近几年，随着《长城》、《捉妖记》、《九层妖塔》等片的市场表现，给了中外合拍大片一个非常大的信心。但很多中外合作的项目不是按照市场规律和自我的竞争优势来做，而是按照老板的所谓“高大上”的民族情怀来做。这样就容易做出《白幽灵传奇之绝命逃亡》、《人鱼帝国》这样离...  (展开)

一、多个时空


《纯粹理性批判》中的第一经验类比（Analogies of Experience）要求在现象中有一个恒定且唯一之物来表象意识中的时间本身。恒定，或永恒，因为作为总体的时间本身是始终在那的；惟一，因为只有一个时间。这个惟一且永恒的东西，即现象中的实体（Substance）。康德明确把这个实体与洛克的托子（Substratum）区分开来，认为实体是以各种方式显现于人的，而不是像托子那样不可知，也不显现。

我要说，洛克的托子的作用是保证物的个体化与同一性。这个作用在康德那儿，似乎是由物自体和先验范畴共同完成。先验范畴组织现象，在使意识对现象的认识成为可能的同时，也使同一的意识本身成为可能——对先验对象的构成即对自我的构成。而物自体在这个过程中究竟如何起作用，不详。康德的物自体与洛克的托子一样，是个让理论显得尴尬，却又不得不进行的假设。

尽管康德反复说现象中的实体不是洛克的托子，但这个实体究竟是什么，他又语焉不详。出于他对牛顿力学的接受，有人尝试将其理解为牛顿意义上的质量。我论证过，这样的解读将面临一个两难困境：如果实体是个体化了的质量，时间便不是惟一的；如果实体是现象世界中的总质量，基于二律背反的理由——这个总体无法成为经验对象——我们便无法经验到它。（详细论述见篇末附录）

若是跳出康德阐释，取前一个困境：时间不是惟一的，每个作为现象的物都意味着一个独立的时间体系，我们就科幻了：空间中的一个一个的物，奠基着意识中的一个又一个时间系，我们可以生活在不同的时空中，当我们经验不同的物。甚至，对应地说，我们总在成为另一个人，当我们来到不同的时空。

于是，我情愿把亨利的生活看作对康德的一次失败却有趣的解读。与其说他是一位时间旅行者，一位不停地穿越时空的超人或可怜人，不如说，他的意识中并没有一个绝对惟一的时间，他所来到并离开的每一个时空，都是一个独立自在的世界，尽管这些世界看上去很像，但哪个都不依赖于另一个——从理念的意义上说。


二、沉默，或消失


影片的前半部分，亨利的突然消失被解释为一种不治的遗传疾病。没有理由地，他时不时就去了另一个时空，赤身裸体地寻找可以穿上的衣服。仿佛常人来到一个新的环境，总是迫不及待地寻找一个身份，穿到自己身上。
亨利总会在一个无从预料的时刻消失，克莱尔生活在一个不确定的世界中。她的爱情是确定的，但她爱的人不确定地存在着。她的生活中弥漫着不确定性，而这恰好让她格外珍惜亨利在她身边的每一分钟。

克莱尔一次次怀孕又一次次流产，因为胎儿也有穿越症，莫名其妙地，便在某个时刻，出离了子宫。但克莱尔最后一次怀孕时，对亨利说，你每次消失都是因为感觉到了压力。所以，从现在开始，我要保持绝对地平静，这样胎儿就可以顺利出生了。
看到这里，我恍然大悟，原来亨利的穿越症是个隐喻，关于男人的隐喻：面对压力，便会沉默与回避，这不正是男人的本能反应么——而这在女人看来，仿佛爱人去了另一个时空，不知何时才能回来，甚至，会不会回来。

我查了查，电影改编自一位女造型艺术家的首部小说，写于一段失败的恋情之后。原来如此。

很多年前听到过一个说法：爱情，对男人来说，是挂在墙上的一幅画，你并不总是去看它；但对女人来说，则是房间里音乐，你想不听都不行。所以，男人需要时不时地呆在纯然属于自我的世界里，在沉默中成为自己。女人却要认为这是对她的疏远、对亲密的疏离，并因此而坐立不安，想方设法闯进那份铁一般的沉默。结果，要么把自己撞疼，要么把爱情撞碎。
这是对小儿女情态的描述。若成年点，便会更同情于另一个说法：人生在世，无非是男人讨慰藉，女人讨生活。人并不总是需要慰藉，尤其在得意之时。人却总在生活，就算你不想。


三、看着，却无法改变


在一次穿越中，亨利来到母亲身边，在地铁里，母亲在看报，他们作为陌生人简短却亲切的交谈了一会儿。亨利告诉母亲，他要结婚了，这个女孩让他感到安全。
克莱尔问他：你什么不去阻止那场车祸，既然你可以回到车祸发生之前。“我无法阻止。无数次我回到过去，回到母亲还在的时候，但每次我都无法改变发生着的一切。”——这话让人特别难过。我们并不能改变过去，就像不能重新雕刻一座已然完成的塑像。

不是么？很多时候，我们从自己当下的境遇中抽身而出，试图站在一个更开阔的角度，超脱地看现在的纠结、焦虑，或苦闷，并自嘲这些都没什么的。但当你身在当下，你知道未来的自己就坐在对面，笑着，看着自己，慈悲地。但你还是无法因此脱身而出。你仍然只能呆在你当下的处境中，无论是过分的快乐，还是仿佛无法挣脱的哀伤。

每一个时刻都是三维的，它包含着过去、现在，和未来这三个维度。我们在回忆中编辑时间，编辑自己，有意无意地遗忘一些，并把另一些反复摩挲。过往明明灭灭，像晴天里，随风晃动的百叶窗投在墙上的影子。每次回忆之后，我们都成为另一个人。
未来也是。未来无数次作为想象呈现于当下，各式各样地，仿佛清晰的回忆。回忆与憧憬，如同天平的两臂，对称着，平衡着，在现在这个支点上。所以，现在这个时刻，最重。


四、期限


有天聚会时，亨利中枪后痛苦挣扎的裸体突然出现在他们的门厅里。又消失了。克莱尔说，我从没见过四十岁之后的你。我见过的你总是很年轻。从这个时候起，死亡就成了他们中的另一个在场者，尽管它总是沉默着。

亨利穿越到未来，遇见了自己的已经十岁的女儿。女儿告诉他，他死于自己五岁那年。她们一直很想念他。那时他们的女儿还没出生。那时克莱尔还一如既往地希望与亨利白头偕老，就像她还没长大时那样，就像她长大之后第一次遇到亨利时那样，就像亨利死后，她仍然留着亨利所有的衣服，等着亨利回来那样。

于她而言，亨利是不会死的。他无非是走远了一下子回不来，他无非是在时空中迷了路，找不到一件让他温暖的衣服。

女儿五岁那年，亨利和克莱尔都已知道，亨利即将死去，中弹而死。期限降至，可能在任何一天，任何一个时刻。在它到来之前，所有相聚的时光都是铭刻，都是用最日常的方式来进行的一次祭奠，一次追忆。当这个期限还不确定，他们相爱着，仿佛一对最平凡的恋人；当这个期限已然确定，他们相爱着，装作不知道他们即将分离。

一个期限并不见得让期限到来之前的一切都显得美好。但，美好的东西都有一个期限。确定的期限，或不确定的期限。你不能试图挽留，那会犹如握紧手中的细沙，握得越紧，便流失得越快，宛如时间，从指缝间悄然流走。
这个期限是否到来，何时到来，都不是你能选择的。你能做的，仅仅是在它到来之前的每一刻，不让自己在未来后悔——克莱尔明白这些，并且，她做到了。

而，这不正是人生么。


——————
附录：On Understanding Substance as Mass

Introduction

In the First Analogy of Experience, Kant argues that there must be some permanently persistent substance in the appearances which represents the persistence of time. Given Kant’s endorsement of Newtonian physics, commentators such as Eric Watkins suggest that such permanently persistent substance can be understood as Newtonian mass. In this paper, however, I argue that we face a dilemma when we try to cash out the notion of substance in terms of Newtonian mass.
The paper proceeds in three steps. In the first section, I present the reason why there needs to be a permanently persistent substance in the appearances, and discuss why it seems to be compelling to conceive of the permanently persistent substance as Newtonian Mass. Then, in the second section, I argue that there are (only) two ways of conceiving of the permanently persistent substance as Newtonian mass, namely, to conceive of substance as individuated mass and to conceive of substance as the sum total of mass in the world of appearances. I show that there are textual indications as well as philosophical reasons to support each option. In the third section, however, I argue that both ways suffer from inescapable problems. Thus, conceiving of the permanently persistent substance in terms of Newtonian mass is not viable.

    
Section I. The Permanently Persistent Substance

In this section, I shall first present the reason why Kant thinks that there must be a permanently persistent substance in the appearances. I then discuss why it is compelling to conceive of such substance as Newtonian mass.
In the chapter “System of all principles of pure understanding,” Kant discusses what makes possible the applications of the categories, i.e. the pure concepts of understanding, to objects, i.e. appearances that are given to sensible intuitions. That is, he discusses what it is that makes the categories have objective validity. Kant’s claim is that the applications of the categories are only possible under certain conditions, and these conditions are spelled out by the principles. For instance, the applications of the relational categories (substance-accidents, cause and effect, and mutual interactions) are possible if they are applied to objects according to the principles of Analogies of Experience. In addition to the three specific principles that correspond to each of the three relational categories, Kant also provides a general principle overarching all three Analogies. The general principle is stated in the second edition as follows: “Experience is possible only through the representations of a necessary connection of perceptions” (B 218). Watkins provides a helpful interpretation of this general principle:
“The general idea is that each of the three relational categories represents a necessary connection that is required for experience of a single time and of objects existing and being temporally related to each other within a single time to be possible.” (My emphasis)
Since this paper is focused on the notion of substance in the first Analogy, I shall ignore the second and third Analogies. So I now turn to a close examination of the first Analogy.
The first Analogy, i.e. the principle of the persistence of substance, is stated in the second edition as follows: “In all change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature.” (B 224) Watkins summarizes Kant’s argument for the first Analogy as follows (which I take to be a correct interpretation):
Premise 1: Appearances, i.e. objects of experience, are made possible by time’s persistence.
Premise 2: We do not perceive time itself.
Therefore, In order to have experience of appearances, there must be some permanent substance in the appearances which can represent time or time’s persistence.
While the appearances, as the objects given to our intuitions, are changing, the substance in appearances always stays the same and is permanent. So, Kant calls the permanent substance “the substratum of everything real” (B 225). But, some clarifications about Kant’s use of the term “substratum” are needed to prevent potential confusions. Substratum in Kant’s text does not mean what Locke uses this term to mean, namely, the bearer of properties which is unchanging and about which we can have no knowledge. For, according to Locke, we can only know what is given to our senses, but since the underlying substratum cannot be given to our senses, we have no access to it and therefore cannot know it.
Kant, by constrast, does not think that there is any Lockean substratum in the world of appearances. For Kant, the fact that the states of the substance are changing and the substance stays the same does not mean the states are separable from the substance. Rather, the changing states of the substance are simply the ways in which the substance is given to us. Thus, we can know the substance, that is, we know the substance through its states. In order to avoid the Lockean implication of the term “substratum,” I shall only use “substance” to refer to the permanently persistent thing in the appearances despite Kant’s own use of “substratum” to talk about what is permanent in the appearances.
Since I have argued that Kant’s notion of substance is not the Lockean substratum, then what is the Kantian notion of substance? We need a positive account of what the substance is. It is obvious that such a permanently persistent thing cannot be captured by ordinary physical objects, no matter whether they are natural objects (say, rocks) or artifacts (say, ships), for neither artifacts nor natural objects always stay the same such that in principle they can never suffer changes. So, it seems no ordinarily construed physical things can be qualified as substance that is permanently persistent. On the other hand, it is very hard to imagine that anything non-physical could play the role the substance is supposed to play. For it is hard to imagine how a non-physical being could be given to our sensible intuition or could be spatiotemporally organized by our a priori intuitions. So, it is unlikely that Kant means something non-physical by “substance.” Thus, there are two constraints on spelling out what substance is. First, it is something physical. Second, as I have shown, the physical being that can be understood as substance cannot be ordinarily individuated physical things such as planet or rock.
In order to meet the above two conditions, Watkins suggests that, given Kant’s commitment to Newtonian science, it is likely that Kant has Newtonian mass in mind when he talks about the substance, since no matter how a physical object changes, its mass always stays the same. Since Newtonian mass is physical and is not an ordinarily individuated object, it seems quite compelling that the substance, which is permanently persistent, just is Newtonian mass. According to common sense, Newtonian mass is understood to be underlying objects such that we cannot directly perceive mass but can only perceive mass through the way it is given to our intuition, namely, through the perception of the objects that have mass. Thus, mass is neither unknowable nor directly perceivable, which seems to fit the description of the substance perfectly.
Moreover, there are many textual indications that suggest the identification of substance with mass. Let me note two examples. First, recall the general principle overarching the three specific Analogies, namely, “In all change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature.” (B 224) It seems that “quantum” is most naturally to be understood as mass, for mass seems to be the only thing in nature that is neither increased nor diminished on Newtonian physics.
The other indication is Kant’s example to illustrate his claim that “he <a philosopher> thus assumed that as incontrovertible that even in fire the matter (substance) never disappears but rather only suffers an alteration in its form.” (B 288, my emphasis):
“A philosopher was asked: How much does the smoke weigh? He replied: If you take away from the weight of the wood that was burnt the weight of the ashes that are left over, you will have the weight of the smoke.” (B 288)
We can see that here Kant explicitly identifies substance with matter. And it is quite plausible to think that “matter” is just another way of saying “mass”. That is, “mass” seems to be the theoretical analog of the term “matter.” This hypothesis is supported by the example of the weight of smoke. For, in the example, the way to calculate the weight of smoke just is to calculate the mass (multiplies the gravitational constant).
However, despite the compelling reasons for the identification of substance with mass, in the next sections, I shall argue that the substance cannot be understood as Newtonian mass, for when we try to work out the details of understanding the substance as mass, we face an unavoidable dilemma.


Section II. Some Mass or the Sum Total of Mass

In this section, I shall argue that there are two ways of conceiving of substance as Newtonian mass, and then show that both ways have some support from the text and are to some extent philosophically plausible. So, both ways deserve detailed considerations. But, in the next section, I shall argue that both ways face insurmountable problems.
In identifying substance with mass, we need to settle an ambiguity: Is the mass meant to be some mass, say the mass of a rock which is 7 kilograms (a randomly chosen weight), or to be the sum total of mass in the world of appearances which is a very large but nonetheless definite amount? Since both some mass and the sum total of mass are permanently persistent, we cannot tell which way of identifying is more plausible with respect to the permanent persistence of substance. So, we must appeal to some other philosophically and/or textually interesting points to ground a preference in choosing one over the other.
Let us first consider identifying the substance with some or individuated mass. First, the first Analogy is the principle according to which the relational category substance-accident is to be applied. Kant defines accidents to be “the determinations of a substance that are nothing other than particular ways for it to exist.”(B 229) Many commentators interpret the relation to be between object and its properties or states. Thus it makes more sense to think that the mass, which is the underlying bearer of properties, is the individuated mass of some object, instead of the sum total of mass in the world of appearances. For instance, in the example of the weight of smoke, Kant seems to conceive of substance as the matter, i.e. mass, of an individual object. Moreover, if we conceive of substance as the sum total of mass in the world of appearances, it is very hard to imagine how substance can be the bearer of properties or what kind of properties of which substance is the bearer.
One might argue that, on the interpretation according to which substance is the sum total of mass, even though we could imagine no properties of which substance is the bearer, we can still conceive of substance as the bearer of (changing) states, i.e. the successive states of the world of appearances. I reply that Kant cannot accept such an idea because the states of the world are not objects of possible experience, for it is at least empirically true that no one could have the whole world of appearances as his object of experience. I will return to this point later on in the paper and use it to argue that conceiving of substance as the sum total of mass is untenable given Kant’s theoretic commitments.
The above discussion is about reasons to prefer the identification of substance with some mass. I now turn to the reasons to prefer the identifications of substance with the sum total of mass. There are some textual evidences in the first Analogy that suggest this latter identification. For instance, the following passage:
“…here the issue is only appearances in the field of experience, the unity of which would never be possible if we were to allow new things (as far as their substance is concerned) to arise. For then everything would disappear that alone can represent the unity of time, namely the identity of the substratum in which alone all change has its thoroughgoing unity. This persistence is therefore nothing more than the way in which we represent the existence of things (in appearances).” (B 229/A186, my emphasis)
In this passage, Kant seems to identify the permanent persistent substance that represents the persistence of time with the unity of appearances, which seems to be the sum total of mass in the whole world of appearances. Let me argue for my understanding of this passage that it indicates that Kant identifies substance with the sum total of mass. I shall argue by reductio: Suppose Kant identified substance with individuated mass in the above passage. Then, it would make no sense to think that the arising of new substance could make the representation of the unity of time impossible. For the arising of new substance in no sense affects the substance, i.e. the mass, of the original objects. Let me use an example to illustrate. Suppose there is a rock whose mass is 7 kilograms and there arises a new object out of nothing, whose mass is 5 kilograms. Insofar as the rock’s mass remains the same, whether or not there are new masses arising out of nothing does not affect the unity of the rock’s mass, which is 7 kilograms. Therefore, in this passage, Kant conceives of substance as the sum total of mass in the whole world of appearances.
So far I have shown that there are compelling reasons to identify substance with some mass or with the sum total of mass respectively. In the next section, I shall argue that there are also devastating reasons to each identification such that either way we go, we face unsolvable problems.


Section III. One Single Time and the Limit of Possible Experience

I now turn to the problems from which the each identification suffers. In this section, I shall argue that these problems make both identifications untenable. Let us first consider the identification of substance with individuated mass (i.e. some mass). I argue that the reason why individuated mass cannot be identified with substance is that individuated mass cannot represent the oneness of time. Recall Kant’s argument for the principle of the first Analogy: in order to have experiences of objects as temporal, we must identify a permanently persistent substance that can represent time in objects. While the states of the substance change, the substance persists so that the substance can represent time that persists. It is important to notice that time, which is supposed to be represented by substance in appearances, is one single time. But, individuated mass cannot represent one single time. For there are many individuated masses, for instance, the mass of a rock which is 7 kilograms, the mass of a cup which is 0.5 kilogram, and the mass of a table which is 3 kilograms, each of which is permanently persistent and undergoes changes. If one of them can represent time, any other also can. In that case, we do not have one single time. Rather, we have many times or time-series, each of which is persistent.
Let me explain in details why multiply individuated masses cannot represent on single time. If these individuated masses can represent one single time, there must be some one single thing that is shared by these individuated masses that serves to represent the singularity of time. Whatever this shared thing is, it is not any of these individuated masses. Therefore, individuated mass cannot present one single time. However, on the other hand, time has be to singular. Here is a passage in the first Analogy which explains why time has to be one single time rather than a plurality of times:
“Substances (in appearances) are the substrata of all time-determinations. The arising of some of them and the perishing of others would itself remove the sole condition of the empirical unity of time, and the appearances would then be related to two different times, in which existence flowed side by side, which is absurd. For there is only one time, in which all different times must not be placed simultaneously but only one after another.” (B 232/A189)
One might argue that it does not matter how many individuated masses can represent time, it only matters that there is an individuated mass that represents time. Insofar as there is such a substance, which is permanently persistent, it suffices to represent one single time. I reply that, in that case, we still do not know which individuated mass is suppose to be the representer of the one single time in appearances. For there is not reason to think that the mass of one object is more suitable to represent time than the mass of another object is, insofar as both of the individuated masses are permanently persistent. Any choice of one over the other is arbitrary. But the unity or singularity of time is not arbitrary, for there can only be one time-series which persists, and any other time-series or temporal relations are just temporal parts of this unique time-series. Thus, I conclude that individuated mass cannot be the representer of time in appearances.
I now turn to argue that the sum total of mass cannot represent time either. The idea of my argument is to make use of Kant’s solution to the Antinomies to show that the permanently persistent substance that represents time in the appearances cannot be the sum total of mass because the sum total of mass is not an object of possible experience. Let me lay out my argument in detail.
In “The Antinomy of Pure Reason” chapter, Kant presents four pairs of arguments concerning four cosmological ideas about the world-whole, namely, whether there is a beginning of time, whether there is indivisibly simple substance, whether there is a first cause, and whether there is a necessary existent. As Allen W. Wood argues, the four antinomies share a general form, namely, the thesis of each antinomy claims that there must be a first member of the conditioning-conditioned chain, while the antithesis of each antinomy claims that there is no first member of such a chain and that the chain goes back into infinity. Kant argues that there are valid arguments for each of the four theses as well as valid arguments for each of the four antitheses, so we need a solution to such contradictions.
Kant’s solution to the contradictions, as Wood argues, relies on his doctrine of transcendental idealism. As for the first two antinomies, Wood argues
The mathematical antinomies are generated by mathematical principles that apply to things only insofar as they are given in sensible intuition…But these [the first two] series of conditions are never given to intuition as a whole...The theses are false because the principles of possible experience make it impossible for objects corresponding to the cosmological ideas of a first event, a largest extent of the world or a simple substance, ever to be given to intuition.”
Thus, the reason why Kant thinks that the claims made by the theses of the first and second antinomies are false is that neither the beginning of time nor the spatial boundary of the world or an indivisible substance can ever be given to our sensible intuition. If something cannot be given to our sensible intuition, according to Kant, we cannot have experience of it. Let me call this principle the object-of-sensible-intuition principle, namely, if something cannot be given to our sensible intuitions, then it cannot be object of our possible experience. And we can apply this principle to an object to determine whether that object can be object of possible experience. That is, if the object in question can be given to our sensible intuition, then the object can be object of our possible experience, but if the object cannot be given to our sensible intuition, then it cannot be object of our possible experience.
Now, let me apply the object-of-sensible-intuition principle to the idea of the sum total of mass. We can see that the sum total of mass cannot be given to our sensible intuition, so, the sum total of mass cannot be object of our possible experience. For the world of appearances seems to mean the whole universe or cosmos (because everything in the universe stands in causal relations to each other), there is no way for all of the mass in the whole universe to be given to our sensible intuition. Actually, we do not even know whether there are spatial boundaries of the universe, so we do not even know whether the sum total of mass in the all universe is finite. Thus, the sum total of mass cannot be object of possible experience. So, the sum total of mass cannot be that which represents time in appearances. For the reason there must be a permanently persistent substance in appearances which represents time is to make our temporally connected representations of objects possible. But, if the sum total of mass cannot be object of experience, it cannot make our experience of object possible. Thus, the permanently persistent substance in appearances cannot be the sum total of mass.
One might object that in the antinomies, the cosmological ideas at issue are condition-condition series. (B 436/A410) But the sum total of mass is not a series. Rather, it is an aggregate about which the question of conditioning and conditioned does not arise at all. Thus, Kant’s remarks on the antinomies have no bearing on whether the idea of the sum total of mass has any objective validity or significance. Moreover, the first two antinomies concern whether the conditioning-conditioned series go on into infinities. And it seems that it is impossible for us to experience infinity, for no matter what we experience it is finite insofar as we have experienced it. But, the quantum of the sum total of mass seems to be a definite and finite amount. By virtues of what can we claim that the sum total of mass cannot be object of experience? Is this “cannot” an empirical cannot, or an In-Principle cannot? If the answer is the former, the empirical “cannot” does not seem to be strong enough to show that the sum total of mass cannot be experienced, because we cannot know or predict whether in the future empirical sciences and technologies will make the sum total of mass possible object of experience. If the answer is the latter, at least further explanations of why the sum total of mass, which is a finite and definite amount, cannot be object of possible experience in principle are needed.
To the first objection I have two replies. First, in the first antinomy, Kant also discusses whether there is boundary or the largest extent of space. It is not obvious that there is a spatial series in the sense that it is obvious that there is a temporal series in which one moment succeeds its previous moments. However, according to Kant, we can think of the space acquiring its quantum through repeatedly or successively adding spatial units to the previous spatial units. (A 428/B 456) That is, the way of conceiving of space as a spatial series depends on the way of conceiving of time as a temporal series, which is naturally serial. Then, by the same token, we can also think of the sum total of mass acquiring its quantum by successively adding massive units to previous massive units. Thus, if the object-of-sensible-intuition principle applies to the idea of the boundary of space, it should also apply to the idea of the sum total of mass of the whole world of appearances.
Second, the fact that Kant applies the object-of-sensible-intuition-principle to the first two (or three) cosmological ideas to solve the contradictions does not mean that the principle can only be employed to deal with the antinomies. If the principle is applicable to other ideas, we can also use the principle to deal with other ideas. Since the object-of-sensible-intuition principle is derived from transcendental idealism, which is an important element in the whole Critique, there is no reason why the principle cannot be applied to other ideas than cosmological ideas. Thus, it is legitimate to use the object-of-sensible-intuition principle to show that the sum total of mass of whole world of appearances cannot be object of possible experience. So, the sum total of mass cannot be what represents time in appearances.
My reply to the second objection has two steps. First, it needs to be clarified that, although the first two antinomies concern whether the conditioning-conditioned series are infinite, Kant’s solution by the object-of-sensible-intuition principle does not rely on the whether the series are infinite. The principle only concerns whether the things to which the cosmological ideas refer can be given to our sensible intuition. It does not concern whether the things are infinite. It seems true that infinity cannot be object of sensible intuition. But this does not mean that all finite things can be given to our sensible intuition. Actually Kant rejects the claim that all finite things can be given to our sensible intuition. For Kant thinks the thesis of the first antinomy is false, because the beginning of time or the boundary of space cannot be given to our sensible intuition so that it cannot be object of possible experience.
The second step of my reply is to spell out in which sense of “cannot,” the sum total of mass cannot be object of possible experience. It seems to me that the distinction between empirical “cannot” and In-Principle “cannot” is hard to cash out in the context of Critique. For, in the Critique, any legitimate claim to knowledge entails that the object of which the knowledge is can be experienced. Thus, it seems that the empiricality of the “cannot” entails the In-Principality of the “cannot”.
However, concerning the claim that we cannot predict whether in the future empirical sciences and technologies will make the sum total of mass possible object of experience, what would Kant say? Would Kant agree that future sciences and technologies might or could transform a transcendent idea into an idea which refers to object of possible experience? I do not think he would. For Kant thinks his Critique settles metaphysical questions once and for all by theoretical reason, which is static or a-historical. Future discoveries made by sciences and technologies should be able to do no damage to the doctrines in Critique. Moreover, it should be odd to Kant’s ear that progresses made by empirical sciences could have any bearings on the doctrines in the Critique, which he builds up from scratch employing only pure reason, which is absolutely a-historical.
Thus, I conclude that the above arguments show that identifying substance with the sum total of mass in the world of appearance is not tenable. Since I showed earlier in this section that identifying substance with individuated mass is not tenable either, I conclude that the general strategy of identifying substance with mass is untenable.


Section IV. Concluding Remarks

In this paper, I showed that a seemingly very promising way of understanding the permanently persistent substance discussed in the first Analogy, namely, conceiving of substance as Newtonian mass, is untenable. Then, I wonder whether there are other promising ways of providing a positive account of substance or actually it is the case that the notion of substance in the first Analogy is itself untenable. At this stage, maybe I could follow Kant’s stance on the things of themselves, namely, they exist, but we can have no knowledge about the way of their existence. But, at the same time, we need to have this minimal conviction that they exist. Similarly, concerning substance, we can have no knowledge about what the permanently persistent substance is, but we need to have the minimal conviction that it exists in the world of appearances and it serves to represent time.

周星驰继续饰演他在《赌圣》中的角色，却遇上了刘德华在《赌神》中扮演的角色。
很有趣吧，光看这个噱头，就已经觉得值回票价了。
其实有段时间，总是赌圣赌侠赌后赌神，赌赌赌。。。。。。。傻傻分不清楚，可是现在的涉及“赌”这个题材的电影越来越少了呢。
来看看这部电影的主要人物构成吧：
《赌圣》中的阿星(周星驰饰演)
达叔(吴孟达饰演)
《赌神》中的陈刀仔(刘德华饰演)
仅仅这三个人就赚尽眼球，更不要说张敏啊，大嘴九啊等等等等的配角也很有意思。
港片的带有喜剧特色的赌片，总是离不开特异功能，这部也不例外
阿星的特异功能不仅可以透视，千里之外，还有隐身，催眠等等。
在赌博比赛上技能和经验变得无关紧要，每个玩家都会输给拥有最酷神奇超能力的家伙。
虽然很夸张，不过作为一部喜剧而已，博得一笑也就是了。

我下的盗版，下午看完的，看完之后过来点看过呢，心说好久没有看豆瓣影评了，看一眼吧，一看吓我一跳，从专业影评人到普通豆友，这评论怎么一水的啊？

坍塌啊重建啊，佛教啊，生死啊，文艺啊，什么什么。粗略浏览完这些之后，我决定贡献一篇最低俗的影评。

影评就仨字：没撸点。

我本来是想看范冰冰的胸肌和大腿的，结果没看到，这不能赖我，你看电影底下的剧照的样子都像有胸肌跟大腿似的。这说明宣传很坑爹。

然后片子还不错，总体来说，我一边开着电影一边刷豆瓣的频率很低，比看其他别的片子的时候低很多。

喜欢这片子还一个原因就是这是李玉电影中男人最不贱的一个片子，从那个女同片到苹果，上边的男的都贱呼呼的，硬生生的想把直女逼弯的样子。

所谓李玉的影子，我觉得就是李玉又意淫老太太了，从女同片上听崔健的妈，到这个片子上蹦迪的张艾嘉，李玉不停，意淫不止。

也挺娄烨的。

我没看着我自己，我觉得最接近我生活的片子还是《任逍遥》虽然也有点假。

这不是啥神圣的片子，挺值得看的。

没了。

   刚看了一半的《警犬巴打》。总的说剧情诙谐幽默，也反映了当下的一些民生，所以整体来说还挺期待往下看的。不过钟嘉欣扮演的马志昊的角色让人看着有点奇怪。
    作为本剧学历最高，智商最高，还是位有编制的兽医，可以算得上是社会精英人士了。至少社会地位比起剧中其他的同辈角色要高。但是她貌似一点都不受尊重。在母婴店给三妹买婴儿用品的时候被一群孕妇围殴；巴打对蛇唾液敏感出现幻觉的时候被殴打······有人肯定会解释说是那些施暴者的错，或是一些不可抗力因素。可马志昊的设定不是心高气傲的社会精英，最看不起那些“平头百姓”吗？在如此“暴行”之后还能原谅他们，一点都不觉得自己吃亏······难道她其实内心是个抖M？还是编剧借那些人的手发泄了一把对中产阶级的不满？在巴打对马志昊动手那段我就震惊了，尽管我知道事出有因。我就是想了想如果巴打婚后又因为某种原因出现幻觉，这样的暴行不是还要上演？总言之不是他俩不相配，而是展开的方式有问题。编剧和导演没能想好一个更为合理的过程。

白蝶传说之幽生蝴蝶兰


    传说在很久以前，有一只白蝴蝶，她很羡慕世界的主宰——人，羡慕人类的一切。所以她有一个梦想，她想做一个人。

    在祈祷了999次后，终于出现了一个自称是神仙的白胡子老头，她向老头表明了心意，这个人们称之为月老的白胡子终于被她的精神所感动，答应了她，不过他说：“人是人，蝶是蝶，如果我把你变成了人，这世界的平衡就会被打破，必须要有人愿意变成蝶，你才可以变成人，这样，世间万物才不致于混乱，你等着吧，时间到了我会通知你的。”

    冬去春来，白蝶不知冬眠了多少次。终于，月老又出现了，月老告诉她一个好消息：“有一个人为了救自己的男友，愿意化蝶三年，因此，你也有三年的做人时间。那个傻女人相信他男人三年不变心，我跟她打赌说肯定会移情别恋。所以如果你能在三年内成为那个男人的女朋友，我可以让你永世为人。”

    就这样，她成功的变成了一个人，而且还是一个高挑的美人，有生以来第一次有了一个人类的名字，月老还给了她一个方便接近那个植物学家男人的身份：《药物与理》杂志编辑记者。

    借着杂志社要她采访男人的机会，她来到了男人居住的世外桃源——月岛。当她第一次见到男人的时候，她一下子被这个帅气的小伙子吸引住了，一直以为所谓专家肯定是上了年纪的老头，没想专家也可以这么年轻，这么英俊。就是月老不说，我也要成为他的女人，白蝶在心里默默地对自己说。

    为了了解这个男人，白蝶认识了他的邻家女孩，说是邻居，但白蝶也感受到了这个邻居不简单，因为她知道男人的事情太多了，简直是他肚子里的蛔虫。不过也好，白蝶通过她知道他不少的事情，为自己能进入男人的生活，提供不少的方便。

    采访结束后，白蝶把搜集到有关男人和他前女友的资料好好的整理了一下，整整有一大本，什么男人的习性、爱好，什么他前女友的性格特征，这些都是做他女朋友的必备资料。在这之后的一年多，白蝶基本上把时间都花在了学习怎样当他的女朋友上，虽然很辛苦，但她无怨无悔，不止是为月老，更是为自己。

    两年后，白蝶借着度假的名义再一次来到了男人的世外桃源。那天，刚好下着大雨，差一点把男人的房子都冲走，白蝶知道男人温室里的花花草草是他的生命，所以要取得他的好感，必须与他站在同一阵线上，她毅然的脱下了自己的外套，想以此堵住门缝，阻止更多洪水灌入房中，虽然这一办法并没有为这些花花草草减少多少灾难，但她成功了，成功地赢得了男人的好感，当男人热情地招呼她进来洗个澡，还把自己女朋友的衣服拿来给她换的时候，虽然还打着喷嚏，但她开心地笑了。

    男人关心地给她冲了一杯药水，还拿出了珍藏两年的饼干，这是两年前他的女朋友做的，男人很喜欢，一直舍不得吃，自己一边吃着说好，一边还让白蝶就着药水吃几片，白蝶拿起来就闻到一股味儿，连忙说不用不用，心里却暗自高兴，这两年的功夫没有白费，明天看我的，白蝶心里想。

    果然，当白蝶使出浑身解数，做出了一模一样的饼干时，得到了男人的大加赞赏。但男人却意外地发现五只小猪调料盒都被她贴上了标签，面对白蝶的解释，男人嘴上虽然说这样好这样好，但细心的白蝶还是感觉到了有点不对劲。所以当第二天的时候，白蝶又撕下了标签，把五只一模一样的小猪推到男人前面的时候，男人虽然诧异怎么标签又没了，但白蝶却感觉到了男人内心的喜悦，尽管他只是嘴角露出那一点点笑容，还是被白蝶捕捉到了。作为一个人，白蝶是细心的，她想把每一个细节做好，细节决定成败，白蝶这样想。

    之后，白蝶尽量把自己当成这个房间的女主人，在生活上对男人嘘寒问暖，在工作上做男人的得力助手。对于男人带回来的六棵幽生蝴蝶兰，白蝶也尽心照顾，因为她知道这是男人当前研究的全部，照顾好幽生蝴蝶兰才能真正赢得男人的心，才能完成月老的任务，做一辈子的人。

    可好景不长，一次跟随男人外出考察植物时，白蝶突然发现地上有好多昆虫的尸体，她被吓了一跳，这种场景她在好多年前见到过，那时妈妈告诉她说这些昆虫得了瘟疫，那一次，死了好多好多的昆虫，包括她的同类白蝴蝶。回到房间后，白蝶觉得自己应该做点什么，一番思索后，她把这些昆虫死亡的照片发到了《卫生报》编辑部，她觉得万能的人类应该可以拯救这些可怜的虫儿。

    但事与愿违。那天，白蝶不知是不是被虫儿传染了，正发着高烧，忽然听到屋外一片吵闹声，推开门一看，一群穿着白色衣服的人，自称是防疫队的，要对月岛全面杀毒。天哪，人类怎么可以这么自私，原想拯救昆虫的点子，居然为昆虫们带来了灭顶之灾，白蝶只觉得天旋地转，一下子就晕了过去，不省人事。

    等她醒过来的时候，她惊奇地发现自己的报纸上居然有一只蚱蜢和一只瓢虫，看来是慌不择路了。救得一只是一只，白蝶赶紧把它们藏到了储藏室。随后，她与男人一起加入到了抗议暴力杀虫的队伍中，为拯救这一大片的生命作最后的努力。

    男人和她的抗议并没有得到防疫队的重视，但就在这紧要关头，男人的幽生蝴蝶兰开了，幽生蝴蝶兰只有一天的花期，这是他守候近一年的研究，必须要有花仙子配种才能延长它的花期，但花仙子却在千里之外的星岛。白蝶恨不得变回蝴蝶，飞到星岛为男人取回花仙子的花粉，但此时的她却爱莫能助，只能拼命地鼓励他用其它花粉试试，结果不言而喻，男人失败了。

    失败后，男人拿着最后一株幽生蝴蝶兰来到了月老树下，这时白蝶才明白，原来幽生蝴蝶兰不仅是他的研究，还是他的爱情，寄托着他对前女友的无限相思。看到这一幕，白蝶明白了，不仅是男人的研究失败了，自己的任务也失败，三年一晃而过，是时候走了。

    码头上，男人送白蝶离开，对白蝶像普通朋友那样的客气，欢迎她下次再来月岛度假，但白蝶却黯然神伤，因为只有她自己才知道，这差不多就是永别，跟男人的永别，跟人类生活的永别。

    ……

    不过还好，变回白蝶蝴后，她也挺开心，因为她交了两个好朋友，一个叫蚱蜢，一个叫瓢虫，两个很有趣的家伙。

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在我看来，《极限特工3》和《忍者神龟2》有点类似，都是受限于中等的投资（据说《极限特工3》的投资为8500万美金，《忍者神龟2》则为1.35亿，在特效大片中也不算很高），所以在动作场面的设计上都借鉴了前人的很多优秀成果。如果说《忍者神龟2》的高潮段落和《复仇者联盟》非常...  (展开)

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首先编剧属于典型被驴踢了脑子还自以为萌系，野蛮女友这么老套的题材也拍不出啥新意，只好各种装......电影是不需要真实，因为它本来就是一个梦，所以大家才愿意心甘情愿沉溺。可是，演员总要还原生活吧。整部戏，感觉是黄渤一个人在硬撑。因为对手太差，所以情到深处人孤独，看得那个了无生趣啊！

江一燕有张集大成（章子怡、徐静蕾）的脸，玉女的优点没学会，那些假大空的演技全部在她身上，唯独缺一颗灵动的心！简单扮纯真装知性可以，只要有内心戏，感情里的层次感就全然不能传达......当她失声痛哭，我在电影院里真想佯装悲伤也挤出几滴泪应景一下，可是......我真想问一句你肿么了.......

《非诚勿扰1》热了北海道的旅游，2给三亚亚龙湾锦上添花，《假》的投资方是不是也想走这个路线，所以硬生生添了一个外国景点...只是故事转折的太突兀，而且情结太假，糟蹋了漂亮的雪景啊......


然后是电影里的音乐。话说，以后网络歌手都别把钱浪费在媒体推广上了，大家一起攒局儿直接投电影，就以《假》为参照，插曲一首接一首，完全不用照顾节奏和情绪，feel来了恨不能把电影变成音乐剧！

最后我引用《假装情侣》观影研讨会“专家”们的评语：作为一部都市喜剧爱情影片，《假装情侣》制作精良、画面优美，情节设置巧妙，台词极富喜感，演员表演到位，不失为近几年此类影片中的佳作。来自院线、媒体的专家们还积极为该片的宣传推广和发行放映出谋划策，希望片方能够充分发挥影片在类型题材、档期选择等方面的优势，吸引更多观众走进影院观影。

对此我只有一句话说：你有权保持沉默，但你所说的每一句话都将成为遗言。

这篇影评可能有剧透 老段： 郭涛饰演的老段是片中灵魂人物，无论正派反派、亲友仇敌，都和他密切相关。 根据剧情倒推，老段年轻时肯定是个精通古玩古董，少年得志，腰缠万贯的家伙。可惜风流成性、放荡不羁，先后娶了三个老婆，生有二子一女。鲜花着锦、盛极必衰，在国宝“玉麒麟”失窃一案中受到...  (展开)

两天追到了第三季，但是觉得第三季不太精彩，目前看到第三集，最爱萨维，泽克，范斯，不知道为什么对男女主喜欢不起来，第三季开始能get 一点女主的颜值，杰瑞德开始真的很好，后来跟那个酒吧的老板娘看对眼后，又觉得他也不是只钟情于小米，编剧的脑洞真的无敌了，下一个镜头...  (展开)

      时隔上映26天 《百鸟朝凤》的票房将近8000万了，最初关注电影时 是方励的惊天一跪求排片 引起对该片的关注，当时给我的感觉，影方为了电影票房拼了。在前段时间看美队时 还在影院看到李安支持百鸟朝凤的视频，一直没有去看，昨天实在没啥可看了，把这部片看了吧。
     《百鸟朝凤》讲述了随着时代的发展 中国民间艺术唢呐的逐渐消失。影片前半部分讲述焦三爷与两个小徒弟之间学艺点滴，天鸣不想唢呐，多半是父亲逼着让学，无天赋 但做事踏实 认真。蓝玉有天赋，人机灵，学东西快，焦三爷出活都先带着蓝玉。当焦三爷给天鸣第一只唢呐 ，天鸣激动的掉泪。百鸟朝凤一代只传一人，最后焦三爷选择传给天鸣。树林里 天鸣听出来的鸟声更多，危险中天鸣记住师傅的话唢呐离口不离手。这些都是选天鸣的原因吧。选传承人不仅仅看活好不好更多看做人吧 后半部分 游家班成立，天鸣当上了掌门人，但随着时代的发展变迁，新鲜事物西洋乐队的引进，传统民间艺术唢呐面临淘汰，师兄们为了生计放弃唢呐选择去城里打工，焦三爷为了唢呐精神吹到吐血，最后也拯救不了唢呐淘汰的现实。当文化局的正局长上门请家班吹一场唢呐记录下来，焦三爷立马答应。焦三爷心里清楚 光靠天鸣 唢呐是传承不下去的。到最后结局 焦三爷死后确唯独天鸣自己在坟前吹唢呐。一代唢呐匠人最后却是这个结局，银幕外的观众看着心酸。
      唢呐只是众多文化艺术逐渐消失的一种，其实有很多民间艺术随着时代的变迁在逐渐消失淘汰。
      影片焦三爷的饰演者陶泽如其实是个老演员了，小时候看过他演的电视剧《黑洞》，焦三爷的匠人劲儿演的入木三分。两个小徒弟小演员 演的不错。长大后的天鸣演的更木讷一些。
      整体来看电影一般，但在被特效的外国片子包围下，看看这种朴实的电影也是一种好的选择。
      看完电影也许我当初认为下跪为了票房只是一个原因吧，更多是希望很多人能看到这部电影吧。据悉影片已延至7月6下档，看来票房过亿还是有希望的。

男友深夜给我打电话说给我推荐一部看了要哭的电影—就是《王家欣》。

就是一个犯傻的女孩陪着一个男孩犯傻 一系列发生在坪洲的傻傻的爱情故事。
电影之所以能让我们有共鸣 是因为我们都曾经傻傻地等过 爱过 我们都曾经是王家欣 也曾经是陈俊贤 只是我们都没有打遍整个城市的电话花光所有力气去找那一个人 没有三十五年如一日地在同一个地方等那个猝不及防就离开了的人。他们怎么可以那么傻 当初的我们怎么可以那么傻。

最开始 王家欣是想看看世上是不是会真的有这样一个傻瓜 会一直等一个人。到后来 她嫉妒 大家都叫王家欣 为什么她能遇到这样的一个痴情男人 自己却没有。再后来 她帮他找王嘉欣 不知不觉间爱上了这个傻小子 既想让他开心 又害怕真的找到以后 她会失去他。
「如果真係俾你搵到佢，你會唔會忘記我？」
「唔會」
「你應承我，永遠都唔會忘記我！我地勾手指尾。」

她為他辦了王家欣聯誼會 幫他保存好了吉他 讓他唱出那首寫給王家欣的歌。聯誼會之後她哭著走了 是她知道 自己再努力 也都替代不了他心中的那個王家欣。
「如果冇左佢，你會唔會鐘意我啊？」
「我唔知啊」

其實到最後 俊賢心中的王安欣早就變成了王家欣 只是連他自己都不知道 不然當他在巴士上重遇那個一直在尋找的人的時候 怎麼可能不追上前去。

而紹叔和黃細妹的故事是讓我最感動的。紹叔在戲院35年如一日地等著細妹 人生有多少個35年？他們重逢了 這成了一個最浪漫的愛情故事 如果一輩子都沒遇上 就成了一個最大的遺憾。幸好。

故事裡彷彿所有人都找到了自己的歸宿 20年後 當王安欣知道這一切雖然感動 但她最後是打給了現在的男朋友
「梗係嬲啦！快d請我食飯，氹翻我啊！」

陪伴是最真誠的告白。
當然 這種等只適合相互之間有愛的兩個人 不然 無論多久 被感動的只有自己