本来刚开始看的时候吧，觉得还看得过去，虽然也有一些让人哭笑不得的剧情，但大体上还是过得去。谁知越到最后，越发现是脑残剧。到后面时，它把所有的人都当作是脑残来演。
举例：
伯暄妈，这个人不用我说，你们也都明白她如何脑残了；
公司财务，虽然电视剧没有把财务放出来，但就他会把正规公司的钱全部打到郑广美的私人账户这件事，你再说郑广美是大股东，也不可能打到私人账户而其它股东不用管的，电视剧里也演过伯暄给其他股东分红时，是有那么长名单，也就说明不止一个股东；
伯暄，郑广美在已怀孕后才和伯暄上床的，也就是说在生孩子时至少提前了一个月，剧情里也说了是八个月就生了孩子的，伯暄和伯暄他妈那么重视这个儿子，还会不知道孩子是怀胎十月生的。。。。。。
反正此类的事情太多了，总之一句话，就是把所有人都当作脑残了。

一部关于历史问题的电影，但不沉重，却很过瘾，女主聪明，幽默，博学，当然会犯所有女人都易感情用事的错误，但依然可啊，夏洛克的哥哥和对手一个成为历史学家，一个变成运筹帷幄的律师，不变都依然是高智商。大律师亲自绕奥斯维营走一圈，深夜喝酒吸烟为官司准备，研究对方近...  (展开)

真功夫电影《功夫战斗机》将于11月1日在全国上映。影片由蒋国权和陈天星联合导演，超级散打王柳海龙、法国动作影星亚力山大等主演。该片未映先热，不久前已斩获好莱坞AOF国际电影节“最佳动作设计”和韩国光州国际电影节“动作艺术成就奖”两项大奖。在内地公映前，澳大利亚、韩国等国外电影院线将提前上映。

　　《功夫战斗机》将以真功夫为看点，截拳道功夫明星陈天星和散打王柳海龙之间将有多场真功夫实战。

　　此外，影片还邀请了欧美动作明星亚力山大加盟，同时和来自日本、泰国的拳击演员过招，增加惊险指数。据了解，为了追求真功夫的拍摄，片中的动作对手戏多是赤身肉搏，导致拍摄现场血肉横飞，陈天星和柳海龙等人在拍摄过程中还曾发生高楼坠落、多次打伤肌肉、骨头脱臼、牙齿被打掉等“搏命”情况。

这篇剧评可能有剧透 看完整部剧又来评一次。 感谢评论区指出Lucia收费的具体细节。看完剧要祝贺一下Albie买了个教训，Lucia得到了她想要的，爱情呀还是太鬼扯了。 复盘一下，这趟旅程结束，所有人都撕开他们的遮羞布，所有人都有个美好的未来。 Cameron，又偷偷花天酒地了，开心。 Daphne，又保持...  (展开)

这篇影评可能有剧透 整个就是欠打磨的设定，安吉丽娜朱莉割裂的设定强行插入，然而她整个角色欠缺塑造，扁平刻意，从始至终沉浸在她失败的那次任务中，反反复复的说，味同嚼蜡，导致后面的叙述跟着扁平起来，全片如果再多半个小时塑造朱莉的角色，我想我会更投入，包括杀手，角色没有立起，着墨太...  (展开)

就是一部普通的商业片，票房这么高，不知道什么道理，可能是同期没什么特别好看的电影，也可能大家就喜欢看青春搞笑又矫情的爱情片，好做梦、好代入。 男女主都没有亮点，郑恺不错，看着又潮又帅又痞又有点可爱，女配也很搭。 剧情，这片没什么特别的剧情，就是两对男女的分分...  (展开)

老实说，看片花那会激动了好久，电影的质感那样好，两个女人都是那样美，张东健欧巴是那样的帅，然后心心念念到了今天，果断买了电影票第一时间入场，第一时间跑到豆瓣想表达一下我现在的心情，可是，看到满屏的一星，满屏的那些个不入流的话语，满屏的带着个人偏见的劣评，或者说满屏的黑子与五毛，我的心就开始拔凉拔凉了，豆瓣让人失望了。

一、多个时空


《纯粹理性批判》中的第一经验类比（Analogies of Experience）要求在现象中有一个恒定且唯一之物来表象意识中的时间本身。恒定，或永恒，因为作为总体的时间本身是始终在那的；惟一，因为只有一个时间。这个惟一且永恒的东西，即现象中的实体（Substance）。康德明确把这个实体与洛克的托子（Substratum）区分开来，认为实体是以各种方式显现于人的，而不是像托子那样不可知，也不显现。

我要说，洛克的托子的作用是保证物的个体化与同一性。这个作用在康德那儿，似乎是由物自体和先验范畴共同完成。先验范畴组织现象，在使意识对现象的认识成为可能的同时，也使同一的意识本身成为可能——对先验对象的构成即对自我的构成。而物自体在这个过程中究竟如何起作用，不详。康德的物自体与洛克的托子一样，是个让理论显得尴尬，却又不得不进行的假设。

尽管康德反复说现象中的实体不是洛克的托子，但这个实体究竟是什么，他又语焉不详。出于他对牛顿力学的接受，有人尝试将其理解为牛顿意义上的质量。我论证过，这样的解读将面临一个两难困境：如果实体是个体化了的质量，时间便不是惟一的；如果实体是现象世界中的总质量，基于二律背反的理由——这个总体无法成为经验对象——我们便无法经验到它。（详细论述见篇末附录）

若是跳出康德阐释，取前一个困境：时间不是惟一的，每个作为现象的物都意味着一个独立的时间体系，我们就科幻了：空间中的一个一个的物，奠基着意识中的一个又一个时间系，我们可以生活在不同的时空中，当我们经验不同的物。甚至，对应地说，我们总在成为另一个人，当我们来到不同的时空。

于是，我情愿把亨利的生活看作对康德的一次失败却有趣的解读。与其说他是一位时间旅行者，一位不停地穿越时空的超人或可怜人，不如说，他的意识中并没有一个绝对惟一的时间，他所来到并离开的每一个时空，都是一个独立自在的世界，尽管这些世界看上去很像，但哪个都不依赖于另一个——从理念的意义上说。


二、沉默，或消失


影片的前半部分，亨利的突然消失被解释为一种不治的遗传疾病。没有理由地，他时不时就去了另一个时空，赤身裸体地寻找可以穿上的衣服。仿佛常人来到一个新的环境，总是迫不及待地寻找一个身份，穿到自己身上。
亨利总会在一个无从预料的时刻消失，克莱尔生活在一个不确定的世界中。她的爱情是确定的，但她爱的人不确定地存在着。她的生活中弥漫着不确定性，而这恰好让她格外珍惜亨利在她身边的每一分钟。

克莱尔一次次怀孕又一次次流产，因为胎儿也有穿越症，莫名其妙地，便在某个时刻，出离了子宫。但克莱尔最后一次怀孕时，对亨利说，你每次消失都是因为感觉到了压力。所以，从现在开始，我要保持绝对地平静，这样胎儿就可以顺利出生了。
看到这里，我恍然大悟，原来亨利的穿越症是个隐喻，关于男人的隐喻：面对压力，便会沉默与回避，这不正是男人的本能反应么——而这在女人看来，仿佛爱人去了另一个时空，不知何时才能回来，甚至，会不会回来。

我查了查，电影改编自一位女造型艺术家的首部小说，写于一段失败的恋情之后。原来如此。

很多年前听到过一个说法：爱情，对男人来说，是挂在墙上的一幅画，你并不总是去看它；但对女人来说，则是房间里音乐，你想不听都不行。所以，男人需要时不时地呆在纯然属于自我的世界里，在沉默中成为自己。女人却要认为这是对她的疏远、对亲密的疏离，并因此而坐立不安，想方设法闯进那份铁一般的沉默。结果，要么把自己撞疼，要么把爱情撞碎。
这是对小儿女情态的描述。若成年点，便会更同情于另一个说法：人生在世，无非是男人讨慰藉，女人讨生活。人并不总是需要慰藉，尤其在得意之时。人却总在生活，就算你不想。


三、看着，却无法改变


在一次穿越中，亨利来到母亲身边，在地铁里，母亲在看报，他们作为陌生人简短却亲切的交谈了一会儿。亨利告诉母亲，他要结婚了，这个女孩让他感到安全。
克莱尔问他：你什么不去阻止那场车祸，既然你可以回到车祸发生之前。“我无法阻止。无数次我回到过去，回到母亲还在的时候，但每次我都无法改变发生着的一切。”——这话让人特别难过。我们并不能改变过去，就像不能重新雕刻一座已然完成的塑像。

不是么？很多时候，我们从自己当下的境遇中抽身而出，试图站在一个更开阔的角度，超脱地看现在的纠结、焦虑，或苦闷，并自嘲这些都没什么的。但当你身在当下，你知道未来的自己就坐在对面，笑着，看着自己，慈悲地。但你还是无法因此脱身而出。你仍然只能呆在你当下的处境中，无论是过分的快乐，还是仿佛无法挣脱的哀伤。

每一个时刻都是三维的，它包含着过去、现在，和未来这三个维度。我们在回忆中编辑时间，编辑自己，有意无意地遗忘一些，并把另一些反复摩挲。过往明明灭灭，像晴天里，随风晃动的百叶窗投在墙上的影子。每次回忆之后，我们都成为另一个人。
未来也是。未来无数次作为想象呈现于当下，各式各样地，仿佛清晰的回忆。回忆与憧憬，如同天平的两臂，对称着，平衡着，在现在这个支点上。所以，现在这个时刻，最重。


四、期限


有天聚会时，亨利中枪后痛苦挣扎的裸体突然出现在他们的门厅里。又消失了。克莱尔说，我从没见过四十岁之后的你。我见过的你总是很年轻。从这个时候起，死亡就成了他们中的另一个在场者，尽管它总是沉默着。

亨利穿越到未来，遇见了自己的已经十岁的女儿。女儿告诉他，他死于自己五岁那年。她们一直很想念他。那时他们的女儿还没出生。那时克莱尔还一如既往地希望与亨利白头偕老，就像她还没长大时那样，就像她长大之后第一次遇到亨利时那样，就像亨利死后，她仍然留着亨利所有的衣服，等着亨利回来那样。

于她而言，亨利是不会死的。他无非是走远了一下子回不来，他无非是在时空中迷了路，找不到一件让他温暖的衣服。

女儿五岁那年，亨利和克莱尔都已知道，亨利即将死去，中弹而死。期限降至，可能在任何一天，任何一个时刻。在它到来之前，所有相聚的时光都是铭刻，都是用最日常的方式来进行的一次祭奠，一次追忆。当这个期限还不确定，他们相爱着，仿佛一对最平凡的恋人；当这个期限已然确定，他们相爱着，装作不知道他们即将分离。

一个期限并不见得让期限到来之前的一切都显得美好。但，美好的东西都有一个期限。确定的期限，或不确定的期限。你不能试图挽留，那会犹如握紧手中的细沙，握得越紧，便流失得越快，宛如时间，从指缝间悄然流走。
这个期限是否到来，何时到来，都不是你能选择的。你能做的，仅仅是在它到来之前的每一刻，不让自己在未来后悔——克莱尔明白这些，并且，她做到了。

而，这不正是人生么。


——————
附录：On Understanding Substance as Mass

Introduction

In the First Analogy of Experience, Kant argues that there must be some permanently persistent substance in the appearances which represents the persistence of time. Given Kant’s endorsement of Newtonian physics, commentators such as Eric Watkins suggest that such permanently persistent substance can be understood as Newtonian mass. In this paper, however, I argue that we face a dilemma when we try to cash out the notion of substance in terms of Newtonian mass.
The paper proceeds in three steps. In the first section, I present the reason why there needs to be a permanently persistent substance in the appearances, and discuss why it seems to be compelling to conceive of the permanently persistent substance as Newtonian Mass. Then, in the second section, I argue that there are (only) two ways of conceiving of the permanently persistent substance as Newtonian mass, namely, to conceive of substance as individuated mass and to conceive of substance as the sum total of mass in the world of appearances. I show that there are textual indications as well as philosophical reasons to support each option. In the third section, however, I argue that both ways suffer from inescapable problems. Thus, conceiving of the permanently persistent substance in terms of Newtonian mass is not viable.

    
Section I. The Permanently Persistent Substance

In this section, I shall first present the reason why Kant thinks that there must be a permanently persistent substance in the appearances. I then discuss why it is compelling to conceive of such substance as Newtonian mass.
In the chapter “System of all principles of pure understanding,” Kant discusses what makes possible the applications of the categories, i.e. the pure concepts of understanding, to objects, i.e. appearances that are given to sensible intuitions. That is, he discusses what it is that makes the categories have objective validity. Kant’s claim is that the applications of the categories are only possible under certain conditions, and these conditions are spelled out by the principles. For instance, the applications of the relational categories (substance-accidents, cause and effect, and mutual interactions) are possible if they are applied to objects according to the principles of Analogies of Experience. In addition to the three specific principles that correspond to each of the three relational categories, Kant also provides a general principle overarching all three Analogies. The general principle is stated in the second edition as follows: “Experience is possible only through the representations of a necessary connection of perceptions” (B 218). Watkins provides a helpful interpretation of this general principle:
“The general idea is that each of the three relational categories represents a necessary connection that is required for experience of a single time and of objects existing and being temporally related to each other within a single time to be possible.” (My emphasis)
Since this paper is focused on the notion of substance in the first Analogy, I shall ignore the second and third Analogies. So I now turn to a close examination of the first Analogy.
The first Analogy, i.e. the principle of the persistence of substance, is stated in the second edition as follows: “In all change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature.” (B 224) Watkins summarizes Kant’s argument for the first Analogy as follows (which I take to be a correct interpretation):
Premise 1: Appearances, i.e. objects of experience, are made possible by time’s persistence.
Premise 2: We do not perceive time itself.
Therefore, In order to have experience of appearances, there must be some permanent substance in the appearances which can represent time or time’s persistence.
While the appearances, as the objects given to our intuitions, are changing, the substance in appearances always stays the same and is permanent. So, Kant calls the permanent substance “the substratum of everything real” (B 225). But, some clarifications about Kant’s use of the term “substratum” are needed to prevent potential confusions. Substratum in Kant’s text does not mean what Locke uses this term to mean, namely, the bearer of properties which is unchanging and about which we can have no knowledge. For, according to Locke, we can only know what is given to our senses, but since the underlying substratum cannot be given to our senses, we have no access to it and therefore cannot know it.
Kant, by constrast, does not think that there is any Lockean substratum in the world of appearances. For Kant, the fact that the states of the substance are changing and the substance stays the same does not mean the states are separable from the substance. Rather, the changing states of the substance are simply the ways in which the substance is given to us. Thus, we can know the substance, that is, we know the substance through its states. In order to avoid the Lockean implication of the term “substratum,” I shall only use “substance” to refer to the permanently persistent thing in the appearances despite Kant’s own use of “substratum” to talk about what is permanent in the appearances.
Since I have argued that Kant’s notion of substance is not the Lockean substratum, then what is the Kantian notion of substance? We need a positive account of what the substance is. It is obvious that such a permanently persistent thing cannot be captured by ordinary physical objects, no matter whether they are natural objects (say, rocks) or artifacts (say, ships), for neither artifacts nor natural objects always stay the same such that in principle they can never suffer changes. So, it seems no ordinarily construed physical things can be qualified as substance that is permanently persistent. On the other hand, it is very hard to imagine that anything non-physical could play the role the substance is supposed to play. For it is hard to imagine how a non-physical being could be given to our sensible intuition or could be spatiotemporally organized by our a priori intuitions. So, it is unlikely that Kant means something non-physical by “substance.” Thus, there are two constraints on spelling out what substance is. First, it is something physical. Second, as I have shown, the physical being that can be understood as substance cannot be ordinarily individuated physical things such as planet or rock.
In order to meet the above two conditions, Watkins suggests that, given Kant’s commitment to Newtonian science, it is likely that Kant has Newtonian mass in mind when he talks about the substance, since no matter how a physical object changes, its mass always stays the same. Since Newtonian mass is physical and is not an ordinarily individuated object, it seems quite compelling that the substance, which is permanently persistent, just is Newtonian mass. According to common sense, Newtonian mass is understood to be underlying objects such that we cannot directly perceive mass but can only perceive mass through the way it is given to our intuition, namely, through the perception of the objects that have mass. Thus, mass is neither unknowable nor directly perceivable, which seems to fit the description of the substance perfectly.
Moreover, there are many textual indications that suggest the identification of substance with mass. Let me note two examples. First, recall the general principle overarching the three specific Analogies, namely, “In all change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature.” (B 224) It seems that “quantum” is most naturally to be understood as mass, for mass seems to be the only thing in nature that is neither increased nor diminished on Newtonian physics.
The other indication is Kant’s example to illustrate his claim that “he <a philosopher> thus assumed that as incontrovertible that even in fire the matter (substance) never disappears but rather only suffers an alteration in its form.” (B 288, my emphasis):
“A philosopher was asked: How much does the smoke weigh? He replied: If you take away from the weight of the wood that was burnt the weight of the ashes that are left over, you will have the weight of the smoke.” (B 288)
We can see that here Kant explicitly identifies substance with matter. And it is quite plausible to think that “matter” is just another way of saying “mass”. That is, “mass” seems to be the theoretical analog of the term “matter.” This hypothesis is supported by the example of the weight of smoke. For, in the example, the way to calculate the weight of smoke just is to calculate the mass (multiplies the gravitational constant).
However, despite the compelling reasons for the identification of substance with mass, in the next sections, I shall argue that the substance cannot be understood as Newtonian mass, for when we try to work out the details of understanding the substance as mass, we face an unavoidable dilemma.


Section II. Some Mass or the Sum Total of Mass

In this section, I shall argue that there are two ways of conceiving of substance as Newtonian mass, and then show that both ways have some support from the text and are to some extent philosophically plausible. So, both ways deserve detailed considerations. But, in the next section, I shall argue that both ways face insurmountable problems.
In identifying substance with mass, we need to settle an ambiguity: Is the mass meant to be some mass, say the mass of a rock which is 7 kilograms (a randomly chosen weight), or to be the sum total of mass in the world of appearances which is a very large but nonetheless definite amount? Since both some mass and the sum total of mass are permanently persistent, we cannot tell which way of identifying is more plausible with respect to the permanent persistence of substance. So, we must appeal to some other philosophically and/or textually interesting points to ground a preference in choosing one over the other.
Let us first consider identifying the substance with some or individuated mass. First, the first Analogy is the principle according to which the relational category substance-accident is to be applied. Kant defines accidents to be “the determinations of a substance that are nothing other than particular ways for it to exist.”(B 229) Many commentators interpret the relation to be between object and its properties or states. Thus it makes more sense to think that the mass, which is the underlying bearer of properties, is the individuated mass of some object, instead of the sum total of mass in the world of appearances. For instance, in the example of the weight of smoke, Kant seems to conceive of substance as the matter, i.e. mass, of an individual object. Moreover, if we conceive of substance as the sum total of mass in the world of appearances, it is very hard to imagine how substance can be the bearer of properties or what kind of properties of which substance is the bearer.
One might argue that, on the interpretation according to which substance is the sum total of mass, even though we could imagine no properties of which substance is the bearer, we can still conceive of substance as the bearer of (changing) states, i.e. the successive states of the world of appearances. I reply that Kant cannot accept such an idea because the states of the world are not objects of possible experience, for it is at least empirically true that no one could have the whole world of appearances as his object of experience. I will return to this point later on in the paper and use it to argue that conceiving of substance as the sum total of mass is untenable given Kant’s theoretic commitments.
The above discussion is about reasons to prefer the identification of substance with some mass. I now turn to the reasons to prefer the identifications of substance with the sum total of mass. There are some textual evidences in the first Analogy that suggest this latter identification. For instance, the following passage:
“…here the issue is only appearances in the field of experience, the unity of which would never be possible if we were to allow new things (as far as their substance is concerned) to arise. For then everything would disappear that alone can represent the unity of time, namely the identity of the substratum in which alone all change has its thoroughgoing unity. This persistence is therefore nothing more than the way in which we represent the existence of things (in appearances).” (B 229/A186, my emphasis)
In this passage, Kant seems to identify the permanent persistent substance that represents the persistence of time with the unity of appearances, which seems to be the sum total of mass in the whole world of appearances. Let me argue for my understanding of this passage that it indicates that Kant identifies substance with the sum total of mass. I shall argue by reductio: Suppose Kant identified substance with individuated mass in the above passage. Then, it would make no sense to think that the arising of new substance could make the representation of the unity of time impossible. For the arising of new substance in no sense affects the substance, i.e. the mass, of the original objects. Let me use an example to illustrate. Suppose there is a rock whose mass is 7 kilograms and there arises a new object out of nothing, whose mass is 5 kilograms. Insofar as the rock’s mass remains the same, whether or not there are new masses arising out of nothing does not affect the unity of the rock’s mass, which is 7 kilograms. Therefore, in this passage, Kant conceives of substance as the sum total of mass in the whole world of appearances.
So far I have shown that there are compelling reasons to identify substance with some mass or with the sum total of mass respectively. In the next section, I shall argue that there are also devastating reasons to each identification such that either way we go, we face unsolvable problems.


Section III. One Single Time and the Limit of Possible Experience

I now turn to the problems from which the each identification suffers. In this section, I shall argue that these problems make both identifications untenable. Let us first consider the identification of substance with individuated mass (i.e. some mass). I argue that the reason why individuated mass cannot be identified with substance is that individuated mass cannot represent the oneness of time. Recall Kant’s argument for the principle of the first Analogy: in order to have experiences of objects as temporal, we must identify a permanently persistent substance that can represent time in objects. While the states of the substance change, the substance persists so that the substance can represent time that persists. It is important to notice that time, which is supposed to be represented by substance in appearances, is one single time. But, individuated mass cannot represent one single time. For there are many individuated masses, for instance, the mass of a rock which is 7 kilograms, the mass of a cup which is 0.5 kilogram, and the mass of a table which is 3 kilograms, each of which is permanently persistent and undergoes changes. If one of them can represent time, any other also can. In that case, we do not have one single time. Rather, we have many times or time-series, each of which is persistent.
Let me explain in details why multiply individuated masses cannot represent on single time. If these individuated masses can represent one single time, there must be some one single thing that is shared by these individuated masses that serves to represent the singularity of time. Whatever this shared thing is, it is not any of these individuated masses. Therefore, individuated mass cannot present one single time. However, on the other hand, time has be to singular. Here is a passage in the first Analogy which explains why time has to be one single time rather than a plurality of times:
“Substances (in appearances) are the substrata of all time-determinations. The arising of some of them and the perishing of others would itself remove the sole condition of the empirical unity of time, and the appearances would then be related to two different times, in which existence flowed side by side, which is absurd. For there is only one time, in which all different times must not be placed simultaneously but only one after another.” (B 232/A189)
One might argue that it does not matter how many individuated masses can represent time, it only matters that there is an individuated mass that represents time. Insofar as there is such a substance, which is permanently persistent, it suffices to represent one single time. I reply that, in that case, we still do not know which individuated mass is suppose to be the representer of the one single time in appearances. For there is not reason to think that the mass of one object is more suitable to represent time than the mass of another object is, insofar as both of the individuated masses are permanently persistent. Any choice of one over the other is arbitrary. But the unity or singularity of time is not arbitrary, for there can only be one time-series which persists, and any other time-series or temporal relations are just temporal parts of this unique time-series. Thus, I conclude that individuated mass cannot be the representer of time in appearances.
I now turn to argue that the sum total of mass cannot represent time either. The idea of my argument is to make use of Kant’s solution to the Antinomies to show that the permanently persistent substance that represents time in the appearances cannot be the sum total of mass because the sum total of mass is not an object of possible experience. Let me lay out my argument in detail.
In “The Antinomy of Pure Reason” chapter, Kant presents four pairs of arguments concerning four cosmological ideas about the world-whole, namely, whether there is a beginning of time, whether there is indivisibly simple substance, whether there is a first cause, and whether there is a necessary existent. As Allen W. Wood argues, the four antinomies share a general form, namely, the thesis of each antinomy claims that there must be a first member of the conditioning-conditioned chain, while the antithesis of each antinomy claims that there is no first member of such a chain and that the chain goes back into infinity. Kant argues that there are valid arguments for each of the four theses as well as valid arguments for each of the four antitheses, so we need a solution to such contradictions.
Kant’s solution to the contradictions, as Wood argues, relies on his doctrine of transcendental idealism. As for the first two antinomies, Wood argues
The mathematical antinomies are generated by mathematical principles that apply to things only insofar as they are given in sensible intuition…But these [the first two] series of conditions are never given to intuition as a whole...The theses are false because the principles of possible experience make it impossible for objects corresponding to the cosmological ideas of a first event, a largest extent of the world or a simple substance, ever to be given to intuition.”
Thus, the reason why Kant thinks that the claims made by the theses of the first and second antinomies are false is that neither the beginning of time nor the spatial boundary of the world or an indivisible substance can ever be given to our sensible intuition. If something cannot be given to our sensible intuition, according to Kant, we cannot have experience of it. Let me call this principle the object-of-sensible-intuition principle, namely, if something cannot be given to our sensible intuitions, then it cannot be object of our possible experience. And we can apply this principle to an object to determine whether that object can be object of possible experience. That is, if the object in question can be given to our sensible intuition, then the object can be object of our possible experience, but if the object cannot be given to our sensible intuition, then it cannot be object of our possible experience.
Now, let me apply the object-of-sensible-intuition principle to the idea of the sum total of mass. We can see that the sum total of mass cannot be given to our sensible intuition, so, the sum total of mass cannot be object of our possible experience. For the world of appearances seems to mean the whole universe or cosmos (because everything in the universe stands in causal relations to each other), there is no way for all of the mass in the whole universe to be given to our sensible intuition. Actually, we do not even know whether there are spatial boundaries of the universe, so we do not even know whether the sum total of mass in the all universe is finite. Thus, the sum total of mass cannot be object of possible experience. So, the sum total of mass cannot be that which represents time in appearances. For the reason there must be a permanently persistent substance in appearances which represents time is to make our temporally connected representations of objects possible. But, if the sum total of mass cannot be object of experience, it cannot make our experience of object possible. Thus, the permanently persistent substance in appearances cannot be the sum total of mass.
One might object that in the antinomies, the cosmological ideas at issue are condition-condition series. (B 436/A410) But the sum total of mass is not a series. Rather, it is an aggregate about which the question of conditioning and conditioned does not arise at all. Thus, Kant’s remarks on the antinomies have no bearing on whether the idea of the sum total of mass has any objective validity or significance. Moreover, the first two antinomies concern whether the conditioning-conditioned series go on into infinities. And it seems that it is impossible for us to experience infinity, for no matter what we experience it is finite insofar as we have experienced it. But, the quantum of the sum total of mass seems to be a definite and finite amount. By virtues of what can we claim that the sum total of mass cannot be object of experience? Is this “cannot” an empirical cannot, or an In-Principle cannot? If the answer is the former, the empirical “cannot” does not seem to be strong enough to show that the sum total of mass cannot be experienced, because we cannot know or predict whether in the future empirical sciences and technologies will make the sum total of mass possible object of experience. If the answer is the latter, at least further explanations of why the sum total of mass, which is a finite and definite amount, cannot be object of possible experience in principle are needed.
To the first objection I have two replies. First, in the first antinomy, Kant also discusses whether there is boundary or the largest extent of space. It is not obvious that there is a spatial series in the sense that it is obvious that there is a temporal series in which one moment succeeds its previous moments. However, according to Kant, we can think of the space acquiring its quantum through repeatedly or successively adding spatial units to the previous spatial units. (A 428/B 456) That is, the way of conceiving of space as a spatial series depends on the way of conceiving of time as a temporal series, which is naturally serial. Then, by the same token, we can also think of the sum total of mass acquiring its quantum by successively adding massive units to previous massive units. Thus, if the object-of-sensible-intuition principle applies to the idea of the boundary of space, it should also apply to the idea of the sum total of mass of the whole world of appearances.
Second, the fact that Kant applies the object-of-sensible-intuition-principle to the first two (or three) cosmological ideas to solve the contradictions does not mean that the principle can only be employed to deal with the antinomies. If the principle is applicable to other ideas, we can also use the principle to deal with other ideas. Since the object-of-sensible-intuition principle is derived from transcendental idealism, which is an important element in the whole Critique, there is no reason why the principle cannot be applied to other ideas than cosmological ideas. Thus, it is legitimate to use the object-of-sensible-intuition principle to show that the sum total of mass of whole world of appearances cannot be object of possible experience. So, the sum total of mass cannot be what represents time in appearances.
My reply to the second objection has two steps. First, it needs to be clarified that, although the first two antinomies concern whether the conditioning-conditioned series are infinite, Kant’s solution by the object-of-sensible-intuition principle does not rely on the whether the series are infinite. The principle only concerns whether the things to which the cosmological ideas refer can be given to our sensible intuition. It does not concern whether the things are infinite. It seems true that infinity cannot be object of sensible intuition. But this does not mean that all finite things can be given to our sensible intuition. Actually Kant rejects the claim that all finite things can be given to our sensible intuition. For Kant thinks the thesis of the first antinomy is false, because the beginning of time or the boundary of space cannot be given to our sensible intuition so that it cannot be object of possible experience.
The second step of my reply is to spell out in which sense of “cannot,” the sum total of mass cannot be object of possible experience. It seems to me that the distinction between empirical “cannot” and In-Principle “cannot” is hard to cash out in the context of Critique. For, in the Critique, any legitimate claim to knowledge entails that the object of which the knowledge is can be experienced. Thus, it seems that the empiricality of the “cannot” entails the In-Principality of the “cannot”.
However, concerning the claim that we cannot predict whether in the future empirical sciences and technologies will make the sum total of mass possible object of experience, what would Kant say? Would Kant agree that future sciences and technologies might or could transform a transcendent idea into an idea which refers to object of possible experience? I do not think he would. For Kant thinks his Critique settles metaphysical questions once and for all by theoretical reason, which is static or a-historical. Future discoveries made by sciences and technologies should be able to do no damage to the doctrines in Critique. Moreover, it should be odd to Kant’s ear that progresses made by empirical sciences could have any bearings on the doctrines in the Critique, which he builds up from scratch employing only pure reason, which is absolutely a-historical.
Thus, I conclude that the above arguments show that identifying substance with the sum total of mass in the world of appearance is not tenable. Since I showed earlier in this section that identifying substance with individuated mass is not tenable either, I conclude that the general strategy of identifying substance with mass is untenable.


Section IV. Concluding Remarks

In this paper, I showed that a seemingly very promising way of understanding the permanently persistent substance discussed in the first Analogy, namely, conceiving of substance as Newtonian mass, is untenable. Then, I wonder whether there are other promising ways of providing a positive account of substance or actually it is the case that the notion of substance in the first Analogy is itself untenable. At this stage, maybe I could follow Kant’s stance on the things of themselves, namely, they exist, but we can have no knowledge about the way of their existence. But, at the same time, we need to have this minimal conviction that they exist. Similarly, concerning substance, we can have no knowledge about what the permanently persistent substance is, but we need to have the minimal conviction that it exists in the world of appearances and it serves to represent time.

电影一开篇，老夫妻俩的默契和相濡以沫温馨而动人，和最后揭露丈夫卡斯曼寄生攫取夫人琼恩才华的阴暗形成鲜明对比。正因为这种强烈对比，才让人觉得结局不可理喻。 现实来说，卡斯曼的确是个没有才华而自恋，脾气暴躁不受控，道德低下而又自私的男人（细节太多了，比如劝怀孕的...  (展开)

在她看到的日子里 我始终没有为任何事痛不欲生 可是在她看不到的日子里 我想把自己也杀了。
当时我这句话的理解还停留在是不是要自虐上，现在想来，那种“杀”是诛心杀！

偷 和 偷偷 是不一样的

和尚也有七情六欲吗？寺庙是不是就是一个场所聚集追求相同的人而已？

和你分开的地方是我今生最恐怖的事情，再也不会去

痛定思痛 倍觉痛

三重洞的秘密 好奇害死人

懵懂少年要经过多少才甘心平淡

文/冯凝
        民族主义是指将自我民族作为政治、经济、文化的主体而置于至上至尊价值观考虑的思想或运动。而雪耻型的民族主义，则来源自一连串的“国耻”和创伤记忆，是百年来无数的痛苦塑造出“中国一定要强大”的民族凝聚驱动力。前者或许是中性的，后者则必然是病态的。近年来的中国电影（其实何止电影），在中国正向大国转型的过程中逐渐摆出一副真正的大国心态以配合中华民族与日俱增的各种实力，所以我们能看到《建国大业》中比以往稍显冷静的对待历史问题，不再提及蒋公便恨不得先打三十大板而后快，而我们的国家主席也在聆听别国首脑发表不同政见时只是微微一笑绝不发作。然而凭这些就足以证明我们的国家和民众已经彻底摆脱了那一种自慰式的民族主义心态了吗，我们的百姓真的已经不自卑的欣羡那些民主的大国优越的生活条件了吗，我们真的已经走出那些被歧视被侮辱被屠灭的岁月阴影了吗？从《叶问2》，或者说，从我预言的《叶问2》即将取得的成功看来，远远没有。
        《叶问2》包括他的前篇讲述的俨然是在20多年前就已经红遍大江南北的电视连续剧《霍元甲》已经讲过的故事，无非是一代宗师开武馆收徒，经历磨难最后打败外国拳击高手的套路，只不过在这部作品里融入了以往大宗师不曾有过的还原人性的设计，比如“尊敬”老婆，比如打不过就跑——当然这些都是细枝末节，那种掌控整部电影的情绪与心态的立场，与老历八早我们的民众为之热血沸腾的《霍元甲》无异，放开了说，我们狭隘的民族主义并没有因为生活水平的改善和所谓的精神物质文明建设的两手硬的抓开明多少——这是从观众角度说的，但这种现象不失为一面镜子，折射出电影制作者的某种心态。这种心态到底是什么呢？年轻的香港导演叶伟信和他的团队当然懂得怎样的电影能够在情节，情绪和情感三个方面挑拨起日益麻痹的观众内心深处的神经，王晶屎尿屁的一套是有追求的叶伟信所不屑的，而王家卫式的小资情调就算他能够勉强操控但墨镜哥已经在拍摄同一题材的《一代宗师》，于是百般无奈之下叶伟信终于打着回归原始，振兴港片的旗号，开始玩弄起影视界很久没有发作的民族主义了，果不其然不明真相的民众正中下怀。
        这几年反日反美反法反发达国家的浪潮一波还未平息一波又来侵袭，似乎冷战过后的人们需要用这种方式来保存血性，甚至ZF高官都以某种方式认为这是一种新青年的表现，如果说游行示威这一系列活动是对曾经飞扬青春的五四一代或者五加一四一代人的祭奠的话，那么现如今的这些活动是不是只有祭奠或者表达心声的实质价值有减少呢？毕竟这一类活动的最终结果是没有结果。所以香港电影工作者正好抓住时机，将这种屡战屡败的民族主义体现设定在可以无所忌惮可以以艺术手段放大的电影中，而只要政治正确，他们无须负责。《叶问2》就在这样的背景下呼之欲出了，我们看到一个武术宗师的武技和人品无需进化（金庸小说改编的电影还需要练级和废几次武功），就可以傲立世界之巅，在他的战斗中，他无不以自己的武德和功夫彻底征服对手，无论这个对手是世界之王还是本土冠军，我们太需要以这样一个形象为我们民族代言了，就像现在不能打球的姚明一样：谦逊，智慧，以德服人的同时又恨有几手，所以当去年季后赛第二轮第一场湖人对火箭姚明坚持返场的时候，解说员要说一句，姚明给中国人长脸了——也许这句话在当地的美国球迷看来，会是中国这个神秘的国度一种诡异的代表逻辑吧。
        那又是谁给了叶问这样一个代表中华民族的身份呢？当然是导演设定的几场华洋拳赛了。其实两部叶问电影的实质就是让叶问最终打败片中所涉情境中武功最高的外国人，而且往往都是在一种“中华民族到了最危险”的时候，仿佛只要赢了这一场，日本英国就会立马投降，将殖民地让出，并且起立鼓掌，赞同叶问所倡导的“人与人要互相尊重”，在信奉社会达尔文主义的那个岁月，企图以一个身材并不高大的武术家的一番心平气和的劝说，让外侮放下屠刀立地成佛，这难道不是导演的痴心妄想么？但事实上，包括我自己在那一刻，是有一丝对叶问的膜拜和信仰的，我相信所有看到这一幕的中国观众都会在一瞬间沉浸在民族主义膨胀的意淫快感中，这是因为叶伟信用艺术手段做足了最后一场大战戏的场面，用娴熟得足以媲美好莱坞的镜头语言，拳拳到肉的蒙太奇剪辑，去经营这场战斗，所有黄种人集体的自大在这一刻攀至顶峰，场面宛如抗日战争的最后大决战一般——这背后事实上难道不是雪耻型的民族主义，生怕外侮再来侵略而事先给自己服下的劣质定心丸么？就算中华武术的博大精深在此得到了展示和被认可，但他的攻击性和防御力，说到底是一种观赏大于实战的表演艺术，抱着以强身健体为宗旨的精神的一种运动，不然为何连区区泰拳拳王都能轻易的挑衅我佛山少林寺的大师父呢？
        然而如果我们抛开不正常的心理去审视这部电影本身，《叶问2》可以算作今年开年以来国产电影中的佼佼者了，他成功逃离了续集必然狗尾续貂的宿命，讲述了比第一部更为精彩的情节，即使这些情节无非就是通过几个角度展现一位大师的每个方面。我们从中可以看到，困扰宗师生活的已经不是现有的武学修养，不能符合他日益增长的对付反派的武技需要之间的矛盾，而是应该拿仅有的存钱给孩子付学费还是付房租之间的矛盾，叶问在香港经历的，更像是一名落魄的艺术家，在无人赏识的情况下满腔壮志未酬无用武之地的无奈，这让观众无疑对他增添的认同感，要大于我们在于仁泰的《霍元甲》中看到的，满家灭门还去异地邂逅清纯少女的经历。对比《霍元甲》，《叶问2》同样有说教，同样有武德高于武技的理论基础，但叶伟信所理解的咏春拳，显然比于仁泰所研究的迷踪拳深刻——一名化至臻境的武学宗师，必然将拳法中的风格与行事准则处世哲学融合，拳如其人，叶问的咏春带有女性的阴柔，他的行事便有着能躲则躲，多一事不如少一事的智慧，在民族大义关乎信仰的时刻又能挺身而出，这叫做大丈夫的能屈能伸，而《霍元甲》除了告诫人们武术是防身的（最后也没防住被毒害了）之外，我只能记得这似乎是李连杰说过的最后一部武术电影（那《功夫之王》难道是文艺爱情片？）。
与此同时，叶伟信还原出上世纪四五十年代的香江样貌，虽然我并不了解真实境况当是何如，但至少他不是在车墩随便拉两个路人就冒充十里洋场，各种置景和与之相配合的镜头运用，令人从一开始就投入到影片呈现的时空中，若没有黄晓明给美特斯邦威做广告一样的山寨潮人服饰，电影院至少在这100分钟内不会有笑场的。
        当然，这一切的论述要建立在《叶问2》可以被冠之以中国观众看后得出精彩绝伦的名分的前提基础之上。从媒体场结束之时阅片无数的记者们自发响起的掌声来看，《叶问2》的大卖似乎已经成为了既定的事实。我相信带着当年看《霍元甲》的心态看《叶问2》你不会失望，但如果你能跳出那狭隘的民族主义去欣赏一部优秀的港产动作电影，那种感觉将更加纯粹。

我来自重庆的一个国家级贫困县乡村，比起纪录片里面的条件，我们那里并不算穷，至少吃住医疗教育是能够保障的。 在我还未上幼儿园时村里开始修建公路，很快就通车了，但是一直到我上大学都没有硬化。小时候上学最怕雨天，即使是公路也是泥泞不堪; 过了公路还要走很长一段小路，...  (展开)

本来对动画片之类的是不怎么感兴趣，耐不住身边的人说这电影不错，网上吹的什么国产动画片总算雄起了，国产动画片总算摆脱了五毛特效BALABALA，于是忍不住好奇走进了电影院，想看看国产动画片是怎么雄起的
　　不得不说，特效做的确实还可以，美观又有冲击力，但是，也就只有特效可看了。至于故事，逻辑硬伤太多，虽然看之前就知道这电影时间不长，但是，也没有想到故事居然是残缺的，影院的灯光亮起来的时候，我跟家属楞了一下：就这样就结束了？
　　小白龙的特效做的很威武，里面小白龙两次还是三次出现，开始看到小白龙的时候，还以为它是跟故事有关系的，可是知道最后电影结束，也没看明白，导演搞这么条龙出来是干什么用的，难道就是为了炫一下特技，给画面的精彩加点料？
　　猴子较以往影视剧里形象，多了一些人情味，这点很赞，但是，猴子不是一直被佛祖的禁制给压着的吗？中间流儿撕掉了山上的那道符咒，还以为佛祖的禁止就此被解除了，可是并没有，猴子的力量还是被限制着。而最后跟大BOSS，就是那条恶心的虫子斗的时候，禁止怎么又没了？谁在什么时候帮他解除的？
　　还有终极BOSS，就是那条恶心的虫子，关于那条虫子最多的画面就是虫子的大嘴巴以及里面肉肉的舌头伸来伸去，虫子嘴巴跟舌头给了那么多特写镜头，好歹也喷点法力出来啊，结果就单单是嘴巴和舌头而已，真是浪费那么逼真的肉呼呼的舌头……
　　特效是摆脱了五毛，可是，其他显然没有跟得上

《寡婦》一天看完了，雖然我很喜歡這個演員，但還是個爛片，當然「爛片」和「好看」沒衝突，許多港片都好看，但依然是爛片。整個故事很簡單，一個英國女人，以西方聖母的價值觀，單槍匹馬、身體力行，把剛果和盧旺達相對平衡的市場、軍隊、警察、黑幫、商人、走私、礦業、法制...  (展开)

这篇剧评可能有剧透 我的记性不好，记不住台词，也懒得再回去翻剧里的语句，就这样随心所欲地写了这篇短评。 你看，我做了一件自己想做的事，很开心。 这部剧里，没有孰对孰错，没有针锋相对。相河没有做过任何努力来证明“你说得不对。”或者“应该是这样。”相河说的所有话可以被概括为一句:“你...  (展开)

三星，多一星给茅台酒 从咖啡王子一号店就很吃他的颜，既然男n号也能刷一波存在感～那么总会大火吧？！这之后金材昱开启了漫长的悲情男二角色！这些男二剧中，我只看过玛丽外宿中，也能被郑仁代表打动，想着只为了他追完。但是男女主实在看不下去，强忍了半部弃剧。然后就淡忘...  (展开)

    在网友的一片骂声中，我产生了极大的好奇，决定以身试法，挑战自我，年轻无极限。
  第一个入场，放片儿的大爷过来检票（奇怪）。大爷慢慢撕下我的票根，慢慢递过来，望着我，双眼噙着眼泪，欲言又止……
  一瞬间，我也热泪盈眶。虽然我们之间没有言语的交流，但这一刻的四目相对，已经说明了一切，已经是永恒……
  那一刻，我多想冲破世俗的障碍，对大爷深情的说：大爷！请不要担心我，我是有备而来，一定能坚持到最后！大爷！其实我更担心的是你，一天放几次这个千古烂片？大爷！最蛋疼的人是你是你还是你！大爷！其实，我也害怕，我也恐惧，不知我这幼小的心灵，是否能经得起即将到来的非人折磨，所以！请你！大爷！借给我一个蛋好吗？不然一会，我都不知道哪疼！大爷！……