制作组用心做了的，虽然说会有些改编，但毕竟是动漫，不改编要编很久，所以也请某些原著党不要说了??建模挺好的，同学爸妈也爱看了！就是因为男主的建模帅??，皓晨采儿真的爱住了，天造地设的一对！！绝了哇??剧情速度一般我觉得前期有些慢后期不错，挺适合动漫小白去看...  (展开)

一、多个时空


《纯粹理性批判》中的第一经验类比（Analogies of Experience）要求在现象中有一个恒定且唯一之物来表象意识中的时间本身。恒定，或永恒，因为作为总体的时间本身是始终在那的；惟一，因为只有一个时间。这个惟一且永恒的东西，即现象中的实体（Substance）。康德明确把这个实体与洛克的托子（Substratum）区分开来，认为实体是以各种方式显现于人的，而不是像托子那样不可知，也不显现。

我要说，洛克的托子的作用是保证物的个体化与同一性。这个作用在康德那儿，似乎是由物自体和先验范畴共同完成。先验范畴组织现象，在使意识对现象的认识成为可能的同时，也使同一的意识本身成为可能——对先验对象的构成即对自我的构成。而物自体在这个过程中究竟如何起作用，不详。康德的物自体与洛克的托子一样，是个让理论显得尴尬，却又不得不进行的假设。

尽管康德反复说现象中的实体不是洛克的托子，但这个实体究竟是什么，他又语焉不详。出于他对牛顿力学的接受，有人尝试将其理解为牛顿意义上的质量。我论证过，这样的解读将面临一个两难困境：如果实体是个体化了的质量，时间便不是惟一的；如果实体是现象世界中的总质量，基于二律背反的理由——这个总体无法成为经验对象——我们便无法经验到它。（详细论述见篇末附录）

若是跳出康德阐释，取前一个困境：时间不是惟一的，每个作为现象的物都意味着一个独立的时间体系，我们就科幻了：空间中的一个一个的物，奠基着意识中的一个又一个时间系，我们可以生活在不同的时空中，当我们经验不同的物。甚至，对应地说，我们总在成为另一个人，当我们来到不同的时空。

于是，我情愿把亨利的生活看作对康德的一次失败却有趣的解读。与其说他是一位时间旅行者，一位不停地穿越时空的超人或可怜人，不如说，他的意识中并没有一个绝对惟一的时间，他所来到并离开的每一个时空，都是一个独立自在的世界，尽管这些世界看上去很像，但哪个都不依赖于另一个——从理念的意义上说。


二、沉默，或消失


影片的前半部分，亨利的突然消失被解释为一种不治的遗传疾病。没有理由地，他时不时就去了另一个时空，赤身裸体地寻找可以穿上的衣服。仿佛常人来到一个新的环境，总是迫不及待地寻找一个身份，穿到自己身上。
亨利总会在一个无从预料的时刻消失，克莱尔生活在一个不确定的世界中。她的爱情是确定的，但她爱的人不确定地存在着。她的生活中弥漫着不确定性，而这恰好让她格外珍惜亨利在她身边的每一分钟。

克莱尔一次次怀孕又一次次流产，因为胎儿也有穿越症，莫名其妙地，便在某个时刻，出离了子宫。但克莱尔最后一次怀孕时，对亨利说，你每次消失都是因为感觉到了压力。所以，从现在开始，我要保持绝对地平静，这样胎儿就可以顺利出生了。
看到这里，我恍然大悟，原来亨利的穿越症是个隐喻，关于男人的隐喻：面对压力，便会沉默与回避，这不正是男人的本能反应么——而这在女人看来，仿佛爱人去了另一个时空，不知何时才能回来，甚至，会不会回来。

我查了查，电影改编自一位女造型艺术家的首部小说，写于一段失败的恋情之后。原来如此。

很多年前听到过一个说法：爱情，对男人来说，是挂在墙上的一幅画，你并不总是去看它；但对女人来说，则是房间里音乐，你想不听都不行。所以，男人需要时不时地呆在纯然属于自我的世界里，在沉默中成为自己。女人却要认为这是对她的疏远、对亲密的疏离，并因此而坐立不安，想方设法闯进那份铁一般的沉默。结果，要么把自己撞疼，要么把爱情撞碎。
这是对小儿女情态的描述。若成年点，便会更同情于另一个说法：人生在世，无非是男人讨慰藉，女人讨生活。人并不总是需要慰藉，尤其在得意之时。人却总在生活，就算你不想。


三、看着，却无法改变


在一次穿越中，亨利来到母亲身边，在地铁里，母亲在看报，他们作为陌生人简短却亲切的交谈了一会儿。亨利告诉母亲，他要结婚了，这个女孩让他感到安全。
克莱尔问他：你什么不去阻止那场车祸，既然你可以回到车祸发生之前。“我无法阻止。无数次我回到过去，回到母亲还在的时候，但每次我都无法改变发生着的一切。”——这话让人特别难过。我们并不能改变过去，就像不能重新雕刻一座已然完成的塑像。

不是么？很多时候，我们从自己当下的境遇中抽身而出，试图站在一个更开阔的角度，超脱地看现在的纠结、焦虑，或苦闷，并自嘲这些都没什么的。但当你身在当下，你知道未来的自己就坐在对面，笑着，看着自己，慈悲地。但你还是无法因此脱身而出。你仍然只能呆在你当下的处境中，无论是过分的快乐，还是仿佛无法挣脱的哀伤。

每一个时刻都是三维的，它包含着过去、现在，和未来这三个维度。我们在回忆中编辑时间，编辑自己，有意无意地遗忘一些，并把另一些反复摩挲。过往明明灭灭，像晴天里，随风晃动的百叶窗投在墙上的影子。每次回忆之后，我们都成为另一个人。
未来也是。未来无数次作为想象呈现于当下，各式各样地，仿佛清晰的回忆。回忆与憧憬，如同天平的两臂，对称着，平衡着，在现在这个支点上。所以，现在这个时刻，最重。


四、期限


有天聚会时，亨利中枪后痛苦挣扎的裸体突然出现在他们的门厅里。又消失了。克莱尔说，我从没见过四十岁之后的你。我见过的你总是很年轻。从这个时候起，死亡就成了他们中的另一个在场者，尽管它总是沉默着。

亨利穿越到未来，遇见了自己的已经十岁的女儿。女儿告诉他，他死于自己五岁那年。她们一直很想念他。那时他们的女儿还没出生。那时克莱尔还一如既往地希望与亨利白头偕老，就像她还没长大时那样，就像她长大之后第一次遇到亨利时那样，就像亨利死后，她仍然留着亨利所有的衣服，等着亨利回来那样。

于她而言，亨利是不会死的。他无非是走远了一下子回不来，他无非是在时空中迷了路，找不到一件让他温暖的衣服。

女儿五岁那年，亨利和克莱尔都已知道，亨利即将死去，中弹而死。期限降至，可能在任何一天，任何一个时刻。在它到来之前，所有相聚的时光都是铭刻，都是用最日常的方式来进行的一次祭奠，一次追忆。当这个期限还不确定，他们相爱着，仿佛一对最平凡的恋人；当这个期限已然确定，他们相爱着，装作不知道他们即将分离。

一个期限并不见得让期限到来之前的一切都显得美好。但，美好的东西都有一个期限。确定的期限，或不确定的期限。你不能试图挽留，那会犹如握紧手中的细沙，握得越紧，便流失得越快，宛如时间，从指缝间悄然流走。
这个期限是否到来，何时到来，都不是你能选择的。你能做的，仅仅是在它到来之前的每一刻，不让自己在未来后悔——克莱尔明白这些，并且，她做到了。

而，这不正是人生么。


——————
附录：On Understanding Substance as Mass

Introduction

In the First Analogy of Experience, Kant argues that there must be some permanently persistent substance in the appearances which represents the persistence of time. Given Kant’s endorsement of Newtonian physics, commentators such as Eric Watkins suggest that such permanently persistent substance can be understood as Newtonian mass. In this paper, however, I argue that we face a dilemma when we try to cash out the notion of substance in terms of Newtonian mass.
The paper proceeds in three steps. In the first section, I present the reason why there needs to be a permanently persistent substance in the appearances, and discuss why it seems to be compelling to conceive of the permanently persistent substance as Newtonian Mass. Then, in the second section, I argue that there are (only) two ways of conceiving of the permanently persistent substance as Newtonian mass, namely, to conceive of substance as individuated mass and to conceive of substance as the sum total of mass in the world of appearances. I show that there are textual indications as well as philosophical reasons to support each option. In the third section, however, I argue that both ways suffer from inescapable problems. Thus, conceiving of the permanently persistent substance in terms of Newtonian mass is not viable.

    
Section I. The Permanently Persistent Substance

In this section, I shall first present the reason why Kant thinks that there must be a permanently persistent substance in the appearances. I then discuss why it is compelling to conceive of such substance as Newtonian mass.
In the chapter “System of all principles of pure understanding,” Kant discusses what makes possible the applications of the categories, i.e. the pure concepts of understanding, to objects, i.e. appearances that are given to sensible intuitions. That is, he discusses what it is that makes the categories have objective validity. Kant’s claim is that the applications of the categories are only possible under certain conditions, and these conditions are spelled out by the principles. For instance, the applications of the relational categories (substance-accidents, cause and effect, and mutual interactions) are possible if they are applied to objects according to the principles of Analogies of Experience. In addition to the three specific principles that correspond to each of the three relational categories, Kant also provides a general principle overarching all three Analogies. The general principle is stated in the second edition as follows: “Experience is possible only through the representations of a necessary connection of perceptions” (B 218). Watkins provides a helpful interpretation of this general principle:
“The general idea is that each of the three relational categories represents a necessary connection that is required for experience of a single time and of objects existing and being temporally related to each other within a single time to be possible.” (My emphasis)
Since this paper is focused on the notion of substance in the first Analogy, I shall ignore the second and third Analogies. So I now turn to a close examination of the first Analogy.
The first Analogy, i.e. the principle of the persistence of substance, is stated in the second edition as follows: “In all change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature.” (B 224) Watkins summarizes Kant’s argument for the first Analogy as follows (which I take to be a correct interpretation):
Premise 1: Appearances, i.e. objects of experience, are made possible by time’s persistence.
Premise 2: We do not perceive time itself.
Therefore, In order to have experience of appearances, there must be some permanent substance in the appearances which can represent time or time’s persistence.
While the appearances, as the objects given to our intuitions, are changing, the substance in appearances always stays the same and is permanent. So, Kant calls the permanent substance “the substratum of everything real” (B 225). But, some clarifications about Kant’s use of the term “substratum” are needed to prevent potential confusions. Substratum in Kant’s text does not mean what Locke uses this term to mean, namely, the bearer of properties which is unchanging and about which we can have no knowledge. For, according to Locke, we can only know what is given to our senses, but since the underlying substratum cannot be given to our senses, we have no access to it and therefore cannot know it.
Kant, by constrast, does not think that there is any Lockean substratum in the world of appearances. For Kant, the fact that the states of the substance are changing and the substance stays the same does not mean the states are separable from the substance. Rather, the changing states of the substance are simply the ways in which the substance is given to us. Thus, we can know the substance, that is, we know the substance through its states. In order to avoid the Lockean implication of the term “substratum,” I shall only use “substance” to refer to the permanently persistent thing in the appearances despite Kant’s own use of “substratum” to talk about what is permanent in the appearances.
Since I have argued that Kant’s notion of substance is not the Lockean substratum, then what is the Kantian notion of substance? We need a positive account of what the substance is. It is obvious that such a permanently persistent thing cannot be captured by ordinary physical objects, no matter whether they are natural objects (say, rocks) or artifacts (say, ships), for neither artifacts nor natural objects always stay the same such that in principle they can never suffer changes. So, it seems no ordinarily construed physical things can be qualified as substance that is permanently persistent. On the other hand, it is very hard to imagine that anything non-physical could play the role the substance is supposed to play. For it is hard to imagine how a non-physical being could be given to our sensible intuition or could be spatiotemporally organized by our a priori intuitions. So, it is unlikely that Kant means something non-physical by “substance.” Thus, there are two constraints on spelling out what substance is. First, it is something physical. Second, as I have shown, the physical being that can be understood as substance cannot be ordinarily individuated physical things such as planet or rock.
In order to meet the above two conditions, Watkins suggests that, given Kant’s commitment to Newtonian science, it is likely that Kant has Newtonian mass in mind when he talks about the substance, since no matter how a physical object changes, its mass always stays the same. Since Newtonian mass is physical and is not an ordinarily individuated object, it seems quite compelling that the substance, which is permanently persistent, just is Newtonian mass. According to common sense, Newtonian mass is understood to be underlying objects such that we cannot directly perceive mass but can only perceive mass through the way it is given to our intuition, namely, through the perception of the objects that have mass. Thus, mass is neither unknowable nor directly perceivable, which seems to fit the description of the substance perfectly.
Moreover, there are many textual indications that suggest the identification of substance with mass. Let me note two examples. First, recall the general principle overarching the three specific Analogies, namely, “In all change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature.” (B 224) It seems that “quantum” is most naturally to be understood as mass, for mass seems to be the only thing in nature that is neither increased nor diminished on Newtonian physics.
The other indication is Kant’s example to illustrate his claim that “he <a philosopher> thus assumed that as incontrovertible that even in fire the matter (substance) never disappears but rather only suffers an alteration in its form.” (B 288, my emphasis):
“A philosopher was asked: How much does the smoke weigh? He replied: If you take away from the weight of the wood that was burnt the weight of the ashes that are left over, you will have the weight of the smoke.” (B 288)
We can see that here Kant explicitly identifies substance with matter. And it is quite plausible to think that “matter” is just another way of saying “mass”. That is, “mass” seems to be the theoretical analog of the term “matter.” This hypothesis is supported by the example of the weight of smoke. For, in the example, the way to calculate the weight of smoke just is to calculate the mass (multiplies the gravitational constant).
However, despite the compelling reasons for the identification of substance with mass, in the next sections, I shall argue that the substance cannot be understood as Newtonian mass, for when we try to work out the details of understanding the substance as mass, we face an unavoidable dilemma.


Section II. Some Mass or the Sum Total of Mass

In this section, I shall argue that there are two ways of conceiving of substance as Newtonian mass, and then show that both ways have some support from the text and are to some extent philosophically plausible. So, both ways deserve detailed considerations. But, in the next section, I shall argue that both ways face insurmountable problems.
In identifying substance with mass, we need to settle an ambiguity: Is the mass meant to be some mass, say the mass of a rock which is 7 kilograms (a randomly chosen weight), or to be the sum total of mass in the world of appearances which is a very large but nonetheless definite amount? Since both some mass and the sum total of mass are permanently persistent, we cannot tell which way of identifying is more plausible with respect to the permanent persistence of substance. So, we must appeal to some other philosophically and/or textually interesting points to ground a preference in choosing one over the other.
Let us first consider identifying the substance with some or individuated mass. First, the first Analogy is the principle according to which the relational category substance-accident is to be applied. Kant defines accidents to be “the determinations of a substance that are nothing other than particular ways for it to exist.”(B 229) Many commentators interpret the relation to be between object and its properties or states. Thus it makes more sense to think that the mass, which is the underlying bearer of properties, is the individuated mass of some object, instead of the sum total of mass in the world of appearances. For instance, in the example of the weight of smoke, Kant seems to conceive of substance as the matter, i.e. mass, of an individual object. Moreover, if we conceive of substance as the sum total of mass in the world of appearances, it is very hard to imagine how substance can be the bearer of properties or what kind of properties of which substance is the bearer.
One might argue that, on the interpretation according to which substance is the sum total of mass, even though we could imagine no properties of which substance is the bearer, we can still conceive of substance as the bearer of (changing) states, i.e. the successive states of the world of appearances. I reply that Kant cannot accept such an idea because the states of the world are not objects of possible experience, for it is at least empirically true that no one could have the whole world of appearances as his object of experience. I will return to this point later on in the paper and use it to argue that conceiving of substance as the sum total of mass is untenable given Kant’s theoretic commitments.
The above discussion is about reasons to prefer the identification of substance with some mass. I now turn to the reasons to prefer the identifications of substance with the sum total of mass. There are some textual evidences in the first Analogy that suggest this latter identification. For instance, the following passage:
“…here the issue is only appearances in the field of experience, the unity of which would never be possible if we were to allow new things (as far as their substance is concerned) to arise. For then everything would disappear that alone can represent the unity of time, namely the identity of the substratum in which alone all change has its thoroughgoing unity. This persistence is therefore nothing more than the way in which we represent the existence of things (in appearances).” (B 229/A186, my emphasis)
In this passage, Kant seems to identify the permanent persistent substance that represents the persistence of time with the unity of appearances, which seems to be the sum total of mass in the whole world of appearances. Let me argue for my understanding of this passage that it indicates that Kant identifies substance with the sum total of mass. I shall argue by reductio: Suppose Kant identified substance with individuated mass in the above passage. Then, it would make no sense to think that the arising of new substance could make the representation of the unity of time impossible. For the arising of new substance in no sense affects the substance, i.e. the mass, of the original objects. Let me use an example to illustrate. Suppose there is a rock whose mass is 7 kilograms and there arises a new object out of nothing, whose mass is 5 kilograms. Insofar as the rock’s mass remains the same, whether or not there are new masses arising out of nothing does not affect the unity of the rock’s mass, which is 7 kilograms. Therefore, in this passage, Kant conceives of substance as the sum total of mass in the whole world of appearances.
So far I have shown that there are compelling reasons to identify substance with some mass or with the sum total of mass respectively. In the next section, I shall argue that there are also devastating reasons to each identification such that either way we go, we face unsolvable problems.


Section III. One Single Time and the Limit of Possible Experience

I now turn to the problems from which the each identification suffers. In this section, I shall argue that these problems make both identifications untenable. Let us first consider the identification of substance with individuated mass (i.e. some mass). I argue that the reason why individuated mass cannot be identified with substance is that individuated mass cannot represent the oneness of time. Recall Kant’s argument for the principle of the first Analogy: in order to have experiences of objects as temporal, we must identify a permanently persistent substance that can represent time in objects. While the states of the substance change, the substance persists so that the substance can represent time that persists. It is important to notice that time, which is supposed to be represented by substance in appearances, is one single time. But, individuated mass cannot represent one single time. For there are many individuated masses, for instance, the mass of a rock which is 7 kilograms, the mass of a cup which is 0.5 kilogram, and the mass of a table which is 3 kilograms, each of which is permanently persistent and undergoes changes. If one of them can represent time, any other also can. In that case, we do not have one single time. Rather, we have many times or time-series, each of which is persistent.
Let me explain in details why multiply individuated masses cannot represent on single time. If these individuated masses can represent one single time, there must be some one single thing that is shared by these individuated masses that serves to represent the singularity of time. Whatever this shared thing is, it is not any of these individuated masses. Therefore, individuated mass cannot present one single time. However, on the other hand, time has be to singular. Here is a passage in the first Analogy which explains why time has to be one single time rather than a plurality of times:
“Substances (in appearances) are the substrata of all time-determinations. The arising of some of them and the perishing of others would itself remove the sole condition of the empirical unity of time, and the appearances would then be related to two different times, in which existence flowed side by side, which is absurd. For there is only one time, in which all different times must not be placed simultaneously but only one after another.” (B 232/A189)
One might argue that it does not matter how many individuated masses can represent time, it only matters that there is an individuated mass that represents time. Insofar as there is such a substance, which is permanently persistent, it suffices to represent one single time. I reply that, in that case, we still do not know which individuated mass is suppose to be the representer of the one single time in appearances. For there is not reason to think that the mass of one object is more suitable to represent time than the mass of another object is, insofar as both of the individuated masses are permanently persistent. Any choice of one over the other is arbitrary. But the unity or singularity of time is not arbitrary, for there can only be one time-series which persists, and any other time-series or temporal relations are just temporal parts of this unique time-series. Thus, I conclude that individuated mass cannot be the representer of time in appearances.
I now turn to argue that the sum total of mass cannot represent time either. The idea of my argument is to make use of Kant’s solution to the Antinomies to show that the permanently persistent substance that represents time in the appearances cannot be the sum total of mass because the sum total of mass is not an object of possible experience. Let me lay out my argument in detail.
In “The Antinomy of Pure Reason” chapter, Kant presents four pairs of arguments concerning four cosmological ideas about the world-whole, namely, whether there is a beginning of time, whether there is indivisibly simple substance, whether there is a first cause, and whether there is a necessary existent. As Allen W. Wood argues, the four antinomies share a general form, namely, the thesis of each antinomy claims that there must be a first member of the conditioning-conditioned chain, while the antithesis of each antinomy claims that there is no first member of such a chain and that the chain goes back into infinity. Kant argues that there are valid arguments for each of the four theses as well as valid arguments for each of the four antitheses, so we need a solution to such contradictions.
Kant’s solution to the contradictions, as Wood argues, relies on his doctrine of transcendental idealism. As for the first two antinomies, Wood argues
The mathematical antinomies are generated by mathematical principles that apply to things only insofar as they are given in sensible intuition…But these [the first two] series of conditions are never given to intuition as a whole...The theses are false because the principles of possible experience make it impossible for objects corresponding to the cosmological ideas of a first event, a largest extent of the world or a simple substance, ever to be given to intuition.”
Thus, the reason why Kant thinks that the claims made by the theses of the first and second antinomies are false is that neither the beginning of time nor the spatial boundary of the world or an indivisible substance can ever be given to our sensible intuition. If something cannot be given to our sensible intuition, according to Kant, we cannot have experience of it. Let me call this principle the object-of-sensible-intuition principle, namely, if something cannot be given to our sensible intuitions, then it cannot be object of our possible experience. And we can apply this principle to an object to determine whether that object can be object of possible experience. That is, if the object in question can be given to our sensible intuition, then the object can be object of our possible experience, but if the object cannot be given to our sensible intuition, then it cannot be object of our possible experience.
Now, let me apply the object-of-sensible-intuition principle to the idea of the sum total of mass. We can see that the sum total of mass cannot be given to our sensible intuition, so, the sum total of mass cannot be object of our possible experience. For the world of appearances seems to mean the whole universe or cosmos (because everything in the universe stands in causal relations to each other), there is no way for all of the mass in the whole universe to be given to our sensible intuition. Actually, we do not even know whether there are spatial boundaries of the universe, so we do not even know whether the sum total of mass in the all universe is finite. Thus, the sum total of mass cannot be object of possible experience. So, the sum total of mass cannot be that which represents time in appearances. For the reason there must be a permanently persistent substance in appearances which represents time is to make our temporally connected representations of objects possible. But, if the sum total of mass cannot be object of experience, it cannot make our experience of object possible. Thus, the permanently persistent substance in appearances cannot be the sum total of mass.
One might object that in the antinomies, the cosmological ideas at issue are condition-condition series. (B 436/A410) But the sum total of mass is not a series. Rather, it is an aggregate about which the question of conditioning and conditioned does not arise at all. Thus, Kant’s remarks on the antinomies have no bearing on whether the idea of the sum total of mass has any objective validity or significance. Moreover, the first two antinomies concern whether the conditioning-conditioned series go on into infinities. And it seems that it is impossible for us to experience infinity, for no matter what we experience it is finite insofar as we have experienced it. But, the quantum of the sum total of mass seems to be a definite and finite amount. By virtues of what can we claim that the sum total of mass cannot be object of experience? Is this “cannot” an empirical cannot, or an In-Principle cannot? If the answer is the former, the empirical “cannot” does not seem to be strong enough to show that the sum total of mass cannot be experienced, because we cannot know or predict whether in the future empirical sciences and technologies will make the sum total of mass possible object of experience. If the answer is the latter, at least further explanations of why the sum total of mass, which is a finite and definite amount, cannot be object of possible experience in principle are needed.
To the first objection I have two replies. First, in the first antinomy, Kant also discusses whether there is boundary or the largest extent of space. It is not obvious that there is a spatial series in the sense that it is obvious that there is a temporal series in which one moment succeeds its previous moments. However, according to Kant, we can think of the space acquiring its quantum through repeatedly or successively adding spatial units to the previous spatial units. (A 428/B 456) That is, the way of conceiving of space as a spatial series depends on the way of conceiving of time as a temporal series, which is naturally serial. Then, by the same token, we can also think of the sum total of mass acquiring its quantum by successively adding massive units to previous massive units. Thus, if the object-of-sensible-intuition principle applies to the idea of the boundary of space, it should also apply to the idea of the sum total of mass of the whole world of appearances.
Second, the fact that Kant applies the object-of-sensible-intuition-principle to the first two (or three) cosmological ideas to solve the contradictions does not mean that the principle can only be employed to deal with the antinomies. If the principle is applicable to other ideas, we can also use the principle to deal with other ideas. Since the object-of-sensible-intuition principle is derived from transcendental idealism, which is an important element in the whole Critique, there is no reason why the principle cannot be applied to other ideas than cosmological ideas. Thus, it is legitimate to use the object-of-sensible-intuition principle to show that the sum total of mass of whole world of appearances cannot be object of possible experience. So, the sum total of mass cannot be what represents time in appearances.
My reply to the second objection has two steps. First, it needs to be clarified that, although the first two antinomies concern whether the conditioning-conditioned series are infinite, Kant’s solution by the object-of-sensible-intuition principle does not rely on the whether the series are infinite. The principle only concerns whether the things to which the cosmological ideas refer can be given to our sensible intuition. It does not concern whether the things are infinite. It seems true that infinity cannot be object of sensible intuition. But this does not mean that all finite things can be given to our sensible intuition. Actually Kant rejects the claim that all finite things can be given to our sensible intuition. For Kant thinks the thesis of the first antinomy is false, because the beginning of time or the boundary of space cannot be given to our sensible intuition so that it cannot be object of possible experience.
The second step of my reply is to spell out in which sense of “cannot,” the sum total of mass cannot be object of possible experience. It seems to me that the distinction between empirical “cannot” and In-Principle “cannot” is hard to cash out in the context of Critique. For, in the Critique, any legitimate claim to knowledge entails that the object of which the knowledge is can be experienced. Thus, it seems that the empiricality of the “cannot” entails the In-Principality of the “cannot”.
However, concerning the claim that we cannot predict whether in the future empirical sciences and technologies will make the sum total of mass possible object of experience, what would Kant say? Would Kant agree that future sciences and technologies might or could transform a transcendent idea into an idea which refers to object of possible experience? I do not think he would. For Kant thinks his Critique settles metaphysical questions once and for all by theoretical reason, which is static or a-historical. Future discoveries made by sciences and technologies should be able to do no damage to the doctrines in Critique. Moreover, it should be odd to Kant’s ear that progresses made by empirical sciences could have any bearings on the doctrines in the Critique, which he builds up from scratch employing only pure reason, which is absolutely a-historical.
Thus, I conclude that the above arguments show that identifying substance with the sum total of mass in the world of appearance is not tenable. Since I showed earlier in this section that identifying substance with individuated mass is not tenable either, I conclude that the general strategy of identifying substance with mass is untenable.


Section IV. Concluding Remarks

In this paper, I showed that a seemingly very promising way of understanding the permanently persistent substance discussed in the first Analogy, namely, conceiving of substance as Newtonian mass, is untenable. Then, I wonder whether there are other promising ways of providing a positive account of substance or actually it is the case that the notion of substance in the first Analogy is itself untenable. At this stage, maybe I could follow Kant’s stance on the things of themselves, namely, they exist, but we can have no knowledge about the way of their existence. But, at the same time, we need to have this minimal conviction that they exist. Similarly, concerning substance, we can have no knowledge about what the permanently persistent substance is, but we need to have the minimal conviction that it exists in the world of appearances and it serves to represent time.

有些话我必须先写在前面，以下所涉及到的部分内容并不是100%纯原创内容，而是我很久前受到一篇文章的影响后才有的感想，我只是可耻的照搬了文章的思路及模式。在这里感谢友邻路西法尔。原谅我的可耻吧，阿门。 手动分割------------------------------------------------------...  (展开)

这篇剧评可能有剧透 (首发澎湃新闻：[https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_2970652]） 作为网飞（Netflix）平台2019年开年大戏，英剧《性教育》（Sex Education）的表现可圈可点。 故事发生在英国某个小镇，高中生欧帝斯的母亲是一名性与亲密关系咨询师，从小耳濡目染的他也继承了衣钵。欧...  (展开)

再看一次《阿郎的故事》。注意到上映年度是1989年。
1989年，我大概在学走路。
1989年，周润发34岁，张艾嘉36岁。


八十年代是周润发最美的时候吧，后来的《安娜与国王》、《卧虎藏龙》，不远的《姨妈的后现代生活》，都看不到那么美的周润发了。用美来形容一个男人似乎不是很恰当，但我找不到别的词。英俊是容貌俊秀的意思吧，但俊秀的人太多了，刘德华谢霆锋还有我们家阿饼，都很英俊，可男人光英俊是不够的。周润发五官俊朗但圆润，许多的人，五官如刀刻般精致，美则美矣，但咄咄逼人。周润发的美是温和的，不具威胁性的。正是这份温润，不论是有情有义许文强（《上海滩》，1980），还是坚持执著的小马哥（《英雄本色》1986年）或者是装聋作哑能忍就忍的钟天正（《监狱风云》1987年），喜欢耍小聪明的热心司机梁少祖（《长短脚之恋》，1988），他都能拿捏得当，收放自如。


说回《阿郎的故事》，其实故事情节千年不变。中华民族是盛产故事的民族，想起来是有道理的。我们的历史太悠久，地域太广袤，物产太丰富，置身这天朝上国，总觉得自己渺小得可以忽略不计。于是我们拼命造出许多的故事来讲给子孙听，把希望寄予子孙身上，希望子孙讲给子孙听时会顺便说一句“这是我××讲给我听的”，更希望讲的人多了，自己就能在长河里散发些许微弱的光。就像俄罗斯人总是把名字取得老长老长，那是因为他们的冬天太漫长，于是他们叫唤着彼此的长名字来打发掉严寒的时光。于是，列宁的全名那么长。于是，浪子回头金不换的爱情故事人人爱听。

 

浪子，像刀锋一样划过青春。每个女人年轻的时候都可能爱上浪子，他们桀骜不驯，放浪不羁，酷爱自由，自命情重；他们开着摩托车呼啸穿破深夜街头的寂静，他们无奈时深深吸一口烟再狠狠砸在地上，他们通常穷途潦倒所以他们会砸掉服装店的玻璃偷出女朋友喜欢的那件衣服，他们有很多女人却只想念一个女人或者他们有一个女人却想念很多女人，比如阿郎，比如《天若有情》里的华弟（刘德华）。而爱上他们的女人，她们无一例外出身富贵之家，见惯了点头哈腰的男人，于是容易爱上不怎么鸟自己的浪子。在早期made in HK的电影模式里，为省去取名字的麻烦，她们连名字都是统一的叠字。比如《阿郎的故事》里面的波波，《天若有情》里面的JOJO（吴倩莲）……浪子当然是可爱的。他们时而浪漫时而暴戾，爱上浪子就像爱上大海，有无限的可能，而你永远不知道下一种可能是什么。每个爱上浪子的女人都渴望自己是天使，是那个让他愿意停下来而不是停在风里的人。只是，极少数的女人能等到金不换。即使等到了，十几年的担忧期盼足已让你的眼角长出深深的感情线。而“时间是怎么样爬过你皮肤只有你自己最清楚”，这不是我说的，是林夕说的。

 
虽然演戏不把自己当人的吴孟达一严肃起来就让人笑场，虽然我已看过许多次，虽然……但我又不得不承认，阿郎，波波，波仔又一次赚足了我的眼泪。我本来打算这一次肯定不哭，但罗大佑那把破得让人心碎的老男人破嗓音没有任何悬念响起来时，我还是去拿纸巾。总有一种力量，让我们泪流满面；总有一些人会在风中逝去，即使这种逝去会让整个世界变得空洞。

 
昨晚才在电视里看到张艾嘉，她已经55岁。美得风光无限大方得体，风情万种宠辱不惊。现实中的她，到底有没有爱过一个浪子呢，林浩君（《心动》1999年）是否曾经是她的浪子呢，我们不得而知。

 
如果你正年轻，去爱上一个浪子吧，他会给你无限的精彩。
如果你正年轻，不要爱上一个浪子，平淡的人生才有精彩。

这部电影真的，如果你有时间没事情做想看这部剧就算了吧～还不如玩贪食蛇，说实话，男主的演技还是可以的，夏沫的弟弟也还行，退一万步说男二都还看得过去，女主真的是没选好～完全无演技，看得我都想跳上去演啊！那台词说的！特别是电影院那段！她说完了台词男主开始说，那个...  (展开)

片名很栏目剧。剧情也很栏目剧，硬要往喜剧上靠，结果变得很傻，各种大写的尴尬。颇黄颇暴力，“每天早上一柱擎天”。三观有问题。

故事与同期的《小明与他的小伙伴们》有点不谋而合，人物设定都有相似处，一样的装疯卖傻当喜剧，强行胳肢人腋窝脚板底。不过这戏绝对省钱，基本单一场景，演员也没名气，所以就算院线只得5万票房，还能卖网络版权，或者卖给CCTV6，亏也亏不了多少。

导演吴天戈是名导吴贻弓的儿子，老子英雄儿好汉，老子是导演的很多儿子也做了导演，或者女儿，最近一个例子是张艺谋的女儿张末，资源总是近水楼台，外面的新人要入行自来不容易。

这篇影评可能有剧透 门神，显然是先于道家神仙体系出现之前的上古神袛。早在山海经里便已记载，又有古书说俩人原是蚩尤手下，被女娲收服后专职驱鬼除魔，守住鬼门关，变成了门神。 中国的神仙传说也是有历史更迭的，不乏有其中的政治意味。从盘古女娲后羿开始，到炎黄共工祝融大禹都算是门神的同...  (展开)

関錦鵬是同道中人，一本曖昧的有些色情的《北京故事》，一個有關包養的不齒話題，因爲融進了導演自己的情愫在裏面，所以分外動情，讓《藍宇》成了一部同志愛情的經典。

李安是電影大師，一個滿是粗口的故事劇本，一個被我們火舞黃沙，與狼共舞模式化了的西部背景，在他的鏡頭下唯美的宛如江南小鎮，《斷背山》的愛情真切的觸動了那顆藏的嚴密的心，如同描白同志的一生。

陳映蓉不是同道中人，執導水平也還不至於爐火純青。雖然她煞有其事的率劇組人員去GAY BAR體驗生活，但她不明白芸芸同志，肯去GAY BAR，甚至敢于出柜的畢竟少數，而在那裏面張狂宣洩的更是少只又少。
或許影片展示的也正是非同志對同志的一般看法：迷亂，沒有愛情，娘娘腔... ...

雖然影片也在努力的去演繹愛情，甚至也有爭吵、和好的百轉千回。但如今連男女之間的愛情都已不是這麽的童話般完美，更何況要背負更多壓力的男男之間的愛情。

都在說影片很純，十七嵗的天空，有著不同于一般愛情的清澈。但看過影片后才發現，清純的與其說是影片，不如説是楊佑寧。乾淨的面孔，清澈的雙眼，無邪的笑容。楊佑寧一個人撐起了這片十七嵗的天空。

001 05:16 自行车坡道 10:20 what's that 15:45 he is sound 27:31 apology 002 13:28 dial 18:00 linda 003 1:13 conor 4:53 daughter of principal 8:04 tattoo 15:30 grave 17:36 chorus 20:44 thief 004 00:01 trip 07:20 anxious 15:29 鸭子的律师 bargain 24:45 scrumbag...  (展开)

 张版《倚天》一出场，大家都炸开了锅，骂声一片。。。估计很多人都没有仔细看过，人云亦云而已，张版《倚天》到底哪里不好，估计说不出来。其实想必看过原著的人都知道，张版《倚天》是原著的最真实描述，我想金庸先生不会在乎大家说张导不好吧，估计他会认为这版是最好的。

      个人认为呢，其实这部戏可以拍得更好。但是张版却没有把握这个机会。

      首先，大量的风景描画，并没有“锦上添花”。看过这部戏的人都会觉得，好多的风景画面，风景美则美矣，却导致以下几个不足。

      1，片中很多场景，都很刻意地宣扬整体美景，所以很多时候我们只能看见远远的有一群人，然后听见说话的声音，却不知道是谁在说话，所以看下来，竟然不知道谁是谁。我很想告诉张SIR，我们是在看《倚天》，不是在看风景。

      2，其实天鹅飞的哪一个片段的是的假的画面，假则假吧，我想大家都能接受，但是他却偏偏分了几次播放这个画面，所以就显得更假了。这些其实都是小事，最重要的是，整体的风景一出来，大家都知道这是那里的，举个里面，片中经常出现的拱门，无忌小时候在西域时出现过，无忌在灵蛇岛出现过，无忌在少林寺出现过。大家一看都知道是同一个地方，很容易让观众误会是同一个地方。特别是在灵蛇岛上面的时候，无忌和赵敏去踩草药的时候，在那个拱门出现过，后面赵敏被芷若陷害，其实应该是赵敏坐船走了，在沙滩醒来，就代表赵敏回到了中土。不过后面呢，赵敏来到了拱门那里，很容易让人觉得赵敏并没有坐船离开灵蛇岛，如果不是看多了《倚天》，估计大家都会问，为什么赵敏没有找到无忌他们。这只是其中的一个例子，什么竹林啊，等等很多的。如果镜头拉近拍摄，从不同角度拍摄，一个地方大家也会认不出来，就不会造成这样的尴尬场面了。

       这些风景场面的拍摄，反正增加了观众对电视剧的理解程度，没看过原著的人，肯定看过这片还是一塌糊涂呢。

       第二，就是张版太按原著来了，其中大家说的最多了插叙什么的，也是按照原著的意思，素不知，小说和电视剧是截然不同的，电视剧太多的插叙，只会让人觉得混乱，小说中的插叙，才能解释以前的谜团。

        还有，小说中有时候是站在无忌角度的猜想，例如，最后面芷若见到蛛儿的鬼魂，害怕的扑到在无忌的怀里，最后无忌发现赵敏不见了，猜想到赵敏肯定是看见芷若和他拥抱的事情，所以不见了，看小说大家能明白，而电视剧中，芷若是扑到在无忌的怀里了，也放了无忌怎么安慰芷若，可是突然画面一切，就放无忌到处找赵敏，让人摸不着头脑，觉得干嘛要找赵敏啊，至少拍怕赵敏看见无忌搂着芷若，转身走的画面啊，让知道赵敏走了。

        其中，赵敏识破了芷若的奸计，在大都用木偶剧表现出来的那里，估计张导觉得按照原著来得话，太大费周章了，就省略了皇帝游行的画面，直接告诉大家这是赵敏安排的，这倒没什么，正当无忌和韩灵儿商量怎么找杨逍他们时，彭莹玉出场了说“以暴制暴，不好”。这真的会让大家笑死的，这句话根本和无忌与韩灵儿交谈的八竿子打不到一块儿。其实原著上是说，韩灵儿看见皇帝出行，想杀了皇帝，无忌就说让他去，彭莹玉才说了那句话阻止无忌的，既然电视剧没有交代无忌要去杀皇帝，彭莹玉说这些话不就是多此一举了么。张导，既然你少了这些，你的台词就不能稍改点吗？至少让人觉得合乎逻辑啊。这种笑话不止一次在这部电视剧中上演。

        最后，我们说说结局，金庸先生最后让无忌在芷若面前勇敢的承认了自己的所爱，但是无忌的性格已注定，被迫放弃教主之位等等这些都表明了无忌的懦弱。所以金庸先生还是让无忌承受了芷若的枷锁。但是电视剧中，无忌不但勇敢地向芷若坦诚了自己的所爱，还让无忌为了赵敏放弃了教主之位，这些举动都做出来了，后面导演还是让无忌承受芷若的枷锁未免就所不过去了，无忌为了赵敏连江山都可以放弃，难道就不能在最后为了赵敏勇敢地向芷若说句“这生非赵敏不娶么”。

       所以张版《倚天》——没为原著添彩，反被原著所累。按照原著是好的，有的时候表现不出来的时候，既然变了，就要变得有逻辑，何必还要依书直说呢。另外风景固然能增加画面的美丽，但是却让观众有了地域上的限制，其实一个人地方可以拍很多地方的戏的。一个地方从不同的角度拍摄，可以让大家觉得不是在同一个地方，这种手法很简单吧。为什么张导反正不能从美丽的风景中跳跃出来呢？
       真的，我想告诉张导既然要导《倚天》，为什么不仔细阅读恶化推敲《倚天》呢？

香港惊悚片《失衡凶间》真的很久没有看过香港惊悚片了…不过，有一个现实问题就是，香港恐怖片真的已经落寞很久了啊，大家觉得目前，华语惊悚恐怖片那个地区出品的良品率相对高一些呢？好了，说回此片，此片由三个惊悚故事组成，相信我，前两个故事《暗角》《死场》真的很…垃...  (展开)