent the unity of time, namely the identity of the substratum in which alone all change has its thoroughgoing unity. This persistence is therefore nothing more than the way in which we represent the existence of things (in appearances).” (B 229/A186, my emphasis)
In this passage, Kant seems to identify the permanent persistent substance that represents the persistence of time with the unity of appearances, which seems to be the sum total of mass in the whole world of appearances. Let me argue for my understanding of this passage that it indicates that Kant identifies substance with the sum total of mass. I shall argue by reductio: Suppose Kant identified substance with individuated mass in the above passage. Then, it would make no sense to think that the arising of new substance could make the representation of the unity of time impossible. For the arising of new substance in no sense affects the substance, i.e. the mass, of the original objects. Let me use an example to illustrate. Suppose there is a rock whose mass is 7 kilograms and there arises a new object out of nothing, whose mass is 5 kilograms. Insofar as the rock’s mass remains the same, whether or not there are new masses arising out of nothing does not affect the unity of the rock’s mass, which is 7 kilograms. Therefore, in this passage, Kant conceives of substance as the sum total of mass in the whole world of appearances.
So far I have shown that there are compelling reasons to identify substance with some mass or with the sum total of mass respectively. In the next section, I shall argue that there are also devastating reasons to each identification such that either way we go, we face unsolvable problems.
Section III. One Single Time and the Limit of Possible Experience
I now turn to the problems from which the each identification suffers. In this section, I shall argue that these problems make both identifications untenable. Let us first consider the identification of substance with individuated mass (i.e. some mass). I argue that the reason why individuated mass cannot be identified with substance is that individuated mass cannot represent the oneness of time. Recall Kant’s argument for the principle of the first Analogy: in order to have experiences of objects as temporal, we must identify a permanently persistent substance that can represent time in objects. While the states of the substance change, the substance persists so that the substance can represent time that persists. It is important to notice that time, which is supposed to be represented by substance in appearances, is one single time. But, individuated mass cannot represent one single time. For there are many individuated masses, for instance, the mass of a rock which is 7 kilograms, the mass of a cup which is 0.5 kilogram, and the mass of a table which is 3 kilograms, each of which is permanently persistent and undergoes changes. If one of them can represent time, any other also can. In that case, we do not have one single time. Rather, we have many times or time-series, each of which is persistent.
Let me explain in details why multiply individuated masses cannot represent on single time. If these individuated masses can represent one single time, there must be some one single thing that is shared by these individuated masses that serves to represent the singularity of time. Whatever this shared thing is, it is not any of these individuated masses. Therefore, individuated mass cannot present one single time. However, on the other hand, time has be to singular. Here is a passage in the first Analogy which explains why time has to be one single time rather than a plurality of times:
“Substances (in appearances) are the substrata of all time-determinations. The arising of some of them and the perishing of others would itself remove the sole condition of the empirical unity of time, and the appearances would then be related to two different times, in which existence flowed side by side, which is absurd. For there is only one time, in which all different times must not be placed simultaneously but only one after another.” (B 232/A189)
One might argue that it does not matter how many individuated masses can represent time, it only matters that there is an individuated mass that represents time. Insofar as there is such a substance, which is permanently persistent, it suffices to represent one single time. I reply that, in that case, we still do not know which individuated mass is suppose to be the representer of the one single time in appearances. For there is not reason to think that the mass of one object is more suitable to represent time than the mass of another object is, insofar as both of the individuated masses are permanently persistent. Any choice of one over the other is arbitrary. But the unity or singularity of time is not arbitrary, for there can only be one time-series which persists, and any other time-series or temporal relations are just temporal parts of this unique time-series. Thus, I conclude that individuated mass cannot be the representer of time in appearances.
I now turn to argue that the sum total of mass cannot represent time either. The idea of my argument is to make use of Kant’s solution to the Antinomies to show that the permanently persistent substance that represents time in the appearances cannot be the sum total of mass because the sum total of mass is not an object of possible experience. Let me lay out my argument in detail.
In “The Antinomy of Pure Reason” chapter, Kant presents four pairs of arguments concerning four cosmological ideas about the world-whole, namely, whether there is a beginning of time, whether there is indivisibly simple substance, whether there is a first cause, and whether there is a necessary existent. As Allen W. Wood argues, the four antinomies share a general form, namely, the thesis of each antinomy claims that there must be a first member of the conditioning-conditioned chain, while the antithesis of each antinomy claims that there is no first member of such a chain and that the chain goes back into infinity. Kant argues that there are valid arguments for each of the four theses as well as valid arguments for each of the four antitheses, so we need a solution to such contradictions.
Kant’s solution to the contradictions, as Wood argues, relies on his doctrine of transcendental idealism. As for the first two antinomies, Wood argues
The mathematical antinomies are generated by mathematical principles that apply to things only insofar as they are given in sensible intuition…But these [the first two] series of conditions are never given to intuition as a whole...The theses are false because the principles of possible experience make it impossible for objects corresponding to the cosmological ideas of a first event, a largest extent of the world or a simple substance, ever to be given to intuition.”
Thus, the reason why Kant thinks that the claims made by the theses of the first and second antinomies are false is that neither the beginning of time nor the spatial boundary of the world or an indivisible substance can ever be given to our sensible intuition. If something cannot be given to our sensible intuition, according to Kant, we cannot have experience of it. Let me call this principle the object-of-sensible-intuition principle, namely, if something cannot be given to our sensible intuitions, then it cannot be object of our possible experience. And we can apply this principle to an object to determine whether that object can be object of possible experience. That is, if the object in question can be given to our sensible intuition, then the object can be object of our possible experience, but if the object cannot be given to our sensible intuition, then it cannot be object of our possible experience.
Now, let me apply the object-of-sensible-intuition principle to the idea of the sum total of mass. We can see that the sum total of mass cannot be given to our sensible intuition, so, the sum total of mass cannot be object of our possible experience. For the world of appearances seems to mean the whole universe or cosmos (because everything in the universe stands in causal relations to each other), there is no way for all of the mass in the whole universe to be given to our sensible intuition. Actually, we do not even know whether there are spatial boundaries of the universe, so we do not even know whether the sum total of mass in the all universe is finite. Thus, the sum total of mass cannot be object of possible experience. So, the sum total of mass cannot be that which represents time in appearances. For the reason there must be a permanently persistent substance in appearances which represents time is to make our temporally connected representations of objects possible. But, if the sum total of mass cannot be object of experience, it cannot make our experience of object possible. Thus, the permanently persistent substance in appearances cannot be the sum total of mass.
One might object that in the antinomies, the cosmological ideas at issue are condition-condition series. (B 436/A410) But the sum total of mass is not a series. Rather, it is an aggregate about which the question of conditioning and conditioned does not arise at all. Thus, Kant’s remarks on the antinomies have no bearing on whether the idea of the sum total of mass has any objective validity or significance. Moreover, the first two antinomies concern whether the conditioning-conditioned series go on into infinities. And it seems that it is impossible for us to experience infinity, for no matter what we experience it is finite insofar as we have experienced it. But, the quantum of the sum total of mass seems to be a definite and finite amount. By virtues of what can we claim that the sum total of mass cannot be object of experience? Is this “cannot” an empirical cannot, or an In-Principle cannot? If the answer is the former, the empirical “cannot” does not seem to be strong enough to show that the sum total of mass cannot be experienced, because we cannot know or predict whether in the future empirical sciences and technologies will make the sum total of mass possible object of experience. If the answer is the latter, at least further explanations of why the sum total of mass, which is a finite and definite amount, cannot be object of possible experience in principle are needed.
To the first objection I have two replies. First, in the first antinomy, Kant also discusses whether there is boundary or the largest extent of space. It is not obvious that there is a spatial series in the sense that it is obvious that there is a temporal series in which one moment succeeds its previous moments. However, according to Kant, we can think of the space acquiring its quantum through repeatedly or successively adding spatial units to the previous spatial units. (A 428/B 456) That is, the way of conceiving of space as a spatial series depends on the way of conceiving of time as a temporal series, which is naturally serial. Then, by the same token, we can also think of the sum total of mass acquiring its quantum by successively adding massive units to previous massive units. Thus, if the object-of-sensible-intuition principle applies to the idea of the boundary of space, it should also apply to the idea of the sum total of mass of the whole world of appearances.
Second, the fact that Kant applies the object-of-sensible-intuition-principle to the first two (or three) cosmological ideas to solve the contradictions does not mean that the principle can only be employed to deal with the antinomies. If the principle is applicable to other ideas, we can also use the principle to deal with other ideas. Since the object-of-sensible-intuition principle is derived from transcendental idealism, which is an important element in the whole Critique, there is no reason why the principle cannot be applied to other ideas than cosmological ideas. Thus, it is legitimate to use the object-of-sensible-intuition principle to show that the sum total of mass of whole world of appearances cannot be object of possible experience. So, the sum total of mass cannot be what represents time in appearances.
My reply to the second objection has two steps. First, it needs to be clarified that, although the first two antinomies concern whether the conditioning-conditioned series are infinite, Kant’s solution by the object-of-sensible-intuition principle does not rely on the whether the series are infinite. The principle only concerns whether the things to which the cosmological ideas refer can be given to our sensible intuition. It does not concern whether the things are infinite. It seems true that infinity cannot be object of sensible intuition. But this does not mean that all finite things can be given to our sensible intuition. Actually Kant rejects the claim that all finite things can be given to our sensible intuition. For Kant thinks the thesis of the first antinomy is false, because the beginning of time or the boundary of space cannot be given to our sensible intuition so that it cannot be object of possible experience.
The second step of my reply is to spell out in which sense of “cannot,” the sum total of mass cannot be object of possible experience. It seems to me that the distinction between empirical “cannot” and In-Principle “cannot” is hard to cash out in the context of Critique. For, in the Critique, any legitimate claim to knowledge entails that the object of which the knowledge is can be experienced. Thus, it seems that the empiricality of the “cannot” entails the In-Principality of the “cannot”.
However, concerning the claim that we cannot predict whether in the future empirical sciences and technologies will make the sum total of mass possible object of experience, what would Kant say? Would Kant agree that future sciences and technologies might or could transform a transcendent idea into an idea which refers to object of possible experience? I do not think he would. For Kant thinks his Critique settles metaphysical questions once and for all by theoretical reason, which is static or a-historical. Future discoveries made by sciences and technologies should be able to do no damage to the doctrines in Critique. Moreover, it should be odd to Kant’s ear that progresses made by empirical sciences could have any bearings on the doctrines in the Critique, which he builds up from scratch employing only pure reason, which is absolutely a-historical.
Thus, I conclude that the above arguments show that identifying substance with the sum total of mass in the world of appearance is not tenable. Since I showed earlier in this section that identifying substance with individuated mass is not tenable either, I conclude that the general strategy of identifying substance with mass is untenable.
Section IV. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I showed that a seemingly very promising way of understanding the permanently persistent substance discussed in the first Analogy, namely, conceiving of substance as Newtonian mass, is untenable. Then, I wonder whether there are other promising ways of providing a positive account of substance or actually it is the case that the notion of substance in the first Analogy is itself untenable. At this stage, maybe I could follow Kant’s stance on the things of themselves, namely, they exist, but we can have no knowledge about the way of their existence. But, at the same time, we need to have this minimal conviction that they exist. Similarly, concerning substance, we can have no knowledge about what the permanently persistent substance is, but we need to have the minimal conviction that it exists in the world of appearances and it serves to represent time.
窃以为这部片作为龙粉是都要看一看的。说剧透的话,那就是童教头逛妓院,呵呵,没见过吧,想想都香艳,看了你不会失望的。
胡慧中那时候也是一朵鲜花啊,又美又有一丝英气爽利,只是一看就风情,红艳
窃以为这部片作为龙粉是都要看一看的。说剧透的话,那就是童教头逛妓院,呵呵,没见过吧,想想都香艳,看了你不会失望的。
胡慧中那时候也是一朵鲜花啊,又美又有一丝英气爽利,只是一看就风情,红艳艳的胭脂终不是良家妇女用的。
看多了这些片,我对汪禹都关注起来。只有他这种平时顽劣的形象才能调笑着跟龙哥讲荤笑话,换了姜大卫是万万不可能的。但在死斗的时候他又有一种豁出去的拼命三郎劲儿,真爷们儿啊。
编剧后边有点儿狠心哎,都容忍到这份上了,您还这样为难童家父子,唉。再说了,士可杀不可辱啊,就杀了孩子直接报仇不好么?变态心理。不过龙哥那种对孩子的爱演绎得可真好,面严心慈,看得我心痛。
一个理发的小伙,操一口字正腔圆的普通话,在水龙头下面洗澡,准确的说应该是刷牙,然后把牙膏的泡沫摸到脑袋,还有全身。偶小时候洗澡也是这个原理,那时还没洗发水,洗头是用洗头膏,外表看上
一个理发的小伙,操一口字正腔圆的普通话,在水龙头下面洗澡,准确的说应该是刷牙,然后把牙膏的泡沫摸到脑袋,还有全身。偶小时候洗澡也是这个原理,那时还没洗发水,洗头是用洗头膏,外表看上去象是软化的肥皂,装在塑料盒子里面,如果偶一个人去洗澡的话,往往都是摸点洗头膏,然后把滑溜溜的泡沫抹在身上,省下打肥皂了。
星星和胖子在大街看美女,然后一对卖唱的出现,背的古琴挡住视线,这俩人出场非常自然(张艺谋同学应该好好学习一下)。后来这俩人去猪笼杀人,弹一曲肝肠断,神腿在前面走,背后的所有咚咚应琴声而断,那只猫,太酷了。
如花没出现?演那个龅牙妹就更好了。 黄mm的气质还是满符合那种单纯的小女生的,后仰在星星怀里的那个pose不好,胸部平了点。还有棒棒糖,电影院外面卖8新刀一颗噢。
以下是摘抄自天涯上看到一篇影评的结束语,"其实,我是一个导演"。看了很多影评,总结最好的就是这句了。时代仍在前进,而历史就是历史。我们可以怀念一个人过去的成就,却并不能因此否定他的转变。无论如何,假如说在周星驰从前的得意作品之中,他作为一个演员的成分仍然要远大于他的导演成就的话,那么在《功夫》出山后,我想他已经可以坦然地说:其实,我是一个导演。又及:五年来,第一次进电影院看电影。并非因为凑热闹,而是觉得我欠周星驰太多太多。这样一个聪明而诚恳的人,如果对于他积淀数年的作品仍然只买D版的话,无疑是对他最大的侮辱。《功夫》在用周星驰的方式对支持他十几年的观众致敬,而我觉得从来只从精神上支持周星驰的人,这一次有必要坐在电影院里,用我们的劳动所得向周星驰十几年的付出真诚地致敬。
再者看到偷渡、多佛惨案这个名字。
原来是2000年真实事件改编,幸好当时我还小不知道这件事,否则很可能会给我留下阴影。
而现在,看完这部片,虽然比较写实也比较黑暗,但是最后张智霖演的阿福带着亨仔生还还是给了我一点希望的曙光。
好。回来说这个片。
实在是拍得太粗糙了,连我爱的张智霖的脸都没拍清楚过。
可是自我觉得总体还是挺不错的。
再者看到偷渡、多佛惨案这个名字。
原来是2000年真实事件改编,幸好当时我还小不知道这件事,否则很可能会给我留下阴影。
而现在,看完这部片,虽然比较写实也比较黑暗,但是最后张智霖演的阿福带着亨仔生还还是给了我一点希望的曙光。
好。回来说这个片。
实在是拍得太粗糙了,连我爱的张智霖的脸都没拍清楚过。
可是自我觉得总体还是挺不错的。阿福爱上了金兰不惜拼尽一切协助她逃到英国。当他说“我一定会帮你找到亨仔”“你信不信我啊”的时候,我已经深深坠入溺爱他的深渊了。当他用身体温暖金兰,他脸上的粗糙他的胡渣和伤疤都让我那么又怜又爱。当最后金兰撑不住离开了,他俩的画面居然显出了这部片唯一有温暖感觉的唯美。他虽然是个无赖痞子,可是他有情有义正直勇敢,他不顾一切地维护金兰,他更即将养育她的儿子,让人怎能不爱?
容我花痴一下,即使是这么邋遢的人阴暗的片,我都觉得张智霖的脸和身材很正。
偷渡这个话题,很沉重。
58个人死在货柜车厢里,是何等的悲剧。幸而有两个幸存者让悲剧显得不那么叫人窒息。
最后亨仔问的问题“为什么我们从福州来,又要回去福州呢?”很冲击。从福州出来,经历那么多的艰难,除去最后的58人,就在登上俄罗斯的火车前还牺牲了那么多的人,值得吗?到底那么多人趋之若慕的那个地方有什么吸引?影片没有给我们交代那些逝去的人为何非要用如此冒险的方法到哪里去,答案也无从得知。很想说,最后幸好他们回去福州了。