转载自：[https://www.weidianyuedu.com/content/4217356346251.html] 商纣王和妲己残害了非常之多的忠臣，为何却不敢去杀闻仲呢? 这第1个原因就是因为在朝中这位太师是一位托孤的大臣，并且在当时商纣王的祖父商王文丁上位的那个时期，其实这位太师就已经遵从师命而辅佐过当时...  (展开)

一、多个时空


《纯粹理性批判》中的第一经验类比（Analogies of Experience）要求在现象中有一个恒定且唯一之物来表象意识中的时间本身。恒定，或永恒，因为作为总体的时间本身是始终在那的；惟一，因为只有一个时间。这个惟一且永恒的东西，即现象中的实体（Substance）。康德明确把这个实体与洛克的托子（Substratum）区分开来，认为实体是以各种方式显现于人的，而不是像托子那样不可知，也不显现。

我要说，洛克的托子的作用是保证物的个体化与同一性。这个作用在康德那儿，似乎是由物自体和先验范畴共同完成。先验范畴组织现象，在使意识对现象的认识成为可能的同时，也使同一的意识本身成为可能——对先验对象的构成即对自我的构成。而物自体在这个过程中究竟如何起作用，不详。康德的物自体与洛克的托子一样，是个让理论显得尴尬，却又不得不进行的假设。

尽管康德反复说现象中的实体不是洛克的托子，但这个实体究竟是什么，他又语焉不详。出于他对牛顿力学的接受，有人尝试将其理解为牛顿意义上的质量。我论证过，这样的解读将面临一个两难困境：如果实体是个体化了的质量，时间便不是惟一的；如果实体是现象世界中的总质量，基于二律背反的理由——这个总体无法成为经验对象——我们便无法经验到它。（详细论述见篇末附录）

若是跳出康德阐释，取前一个困境：时间不是惟一的，每个作为现象的物都意味着一个独立的时间体系，我们就科幻了：空间中的一个一个的物，奠基着意识中的一个又一个时间系，我们可以生活在不同的时空中，当我们经验不同的物。甚至，对应地说，我们总在成为另一个人，当我们来到不同的时空。

于是，我情愿把亨利的生活看作对康德的一次失败却有趣的解读。与其说他是一位时间旅行者，一位不停地穿越时空的超人或可怜人，不如说，他的意识中并没有一个绝对惟一的时间，他所来到并离开的每一个时空，都是一个独立自在的世界，尽管这些世界看上去很像，但哪个都不依赖于另一个——从理念的意义上说。


二、沉默，或消失


影片的前半部分，亨利的突然消失被解释为一种不治的遗传疾病。没有理由地，他时不时就去了另一个时空，赤身裸体地寻找可以穿上的衣服。仿佛常人来到一个新的环境，总是迫不及待地寻找一个身份，穿到自己身上。
亨利总会在一个无从预料的时刻消失，克莱尔生活在一个不确定的世界中。她的爱情是确定的，但她爱的人不确定地存在着。她的生活中弥漫着不确定性，而这恰好让她格外珍惜亨利在她身边的每一分钟。

克莱尔一次次怀孕又一次次流产，因为胎儿也有穿越症，莫名其妙地，便在某个时刻，出离了子宫。但克莱尔最后一次怀孕时，对亨利说，你每次消失都是因为感觉到了压力。所以，从现在开始，我要保持绝对地平静，这样胎儿就可以顺利出生了。
看到这里，我恍然大悟，原来亨利的穿越症是个隐喻，关于男人的隐喻：面对压力，便会沉默与回避，这不正是男人的本能反应么——而这在女人看来，仿佛爱人去了另一个时空，不知何时才能回来，甚至，会不会回来。

我查了查，电影改编自一位女造型艺术家的首部小说，写于一段失败的恋情之后。原来如此。

很多年前听到过一个说法：爱情，对男人来说，是挂在墙上的一幅画，你并不总是去看它；但对女人来说，则是房间里音乐，你想不听都不行。所以，男人需要时不时地呆在纯然属于自我的世界里，在沉默中成为自己。女人却要认为这是对她的疏远、对亲密的疏离，并因此而坐立不安，想方设法闯进那份铁一般的沉默。结果，要么把自己撞疼，要么把爱情撞碎。
这是对小儿女情态的描述。若成年点，便会更同情于另一个说法：人生在世，无非是男人讨慰藉，女人讨生活。人并不总是需要慰藉，尤其在得意之时。人却总在生活，就算你不想。


三、看着，却无法改变


在一次穿越中，亨利来到母亲身边，在地铁里，母亲在看报，他们作为陌生人简短却亲切的交谈了一会儿。亨利告诉母亲，他要结婚了，这个女孩让他感到安全。
克莱尔问他：你什么不去阻止那场车祸，既然你可以回到车祸发生之前。“我无法阻止。无数次我回到过去，回到母亲还在的时候，但每次我都无法改变发生着的一切。”——这话让人特别难过。我们并不能改变过去，就像不能重新雕刻一座已然完成的塑像。

不是么？很多时候，我们从自己当下的境遇中抽身而出，试图站在一个更开阔的角度，超脱地看现在的纠结、焦虑，或苦闷，并自嘲这些都没什么的。但当你身在当下，你知道未来的自己就坐在对面，笑着，看着自己，慈悲地。但你还是无法因此脱身而出。你仍然只能呆在你当下的处境中，无论是过分的快乐，还是仿佛无法挣脱的哀伤。

每一个时刻都是三维的，它包含着过去、现在，和未来这三个维度。我们在回忆中编辑时间，编辑自己，有意无意地遗忘一些，并把另一些反复摩挲。过往明明灭灭，像晴天里，随风晃动的百叶窗投在墙上的影子。每次回忆之后，我们都成为另一个人。
未来也是。未来无数次作为想象呈现于当下，各式各样地，仿佛清晰的回忆。回忆与憧憬，如同天平的两臂，对称着，平衡着，在现在这个支点上。所以，现在这个时刻，最重。


四、期限


有天聚会时，亨利中枪后痛苦挣扎的裸体突然出现在他们的门厅里。又消失了。克莱尔说，我从没见过四十岁之后的你。我见过的你总是很年轻。从这个时候起，死亡就成了他们中的另一个在场者，尽管它总是沉默着。

亨利穿越到未来，遇见了自己的已经十岁的女儿。女儿告诉他，他死于自己五岁那年。她们一直很想念他。那时他们的女儿还没出生。那时克莱尔还一如既往地希望与亨利白头偕老，就像她还没长大时那样，就像她长大之后第一次遇到亨利时那样，就像亨利死后，她仍然留着亨利所有的衣服，等着亨利回来那样。

于她而言，亨利是不会死的。他无非是走远了一下子回不来，他无非是在时空中迷了路，找不到一件让他温暖的衣服。

女儿五岁那年，亨利和克莱尔都已知道，亨利即将死去，中弹而死。期限降至，可能在任何一天，任何一个时刻。在它到来之前，所有相聚的时光都是铭刻，都是用最日常的方式来进行的一次祭奠，一次追忆。当这个期限还不确定，他们相爱着，仿佛一对最平凡的恋人；当这个期限已然确定，他们相爱着，装作不知道他们即将分离。

一个期限并不见得让期限到来之前的一切都显得美好。但，美好的东西都有一个期限。确定的期限，或不确定的期限。你不能试图挽留，那会犹如握紧手中的细沙，握得越紧，便流失得越快，宛如时间，从指缝间悄然流走。
这个期限是否到来，何时到来，都不是你能选择的。你能做的，仅仅是在它到来之前的每一刻，不让自己在未来后悔——克莱尔明白这些，并且，她做到了。

而，这不正是人生么。


——————
附录：On Understanding Substance as Mass

Introduction

In the First Analogy of Experience, Kant argues that there must be some permanently persistent substance in the appearances which represents the persistence of time. Given Kant’s endorsement of Newtonian physics, commentators such as Eric Watkins suggest that such permanently persistent substance can be understood as Newtonian mass. In this paper, however, I argue that we face a dilemma when we try to cash out the notion of substance in terms of Newtonian mass.
The paper proceeds in three steps. In the first section, I present the reason why there needs to be a permanently persistent substance in the appearances, and discuss why it seems to be compelling to conceive of the permanently persistent substance as Newtonian Mass. Then, in the second section, I argue that there are (only) two ways of conceiving of the permanently persistent substance as Newtonian mass, namely, to conceive of substance as individuated mass and to conceive of substance as the sum total of mass in the world of appearances. I show that there are textual indications as well as philosophical reasons to support each option. In the third section, however, I argue that both ways suffer from inescapable problems. Thus, conceiving of the permanently persistent substance in terms of Newtonian mass is not viable.

    
Section I. The Permanently Persistent Substance

In this section, I shall first present the reason why Kant thinks that there must be a permanently persistent substance in the appearances. I then discuss why it is compelling to conceive of such substance as Newtonian mass.
In the chapter “System of all principles of pure understanding,” Kant discusses what makes possible the applications of the categories, i.e. the pure concepts of understanding, to objects, i.e. appearances that are given to sensible intuitions. That is, he discusses what it is that makes the categories have objective validity. Kant’s claim is that the applications of the categories are only possible under certain conditions, and these conditions are spelled out by the principles. For instance, the applications of the relational categories (substance-accidents, cause and effect, and mutual interactions) are possible if they are applied to objects according to the principles of Analogies of Experience. In addition to the three specific principles that correspond to each of the three relational categories, Kant also provides a general principle overarching all three Analogies. The general principle is stated in the second edition as follows: “Experience is possible only through the representations of a necessary connection of perceptions” (B 218). Watkins provides a helpful interpretation of this general principle:
“The general idea is that each of the three relational categories represents a necessary connection that is required for experience of a single time and of objects existing and being temporally related to each other within a single time to be possible.” (My emphasis)
Since this paper is focused on the notion of substance in the first Analogy, I shall ignore the second and third Analogies. So I now turn to a close examination of the first Analogy.
The first Analogy, i.e. the principle of the persistence of substance, is stated in the second edition as follows: “In all change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature.” (B 224) Watkins summarizes Kant’s argument for the first Analogy as follows (which I take to be a correct interpretation):
Premise 1: Appearances, i.e. objects of experience, are made possible by time’s persistence.
Premise 2: We do not perceive time itself.
Therefore, In order to have experience of appearances, there must be some permanent substance in the appearances which can represent time or time’s persistence.
While the appearances, as the objects given to our intuitions, are changing, the substance in appearances always stays the same and is permanent. So, Kant calls the permanent substance “the substratum of everything real” (B 225). But, some clarifications about Kant’s use of the term “substratum” are needed to prevent potential confusions. Substratum in Kant’s text does not mean what Locke uses this term to mean, namely, the bearer of properties which is unchanging and about which we can have no knowledge. For, according to Locke, we can only know what is given to our senses, but since the underlying substratum cannot be given to our senses, we have no access to it and therefore cannot know it.
Kant, by constrast, does not think that there is any Lockean substratum in the world of appearances. For Kant, the fact that the states of the substance are changing and the substance stays the same does not mean the states are separable from the substance. Rather, the changing states of the substance are simply the ways in which the substance is given to us. Thus, we can know the substance, that is, we know the substance through its states. In order to avoid the Lockean implication of the term “substratum,” I shall only use “substance” to refer to the permanently persistent thing in the appearances despite Kant’s own use of “substratum” to talk about what is permanent in the appearances.
Since I have argued that Kant’s notion of substance is not the Lockean substratum, then what is the Kantian notion of substance? We need a positive account of what the substance is. It is obvious that such a permanently persistent thing cannot be captured by ordinary physical objects, no matter whether they are natural objects (say, rocks) or artifacts (say, ships), for neither artifacts nor natural objects always stay the same such that in principle they can never suffer changes. So, it seems no ordinarily construed physical things can be qualified as substance that is permanently persistent. On the other hand, it is very hard to imagine that anything non-physical could play the role the substance is supposed to play. For it is hard to imagine how a non-physical being could be given to our sensible intuition or could be spatiotemporally organized by our a priori intuitions. So, it is unlikely that Kant means something non-physical by “substance.” Thus, there are two constraints on spelling out what substance is. First, it is something physical. Second, as I have shown, the physical being that can be understood as substance cannot be ordinarily individuated physical things such as planet or rock.
In order to meet the above two conditions, Watkins suggests that, given Kant’s commitment to Newtonian science, it is likely that Kant has Newtonian mass in mind when he talks about the substance, since no matter how a physical object changes, its mass always stays the same. Since Newtonian mass is physical and is not an ordinarily individuated object, it seems quite compelling that the substance, which is permanently persistent, just is Newtonian mass. According to common sense, Newtonian mass is understood to be underlying objects such that we cannot directly perceive mass but can only perceive mass through the way it is given to our intuition, namely, through the perception of the objects that have mass. Thus, mass is neither unknowable nor directly perceivable, which seems to fit the description of the substance perfectly.
Moreover, there are many textual indications that suggest the identification of substance with mass. Let me note two examples. First, recall the general principle overarching the three specific Analogies, namely, “In all change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature.” (B 224) It seems that “quantum” is most naturally to be understood as mass, for mass seems to be the only thing in nature that is neither increased nor diminished on Newtonian physics.
The other indication is Kant’s example to illustrate his claim that “he <a philosopher> thus assumed that as incontrovertible that even in fire the matter (substance) never disappears but rather only suffers an alteration in its form.” (B 288, my emphasis):
“A philosopher was asked: How much does the smoke weigh? He replied: If you take away from the weight of the wood that was burnt the weight of the ashes that are left over, you will have the weight of the smoke.” (B 288)
We can see that here Kant explicitly identifies substance with matter. And it is quite plausible to think that “matter” is just another way of saying “mass”. That is, “mass” seems to be the theoretical analog of the term “matter.” This hypothesis is supported by the example of the weight of smoke. For, in the example, the way to calculate the weight of smoke just is to calculate the mass (multiplies the gravitational constant).
However, despite the compelling reasons for the identification of substance with mass, in the next sections, I shall argue that the substance cannot be understood as Newtonian mass, for when we try to work out the details of understanding the substance as mass, we face an unavoidable dilemma.


Section II. Some Mass or the Sum Total of Mass

In this section, I shall argue that there are two ways of conceiving of substance as Newtonian mass, and then show that both ways have some support from the text and are to some extent philosophically plausible. So, both ways deserve detailed considerations. But, in the next section, I shall argue that both ways face insurmountable problems.
In identifying substance with mass, we need to settle an ambiguity: Is the mass meant to be some mass, say the mass of a rock which is 7 kilograms (a randomly chosen weight), or to be the sum total of mass in the world of appearances which is a very large but nonetheless definite amount? Since both some mass and the sum total of mass are permanently persistent, we cannot tell which way of identifying is more plausible with respect to the permanent persistence of substance. So, we must appeal to some other philosophically and/or textually interesting points to ground a preference in choosing one over the other.
Let us first consider identifying the substance with some or individuated mass. First, the first Analogy is the principle according to which the relational category substance-accident is to be applied. Kant defines accidents to be “the determinations of a substance that are nothing other than particular ways for it to exist.”(B 229) Many commentators interpret the relation to be between object and its properties or states. Thus it makes more sense to think that the mass, which is the underlying bearer of properties, is the individuated mass of some object, instead of the sum total of mass in the world of appearances. For instance, in the example of the weight of smoke, Kant seems to conceive of substance as the matter, i.e. mass, of an individual object. Moreover, if we conceive of substance as the sum total of mass in the world of appearances, it is very hard to imagine how substance can be the bearer of properties or what kind of properties of which substance is the bearer.
One might argue that, on the interpretation according to which substance is the sum total of mass, even though we could imagine no properties of which substance is the bearer, we can still conceive of substance as the bearer of (changing) states, i.e. the successive states of the world of appearances. I reply that Kant cannot accept such an idea because the states of the world are not objects of possible experience, for it is at least empirically true that no one could have the whole world of appearances as his object of experience. I will return to this point later on in the paper and use it to argue that conceiving of substance as the sum total of mass is untenable given Kant’s theoretic commitments.
The above discussion is about reasons to prefer the identification of substance with some mass. I now turn to the reasons to prefer the identifications of substance with the sum total of mass. There are some textual evidences in the first Analogy that suggest this latter identification. For instance, the following passage:
“…here the issue is only appearances in the field of experience, the unity of which would never be possible if we were to allow new things (as far as their substance is concerned) to arise. For then everything would disappear that alone can represent the unity of time, namely the identity of the substratum in which alone all change has its thoroughgoing unity. This persistence is therefore nothing more than the way in which we represent the existence of things (in appearances).” (B 229/A186, my emphasis)
In this passage, Kant seems to identify the permanent persistent substance that represents the persistence of time with the unity of appearances, which seems to be the sum total of mass in the whole world of appearances. Let me argue for my understanding of this passage that it indicates that Kant identifies substance with the sum total of mass. I shall argue by reductio: Suppose Kant identified substance with individuated mass in the above passage. Then, it would make no sense to think that the arising of new substance could make the representation of the unity of time impossible. For the arising of new substance in no sense affects the substance, i.e. the mass, of the original objects. Let me use an example to illustrate. Suppose there is a rock whose mass is 7 kilograms and there arises a new object out of nothing, whose mass is 5 kilograms. Insofar as the rock’s mass remains the same, whether or not there are new masses arising out of nothing does not affect the unity of the rock’s mass, which is 7 kilograms. Therefore, in this passage, Kant conceives of substance as the sum total of mass in the whole world of appearances.
So far I have shown that there are compelling reasons to identify substance with some mass or with the sum total of mass respectively. In the next section, I shall argue that there are also devastating reasons to each identification such that either way we go, we face unsolvable problems.


Section III. One Single Time and the Limit of Possible Experience

I now turn to the problems from which the each identification suffers. In this section, I shall argue that these problems make both identifications untenable. Let us first consider the identification of substance with individuated mass (i.e. some mass). I argue that the reason why individuated mass cannot be identified with substance is that individuated mass cannot represent the oneness of time. Recall Kant’s argument for the principle of the first Analogy: in order to have experiences of objects as temporal, we must identify a permanently persistent substance that can represent time in objects. While the states of the substance change, the substance persists so that the substance can represent time that persists. It is important to notice that time, which is supposed to be represented by substance in appearances, is one single time. But, individuated mass cannot represent one single time. For there are many individuated masses, for instance, the mass of a rock which is 7 kilograms, the mass of a cup which is 0.5 kilogram, and the mass of a table which is 3 kilograms, each of which is permanently persistent and undergoes changes. If one of them can represent time, any other also can. In that case, we do not have one single time. Rather, we have many times or time-series, each of which is persistent.
Let me explain in details why multiply individuated masses cannot represent on single time. If these individuated masses can represent one single time, there must be some one single thing that is shared by these individuated masses that serves to represent the singularity of time. Whatever this shared thing is, it is not any of these individuated masses. Therefore, individuated mass cannot present one single time. However, on the other hand, time has be to singular. Here is a passage in the first Analogy which explains why time has to be one single time rather than a plurality of times:
“Substances (in appearances) are the substrata of all time-determinations. The arising of some of them and the perishing of others would itself remove the sole condition of the empirical unity of time, and the appearances would then be related to two different times, in which existence flowed side by side, which is absurd. For there is only one time, in which all different times must not be placed simultaneously but only one after another.” (B 232/A189)
One might argue that it does not matter how many individuated masses can represent time, it only matters that there is an individuated mass that represents time. Insofar as there is such a substance, which is permanently persistent, it suffices to represent one single time. I reply that, in that case, we still do not know which individuated mass is suppose to be the representer of the one single time in appearances. For there is not reason to think that the mass of one object is more suitable to represent time than the mass of another object is, insofar as both of the individuated masses are permanently persistent. Any choice of one over the other is arbitrary. But the unity or singularity of time is not arbitrary, for there can only be one time-series which persists, and any other time-series or temporal relations are just temporal parts of this unique time-series. Thus, I conclude that individuated mass cannot be the representer of time in appearances.
I now turn to argue that the sum total of mass cannot represent time either. The idea of my argument is to make use of Kant’s solution to the Antinomies to show that the permanently persistent substance that represents time in the appearances cannot be the sum total of mass because the sum total of mass is not an object of possible experience. Let me lay out my argument in detail.
In “The Antinomy of Pure Reason” chapter, Kant presents four pairs of arguments concerning four cosmological ideas about the world-whole, namely, whether there is a beginning of time, whether there is indivisibly simple substance, whether there is a first cause, and whether there is a necessary existent. As Allen W. Wood argues, the four antinomies share a general form, namely, the thesis of each antinomy claims that there must be a first member of the conditioning-conditioned chain, while the antithesis of each antinomy claims that there is no first member of such a chain and that the chain goes back into infinity. Kant argues that there are valid arguments for each of the four theses as well as valid arguments for each of the four antitheses, so we need a solution to such contradictions.
Kant’s solution to the contradictions, as Wood argues, relies on his doctrine of transcendental idealism. As for the first two antinomies, Wood argues
The mathematical antinomies are generated by mathematical principles that apply to things only insofar as they are given in sensible intuition…But these [the first two] series of conditions are never given to intuition as a whole...The theses are false because the principles of possible experience make it impossible for objects corresponding to the cosmological ideas of a first event, a largest extent of the world or a simple substance, ever to be given to intuition.”
Thus, the reason why Kant thinks that the claims made by the theses of the first and second antinomies are false is that neither the beginning of time nor the spatial boundary of the world or an indivisible substance can ever be given to our sensible intuition. If something cannot be given to our sensible intuition, according to Kant, we cannot have experience of it. Let me call this principle the object-of-sensible-intuition principle, namely, if something cannot be given to our sensible intuitions, then it cannot be object of our possible experience. And we can apply this principle to an object to determine whether that object can be object of possible experience. That is, if the object in question can be given to our sensible intuition, then the object can be object of our possible experience, but if the object cannot be given to our sensible intuition, then it cannot be object of our possible experience.
Now, let me apply the object-of-sensible-intuition principle to the idea of the sum total of mass. We can see that the sum total of mass cannot be given to our sensible intuition, so, the sum total of mass cannot be object of our possible experience. For the world of appearances seems to mean the whole universe or cosmos (because everything in the universe stands in causal relations to each other), there is no way for all of the mass in the whole universe to be given to our sensible intuition. Actually, we do not even know whether there are spatial boundaries of the universe, so we do not even know whether the sum total of mass in the all universe is finite. Thus, the sum total of mass cannot be object of possible experience. So, the sum total of mass cannot be that which represents time in appearances. For the reason there must be a permanently persistent substance in appearances which represents time is to make our temporally connected representations of objects possible. But, if the sum total of mass cannot be object of experience, it cannot make our experience of object possible. Thus, the permanently persistent substance in appearances cannot be the sum total of mass.
One might object that in the antinomies, the cosmological ideas at issue are condition-condition series. (B 436/A410) But the sum total of mass is not a series. Rather, it is an aggregate about which the question of conditioning and conditioned does not arise at all. Thus, Kant’s remarks on the antinomies have no bearing on whether the idea of the sum total of mass has any objective validity or significance. Moreover, the first two antinomies concern whether the conditioning-conditioned series go on into infinities. And it seems that it is impossible for us to experience infinity, for no matter what we experience it is finite insofar as we have experienced it. But, the quantum of the sum total of mass seems to be a definite and finite amount. By virtues of what can we claim that the sum total of mass cannot be object of experience? Is this “cannot” an empirical cannot, or an In-Principle cannot? If the answer is the former, the empirical “cannot” does not seem to be strong enough to show that the sum total of mass cannot be experienced, because we cannot know or predict whether in the future empirical sciences and technologies will make the sum total of mass possible object of experience. If the answer is the latter, at least further explanations of why the sum total of mass, which is a finite and definite amount, cannot be object of possible experience in principle are needed.
To the first objection I have two replies. First, in the first antinomy, Kant also discusses whether there is boundary or the largest extent of space. It is not obvious that there is a spatial series in the sense that it is obvious that there is a temporal series in which one moment succeeds its previous moments. However, according to Kant, we can think of the space acquiring its quantum through repeatedly or successively adding spatial units to the previous spatial units. (A 428/B 456) That is, the way of conceiving of space as a spatial series depends on the way of conceiving of time as a temporal series, which is naturally serial. Then, by the same token, we can also think of the sum total of mass acquiring its quantum by successively adding massive units to previous massive units. Thus, if the object-of-sensible-intuition principle applies to the idea of the boundary of space, it should also apply to the idea of the sum total of mass of the whole world of appearances.
Second, the fact that Kant applies the object-of-sensible-intuition-principle to the first two (or three) cosmological ideas to solve the contradictions does not mean that the principle can only be employed to deal with the antinomies. If the principle is applicable to other ideas, we can also use the principle to deal with other ideas. Since the object-of-sensible-intuition principle is derived from transcendental idealism, which is an important element in the whole Critique, there is no reason why the principle cannot be applied to other ideas than cosmological ideas. Thus, it is legitimate to use the object-of-sensible-intuition principle to show that the sum total of mass of whole world of appearances cannot be object of possible experience. So, the sum total of mass cannot be what represents time in appearances.
My reply to the second objection has two steps. First, it needs to be clarified that, although the first two antinomies concern whether the conditioning-conditioned series are infinite, Kant’s solution by the object-of-sensible-intuition principle does not rely on the whether the series are infinite. The principle only concerns whether the things to which the cosmological ideas refer can be given to our sensible intuition. It does not concern whether the things are infinite. It seems true that infinity cannot be object of sensible intuition. But this does not mean that all finite things can be given to our sensible intuition. Actually Kant rejects the claim that all finite things can be given to our sensible intuition. For Kant thinks the thesis of the first antinomy is false, because the beginning of time or the boundary of space cannot be given to our sensible intuition so that it cannot be object of possible experience.
The second step of my reply is to spell out in which sense of “cannot,” the sum total of mass cannot be object of possible experience. It seems to me that the distinction between empirical “cannot” and In-Principle “cannot” is hard to cash out in the context of Critique. For, in the Critique, any legitimate claim to knowledge entails that the object of which the knowledge is can be experienced. Thus, it seems that the empiricality of the “cannot” entails the In-Principality of the “cannot”.
However, concerning the claim that we cannot predict whether in the future empirical sciences and technologies will make the sum total of mass possible object of experience, what would Kant say? Would Kant agree that future sciences and technologies might or could transform a transcendent idea into an idea which refers to object of possible experience? I do not think he would. For Kant thinks his Critique settles metaphysical questions once and for all by theoretical reason, which is static or a-historical. Future discoveries made by sciences and technologies should be able to do no damage to the doctrines in Critique. Moreover, it should be odd to Kant’s ear that progresses made by empirical sciences could have any bearings on the doctrines in the Critique, which he builds up from scratch employing only pure reason, which is absolutely a-historical.
Thus, I conclude that the above arguments show that identifying substance with the sum total of mass in the world of appearance is not tenable. Since I showed earlier in this section that identifying substance with individuated mass is not tenable either, I conclude that the general strategy of identifying substance with mass is untenable.


Section IV. Concluding Remarks

In this paper, I showed that a seemingly very promising way of understanding the permanently persistent substance discussed in the first Analogy, namely, conceiving of substance as Newtonian mass, is untenable. Then, I wonder whether there are other promising ways of providing a positive account of substance or actually it is the case that the notion of substance in the first Analogy is itself untenable. At this stage, maybe I could follow Kant’s stance on the things of themselves, namely, they exist, but we can have no knowledge about the way of their existence. But, at the same time, we need to have this minimal conviction that they exist. Similarly, concerning substance, we can have no knowledge about what the permanently persistent substance is, but we need to have the minimal conviction that it exists in the world of appearances and it serves to represent time.

花俩钱儿钱看一场污染眼球摧残心灵降低智商的垃圾电影不算什么，二三十块钱不会让你败家破产，叔去动物园喂鳄鱼还得花个五六十，但你是否知道无数个脑残粉和审丑者的二三十块加起来，这个巨大的数字对那些垃圾导演和编剧是一种多么大的鼓励吗？以后他会屙出更多垃圾来抢占市场和档期，挤压优秀电影的生存空间，让你以后只能领着郭大爷去玩小屎袋。有的朋友说了，票是送的或者是别人请的，反正没花钱不看白不看。那我问你，大便全国免费，你吃吗？套用房事龙＂没有买卖就没有杀害＂的广告语，不当傻逼就没有垃圾。

电影画面从神秘的敦煌莫高窟转入呼伦贝尔大草原，故事围绕一把叫云镝的弓箭缓缓展开，在航拍镜头的帮助下，画面也不断变得唯美，草原如浪，骏马驰骋，雄鹰翱翔，年轻的恋人依偎在草原上倾诉衷肠。民族题材的电影向来是拍摄的难点，因为要面临各种严格的审查，所以要小心翼翼地不去触及禁区，要规避各种禁忌。电影《丝路英雄?云镝》中，从历史的大视野入手，固化了时代背景，却虚化了人物身份，娓娓道来，讲述了儿女情长的纠葛，讲述了阿木霆成长的历程，讲述了丝绸之路黄金时代中的人物命运。看完电影，观众们也就明白，为什么这部电影能够摘获第六届北京国际电影节民族电影展“金杉叶”最佳编剧奖。在印象中，这几年能够在院线上映的民族题材电影数量寥寥无几，这部电影以唯美画风和温情故事算是佼佼者。
唯有民族的，才是世界的，用“民族眼”观察世界才会展现博大精深的民族文化。在电影圈大部分人忙于炒IP圈钱浮躁的时代，要静下心打造一部养眼养心的民族电影绝非易事。
人们常说，一部电影是一个国家对外文化交流的名片。既然是名片，就要体现一个国家一个民族的文化特色和文明底蕴。看到这部养眼养心的史诗电影，我们也相信那些喜欢中国文化的外国友人会喜欢上这部电影，更会吸引他们来中国探寻那些美轮美奂的大草原和敦煌。

这部电影评价很低，但是我隐约感觉柳云龙不应该就这个水平，于是在没什么其他可看的电影的情况下就看了此片。看完的总体感受是，评价低的人大部分是因为没看懂这片，剧情的确比较复杂费解；同时这片也没拍好。
 
这片没拍好的主要问题是把电影当电视剧拍了。柳云龙显然是拍惯了谍战电视剧，当他还想如此复杂的剧情和这么多的人物塞入两个小时的篇幅中的时候，问题就来了。编剧方面，人物这么多，观众未必搞得清楚谁是哪一边的；各种历史背景事件都要扯进去，观众未必都能熟悉和接受；剧情的变化和复杂的计谋一个接一个，观众未必跟得上思路。像《风声》剧情就简单的多，但是所有焦点都集中在一点即“谁是老鬼”上，就让观众更容易的投入。编剧的问题主要是内容太多时间太短，但是导演问题就更大了，本片的导演没有很好的驾驭能力，虽然画面质色不错，但整个镜头感还是电视剧的，动作以及其他紧张的场面的渲染营造也是电视剧的水平。男女主角柳云龙和范冰冰实在不来电，扮演情侣非常生硬。再加上复杂费解的剧情，观众主要的精力都用来理解剧情了，自然就不能体验到观看电影的其他乐趣。尤其是如果还没想明白剧情，那此片在观众心中就完蛋了。
 
但是不得不说此片的剧情还是很tricky的，拍成电视剧或者更长篇幅的电影还是不错的，只要导演的水平再高一点。另外我也没觉得柳云龙自恋，我不知道自恋是什么样的一种状态。下面我就来简单讲讲我的理解和一些背景信息，有剧透小心。
 
首先里面的人物分成三派：柳云龙、于荣光（唱京剧的）、李小冉（吃了范冰冰的药死的那个）、中西正弘（在满铁工作的日本人）、成海岸（送胶卷的日本人），以及一开始就死掉的王宝强和刘璇是共产党；范冰冰、曾江、方芳（范冰冰夜总会的女经理）、蒲巴甲（曾江的手下）是国民党；特高课的日本boss藤木及其手下以及英达是日本和汪伪的人。其中英达是双面间谍，就是同时为国民党和日本人服务。
 
中统和军统都是国民党的特务组织，当时主要任务是抗日情报工作和锄奸。一开始被处以绞刑的日本人尾崎秀实是日本首相近卫文麿的秘书，同时却是个共产党人，同苏联方面的间谍佐尔格有密切联系，事情败露后两人被捕后被处死。近卫文麿也因此事下台。这些史实在电影里也都提到了。
 
影片的前1/3在让人物出场的同时焦点在送出“日军将偷袭珍珠港”这一情报上，这一段剧情比较散就不多说了，还扯到了英国军官和印度公主，总之是早就得到了情报但有人刻意不接受而让珍珠港事件爆发。后2/3的焦点都放在寻找和争夺神秘的胶卷上面。尾崎秀实在被捕前派了日本满洲混血儿成海岸送了一个据说有重大情报的胶卷到在上海工作的日籍共产党人中西正弘手中。结果就在送的当晚中西正弘被藤木抓获，成海岸赶紧又把胶卷取回，通过苏联塔斯社和柳云龙取得了联系。但是中共上级由于王宝强和刘璇的死命令柳云龙和李小冉离开上海，李小冉去和成海岸接头取胶卷，成海岸当场被藤木抓获，李小冉只取到一个瓶塞，还被藤木盯上，她为了避免柳云龙暴露就去撞车，被日本人抓走拷打。
 
藤木没有拷打出胶卷的下落，就使了个反间计，或者说情报逆用，用一个装着“军统投靠日本人名单”假情报的胶卷替代，以成海岸的名义从英达手中流出，到了范冰冰手上。如果此胶卷被认为是真的，很多军统官员会被无辜清洗。这时候中共上级怀疑柳云龙是内奸，因为他的小组除了他都死了。于荣光和副手来抓捕柳云龙，柳云龙被范冰冰救走，他们没有从成海岸处拿到胶卷，反而从英达处得到，因此对成海岸是否是诱捕李小冉的计谋以及胶卷的真假产生了怀疑。这时候成海岸乘隙在范冰冰工作的夜总会门口跳车自杀，意图昭示自己的清白。
 
范冰冰决定用死间来找出答案，所谓“死间”就是派人去敌人内部送错误情报引发敌人上当，最后事情无论成功失败这个送情报的人必死。范冰冰故意被抓，然后“供出”假胶卷交给特高课，并报告是英达给的。她的想法是，如果胶卷是真的，那英达就是泄露日军机密，会被日本人抓起来，如果胶卷是假的，那英达就没事。结果特高课的藤木识破了这一计谋，并将计就计，先迫使英达交代了范冰冰的上级曾江的藏身之处，然后在曾江面前杀了英达以示胶卷为真。但是曾江已经识破胶卷为假，往重庆发送了这一消息并在藤木面前自杀。
 
这时候柳云龙通过追查成海岸的行踪找到了真胶卷在夜总会，但是藤木也通过成海岸自杀地点找到了这里。柳云龙最后在藤木面前烧掉另一个假胶卷，并用自己的命换取了日军对夜总会的解禁，夜总会的酒保得以将成海岸藏在范冰冰喝一半的酒瓶塞里的真胶卷交给了柳云龙的上级于荣光。故事终于结束。胶卷里保存的只是日本战略情报，即决定南下攻击中国和东南亚而非北上打苏联。

微信公众号：肥嘟嘟看电影(feidudumovie)

没有记错的话，刘嘉玲只有在这部戏里是嫁了梁朝伟的。

乖巧的小郡主，顽皮的韦小宝，倒也算得上是琴瑟之合。

二十四年后的今天，戏外的方怡小宝要成亲。

执手二十年，在众人一片惊愕声中，宣布-- 我们要结婚了。
 
还有后一句，这次来真的。
 
很多人说，刘嘉玲终于要嫁给梁朝伟了。“终于”“嫁给”，搞得刘嘉玲很恨嫁的样子。
 
也许因为梁朝伟一直的沉默，记者一向是不喜欢他的，因为没料，所以所有关于婚礼的消息，都是刘嘉玲在说。于是大家就说，哎呀，看她一脸得意，一把年纪还披婚纱。
 
查了下刘嘉玲的出生年月，竟是比林青霞嫁人之时还要大上三岁。
 
不怕，四十六岁的关之琳还在养着小白脸，三十八岁的李嘉欣还在跟许公子你侬我侬。
 
歌德说，人到四十，才能领悟恋爱的真谛。
 
曾有人说“人间处处有遗憾，最憾是青霞不能嫁秦汉”。
 
但林青霞说，在合适的时间，合适的地点，遇到合适的人，就是一种缘分。
 
她是到四十岁才无奈地领悟了这一点，匆匆下嫁邢李源。
 
而刘嘉玲，她没有在合适的时间遇到梁朝伟，他们相遇的时候，他是她好友曾华倩的真命天子，她正努力要嫁入许晋亨家。说是阴差阳错也好，说是命中注定也罢，许家这种名门贵族自然不会要一个来自大陆的“北姑”，曾华倩这种富家千金也是改不了大小姐脾气。于是，在梁朝伟跟曾华倩的第三次分手后，身为曾好友的刘嘉玲去劝和，不料劝着劝着，就和梁牵了手，一牵就是二十年。
 
后来曾刘反目又和好，好像也就是前两年的事，女人很奇怪，抢男朋友这种事都能一笑泯恩仇。不像梁朝伟跟其他四虎，无线一别，千山万水。这对小情侣就这么在香港演艺圈奋斗着，梁朝伟专心演戏，他也不会其他的；刘嘉玲演戏与绯闻齐飞，时不时地与旧爱许晋亨被拍到，也难怪，两个都喜欢蒲的人。演戏那头，从《阿飞正传》开始就被张曼玉压着，压到后来，连男友都差点守不住，怕是怎么也想不到，只怪张曼玉喜欢的男人实在太多样。
 
1990年，是刘嘉玲最黑暗的一年，被人强行拍了裸照，还疑似被QJ。此时梁朝伟很man地对她说：没事的。当然，大众要在10多年后的2002年方才知道这件事，那时梁刘功成名就，圈内手足众多，还让成龙带头骂了死党杨受成的东周刊，刘嘉玲人气不降反升，成为坚强的现代女性的代表。但是回头看1990年，两个人没权没势，全靠梁朝伟的安慰鼓励，刘嘉玲才能强作镇定。多年的单亲家庭生活，一个人抚养母亲和细妹，反倒是造就了梁朝伟对女人的责任心。
 
之后梁朝伟开始拍王家卫的片子，开始影帝之路。他的对手不再是刘德华，而变成了放弃歌唱的张国荣，不过微妙低调的性格使得两人没有张谭那么敌对。反倒是刘嘉玲跟张国荣老友鬼鬼，没事就聚一起打麻将，梁朝伟则从来不参与那些聚会，一门心思在家看书，颇像《重庆森林》里的自闭警察。也算是有趣的“女主外，男主内”。这一时期，刘嘉玲跟同样从大陆来的王菲的关系变得极好，连带的认识了王菲的好友，日后跟她长得极像的那英。因此后来有了张国荣爆料的那个著名的王菲笑话：一日刘嘉玲，王菲在张国荣家打麻将，刘嘉玲说王菲的牌打错了，王菲甩头一句：“说我唱歌不好我认，但你如果说我不会打麻将呢，我打死你！”
 
九十年代后期，香港回归，人心动荡，刘梁渐渐走向香港娱乐圈的核心，确实，也拿不出什么比他们更出色的情侣档了。于是，不断地传出结婚的讯息，据说梁朝伟求了几十次婚都被刘嘉玲拒绝。结婚没了消息，影帝奖项倒是拿到手软，不过女友的疑似绿帽子也戴了一顶顶。被赌王警告后刘嘉玲不敢再和许晋亨走的太近，开始转向其他富商，这点和李嘉欣倒有几分相似，也难怪十多年后李嘉欣挽着曾和刘订婚的许公子大秀恩爱，这边厢刘嘉玲却结成正果，唯一真正嫁给并且是下嫁给许晋亨的何超琼则是主动选择放弃婚姻孑然一身。
 
2002年是一场轮回，十二年后的刘嘉玲再次陷入人生低潮，一方面是梁朝伟与张曼玉的惊天绯闻，一方面是“东周刊”事件的爆发。话说刘嘉玲在圈内好友众多，但是真要到死党也就只得王菲一个，而要说天敌就非张曼玉莫属，从《阿飞正传》开始，5度金像奖提名5次落败，最有希望的《自梳》输给一无是处的《宋家王朝》，只能说是港人永远看不起北姑。张艺谋的一部《英雄》骂声无数，却促成了梁朝伟跟张曼玉的烟雨杭州行，也不知道张曼玉是哪根筋搭错了，也许是跟法国导演的婚姻失败让她转头又开始看上中国人，也许是梁朝伟符合她喜欢的男人的特质:闷骚，有才。总之，香港媒体几乎一边倒的支持梁朝伟跟张曼玉，一心希望香港女儿摧毁北姑爱情。此时“东周刊”来的刚刚好，刘嘉玲顿时塑造了身处弱势不懦弱的美好形象，梁朝伟也幡然醒悟，自此和张曼玉的绯闻烟消云散。
 
之后，梁朝伟继续拍着他的电影，刘嘉玲继续传着她的绯闻，间中，梁朝伟有过几个小明星的小绯闻，刘嘉玲拍过几个商业片和无数广告片，但是情侣组合不再动摇。2006年两人不甘寂寞，一个跟郭台铭上演手牵手游宜兰，一个被李安下了迷药拍了《色戒》，关系再度传出危机，结果又是风平浪静。演艺圈后浪推前浪，狗仔们对他们的新闻也不再那么感兴趣。就这样吧，做不了老夫妇，就做一对老情人。
 
以为就这么永远了，就这么老去了，孰料今年刘嘉玲父亲突然过身，老梁触景生情，加之他一直想要个孩子。
 
听闻最近蓝心湄人工受孕成功，那么同样四十三岁的刘嘉玲还是有希望造人成功的，毕竟，有林青霞四十五岁产女的成功案例在前。
 
虽然很难想象刘嘉玲大谈妈妈经的画面。
 
timing对了，而身边那个人，风风雨雨二十年，再不合适也合适了，那么，结婚吧，管他满脸皱纹，管他是不是爱情的坟墓，管他2008是不是灾年。
 
刘嘉玲梁朝伟要结婚，又管他外面洪水滔天。
 
没有选择明星最喜欢的拉斯维加斯突发奇想婚礼，没有选择港人最爱的加拿大宁静温馨式婚礼，更没有选择豪门最爱的香港本地婚礼。
 
七月二十一，不丹，这个世外桃源般的佛教小国，将被俗世的欢乐喧嚣包围。
 
地方是刘嘉玲选的，越是看过喧闹浮华的人，也越是喜欢宁静单纯。
 
就好像她喜欢梁朝伟。还好还好，最好的时候，最喜欢的人始终在身边。年华老去的时候，他也在身边。
 
这一点，终于赢了“大嫂”张曼玉。
 
这一场喜玛拉雅山见证的婚礼，在天地之间，两个从小饱受歧视的小孩，相互扶持着走到中年，跪在佛祖面前起誓，从此不离不弃不孤单。
 
这一天的黄历上写着：农历六月十九，宜嫁娶，五行为大海水，平执位。
 
正所谓海水之性始安，然暗流汹涌，来之不穷, 纳之不溢，择平常之日婚嫁，归乎宁谧之位。

小宝，你可要好好待方怡。

爱情的距离是最遥远的，也是最亲近的。就像电影《爱，很美》中一样，彼此相爱的人只有真正经历过这种咫尺天涯的距离之后，才能真正体会到爱情的美好。《爱，很美》是一部令人心情舒畅的爱情电影，就犹如一副可爱的水彩画，一盒炎热夏季的清凉冰块，一朵雨后的滴满露珠的鲜花……

因为年轻，《爱，很美》全片充满了朝气。影片是由80后新锐导演殷悦执导，郭品超、颖儿、骆达华等联袂主演的爱情电影。可以用“新”来形容这支团队。比如《爱，很美》这部电影的小清新、小浪漫的基调；比如影片的没处景色都很美，犹如置身于童话王国；比如俊男美女的养眼组合；比如影片中很多网路流行词汇的应用；比如时尚热门的话题等等。

影片的故事并不复杂，从头至尾都很流畅舒服。简单直白的剧情，配以清新的浪漫风格，让《爱，很美》更像一部爱情物语。影片的故事从屌丝女士钱小菲（颖儿饰演）与高富帅摄影师雷振宇（郭品超饰演）阴差阳错的成为了“合租男女”，他们两人无论从性格还是生活习惯来说都是大相径庭，但是命运的安排也正是应验了“不是冤家不聚头”。钱小菲和雷振宇合租，属于因误会而产生交集，因同在一间屋檐间，不得不被彼此融合同化，爱情也就是在不经意间，让他们两人变成了欢喜冤家。

正如同看多了又甜又腻的爱恨交织，倒不如在这个炎热的夏季来点小清新、小浪漫。《爱，很美》正是这么一部清热解暑的影片。静谧唯美的风格是影片的一大亮点，可以说它安静得让人几近窒息。比如男女主人公一起在夜晚漫步海滩，天空中星罗密布，看到整个画面犹如置身于童话世界，没的令人窒息。《爱，很美》很适合年轻的观众，在这样一个浪漫的年纪，看一部爱情的画篇，可以将其他的一切都抛之脑后。

这是一部对爱情满怀憧憬的影片。从大海、沙滩、流星等浪漫元素中就可以看出。颖儿饰演的钱小菲属于标标准准的女屌丝、灰姑娘，迷糊懵懂、普通的长相、平凡的工作能力，外加上“坏脾气”，而郭品超饰演的雷振宇是位标准的隐形高富帅。谁规定了青春只属于长得好看的人？女屌丝同样能令高富帅神魂颠倒、撕心裂肺！正是这种有落差的组合，才能碰撞出奇妙的爱情花火。这部《爱，很美》可称得上是一部“致初恋”的纯爱电影。

《爱，很美》不属于爱情大片，也没有过大的投资，或许正是因为这些简单的元素，这部电影才能表现出清新的风格。可以说，大餐吃多了，来份甜点也不错！

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这个男人有着传统男人的特质：事业心，体贴，幽默，成熟，圆滑，同时对爱情一往情深，有一点大男子主义，不管你信不信，反正是我心目中完美男人的标准。不禁来这里发表下自己的感慨，现实生活中真得有这种人么？还是需要哦从小说中才能创作出来。
小可身上有着新一代女性的漂亮、大方、独立，渴望通过自身努力实现自己的价值。
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