整部电影是吴邪讲述，经由落魄作家三胖呈现在我们眼前的一场梦。

如果按照书的时间线来看，这时的吴邪可能已经经历了张起灵代替自己进入青铜门守门，在了解了部分内幕之后成长为吴小佛爷，与汪家人走上了漫漫斗争之路。从这个角度来看这部电影就很有意思了，在经历了忠诚与背叛，得到与失去的吴邪，是用一种什么口吻来讲述一个“吴邪冲破家族阻碍初次下地”的故事呢？

这个故事里的吴邪，很吴邪。演员的演绎是超出我想象的到位。鹿晗的眼神很清澈，那是一种被家族种种阻隔在外的清澈，这就是吴邪没有被卷入迷局之前的状态——他插科打诨，是个说话有时候贱兮兮的话唠。这种角色对于演员来说看上去很简单，实际上颇具挑战。毕竟你得把握好一个度，让人想揍一顿的傻叉和让人想亲一口的可爱有时只有一线之隔，还好，鹿晗塑造的吴邪是后者。其中还需要注意的是吴邪在整部片子各个时段的眼神变化，对张起灵说我罩你时的少年意气，对于同伴在自己面前死亡的怜惜和恐惧，面对墓室里木偶的好奇，梦境中的迷茫，以及最后将铜币掷下的笑意，都在鹿晗黑白分明的眼中，十分带人入戏。另外有一点，是胖子让吴邪捅了那个和阿宁缠斗的树人时，吴邪将匕首扔给胖子然后推着胖子“杀”死了树人——我就把这里当做手上已经沾满鲜血的关根老师对于年轻时自己的一点点温柔吧。

再说张起灵，这个梦里的张起灵，好像不是那么张起灵。我把这归咎于这是吴邪的一场梦，毕竟张起灵张开嘴杠铃笑可比他喊一句“天啊是陈文锦”让人害怕多了。不过可以理解，毕竟“你怎么知道他不会笑，也许他内心在笑呢？你只是看不到而已”。可能是角色大部分时间都板着脸，演员的发挥并不惊艳，而且我可看出来吴老板深埋内心深处的崇拜了——张起灵的打戏特、别、多。关于这点我在后面会具体说，这里就不再赘述。

接下来说说吴邪梦境中的其他人：阿宁，酷姐，演员从出场的一个眼神就把气势做得很足，说实话如果说这部电影中那两点是我的意外之喜，那就是吴邪和阿宁。阿宁的打戏很帅，一句“you stay”，台词和眼神的完美结合，脱衣服用衣服裹人打斗更是巧劲狠劲具在。如果说有不足那就是阿宁态度的转变以及邪宁戏份缺少，这也放在后面再讲。

吴三省，片子中主要的笑点大部分集中在叔邪的对手戏中，王景春老师演绎得很不错，但是可能是剧本的原因使得原本应该出彩的老狐狸特性和用尽全力阻止吴邪下墓的决心都没有表现出来，所以使得三叔整个出来就很扁平。包括大奎潘子阿忠驴蛋蛋都是如此，角色扁平，觉得有或者没有对于故事并没有影响。

王胖子，终于说到最让我心痛的王胖子了。心痛的就是戏份的大量减少。想问一问做着梦的吴老板，你对得起王月半同志陪着你上刀山下火海为心爱的妹子守灵听见你有难立马跑到你身边的那份情谊吗？？对于我来说，盗墓笔记是铁三角的故事，三个人在迷局中互相拯救的故事，所以王胖子戏份的大量删减让我真的真的很心痛。但是，但是，吴邪和胖子的火花还在，两个人少有的对戏依然是片中的亮点——两个人的斗嘴，吴邪耍的小聪明，呛声死胖子和小孩子，都让我在影院里笑得很开心。有人说演员感觉不大对，我觉得还好，胖子的贫劲儿还在，就是因为戏份过少所以还是显得单薄。不过胖邪两人的初见戏码好想……算保留了吧？

吴邪的这个梦境很有意思，如果一个看过盗墓笔记的人去看，那就会发现很多小彩蛋：铁面生和吴邪萨满和张起灵某种意义上的重叠、梳着妹妹头不停叫“吴邪哥哥”的小花or秀秀、化身为人的驴蛋蛋和阿忠、依旧是为救同伴而死去的大奎还有顶着瓦罐和吴邪相遇的胖子……不能少了关根老师给自己点上的吹箫控虫和坟头蹦迪的技能点、以及自己点燃蜡球带领大家坟头蹦迪之后张起灵向自己投出的赞许目光。很好，这很吴邪。

从吴邪的梦境角度说完了这个故事，那就从电影的角度再来谈一谈。

演员的表演在上面说梦境的时候也说过了，虽然年轻演员居多，但是大家都有出彩的地方。吴邪的表演很有灵性，脸和人设很搭，台词虽然有些地方还有瑕疵但是对于一个非科班且拍戏数量有限的年轻人来说已经是值得表扬的了。阿宁的表演也有亮眼之处，张起灵在看向镜子是确实有询问命运的感觉，王景春老师扮演的三叔也很不错，但是之前说过，因为剧本所以显得有些扁平。

还有这部片子的李仁港风格十分浓重，如果要我下一个定义——这是一部李仁港的盗墓笔记而非南派三叔的盗墓笔记。

整个故事的流畅度和细节处理得并不完美，甚至有些地方让人都有点匪夷所思，其中包括三叔对于吴邪下墓的态度转变、裘德考在听了吴邪一番话之后的洗白（这是我最想吐槽的地方，一个为了长生不老可以屠杀藏民的人明显是亡命之徒那究竟是为了什么在听了吴邪几句话之后就态度一百八十度转变成这样？）。当然，片子中有两个情节是我很喜欢的，而且在我看来，这两个情节不是吴邪向落魄作家三胖讲述的梦境，而是确实发生过的事实——小吴邪听到的苏州评弹和在古楼里遇到的萨满法师。

还有一些细节也是我个人比较喜欢的，《创造亚当》和WU’S GALLERY。《创造亚当》的第二次出现是和吴邪与张起灵两人伸手拯救的画面同时的，开一开脑洞，神和亚当，不管是把吴邪或者张起灵任何一人看做是耶和华或者亚当都没有问题，耶和华在这幅画中唤醒了昏睡慵懒的亚当，唤醒了理性，用充满了善意与怜惜哀伤的眼神看向亚当，两人手指接触灌注神明的旨意和灵魂。仔细想想，吴邪对于张起灵，似乎就是唤醒世间联系的钥匙，而反过来，张起灵是守局的人而吴邪被引入局中。但是要说一句，有些情节太琼瑶了，希望导演以后不要再看那么多同人了谢谢。

特效时好时坏，不功不过。武打戏真的太拖沓太长，以至于除张起灵和那个一直扭胯跳肚皮舞的蛇母那场最终战成功得成了一场煎熬。那种感觉就像在电影院被人按着看完全集的天天有喜一样，呃，你们懂我的意思吗？

想说的还有，可能需要二刷看完再来补充。开始看盗墓笔记的时间也不算长，高一开始现在已经快大四了，比起十年的书粉也还年轻。去看之前很忐忑，看完之后虽然有遗憾但还是比较满意。顺便，希望三胖磨练一下演技。

最后贴出来很喜欢的那段妖艳小女子唱的苏州评弹，或许就是三叔对于吴邪和张起灵两个人的判词吧。

浮生若梦梦浮生，真作假时假亦真。
人生如镜镜映人，但愿是影避凡尘。
花开花落为常道，镜花水月不需寻。
回首空门圣灵起，本是无邪带点真。

＊又想了想，驴蛋蛋是被尸鳖咬死的，算不算吴老板对驴蛋蛋主人的一个小小报复呢？吴老板忒坏忒可爱啦！

回忆吴邪关于平凡和不平凡、进去和出去的两段话，心中颇有感慨。我借曾经的我，说出我心里的话，不后悔走入迷局。鹿晗的声音有种特别的少年气，说出这两句话时的无奈和辛酸……唉，这就是小三爷。

又看到有人说之所以在这个梦里胖子出现的那么少，是因为吴老板不想让胖子走进局中。想想也是，胖子与任何事都无关，只是为了吴邪和张起灵愿意跳身谜海。而吴邪能做的，就是在故事里让他远离灾难。谁说你不再天真，永远都是那个吴邪。

看到了这个，如果用鹿晗的声音和眼神去说出吴邪的这几句话，我可能直接哭晕在影院了。
三叔说，在电影里还一段没放出来的彩蛋：作家对吴邪说：“你乱说，你上次和主编说的不是这样的.”吴邪说：“我还有另一个故事，那个故事里，我们第一次的冒险是在七星鲁王宫，后来，阿宁死了，潘子死了，大奎死了，三叔和小哥失踪了，我现在就要去找他们。”

【如果编剧自己把一个好故事打散带来的是什么？靠书粉努力理解剧情向路人解释有什么用？该展开的没有展开，对于整个故事的流畅度和演员表演的完整性都是灾难性的限制。如果南派三叔就这样对待自己的作品，所有人的努力都是白费的。】

本来不打算看样的抗日科幻剧的，可着三影帝飚戏，又实在不忍心弃局。给了三颗星，一人一颗。
这剧全靠以三影帝为中心的一拨好演员给撑起来的！剧情已吐槽无力，很有生死线的影子，但只配给生死线提鞋~每次线索的切换都显得那么仓促。特地看了看编剧是谁，结果发现这是一编剧团队。这么一大票人还是抵不过一个龙妖！╮(╯▽╰)╭
看着三影帝被这群白痴编剧虐，真心不忍心！

这篇影评可能有剧透 看一堆人在影片分析里写佛教啥的，但我对什么佛什么基督没兴趣，只觉得故事讲得不错，悬疑也够悬疑，值得5星 这里面挺多演员都很眼熟，尤其那个沈女士，真的万年配角 这题材真的不错，上次我还看了一个关于真理教的韩剧，也是个悬疑片，也挺好看的 这个片反转做的是真的不错，...  (展开)

原帖地址在这里：http://tieba.baidu.com/f?kz=168646069


      十二年后看重看孙版杨逍：（一）曾经沧海
    
                                                                                             （凯琳0327）
     近日闲逛于天涯，偶见几张怀念94版倚天屠龙记中光明左使的文章，微一浏览，只见字里行间浸润着难舍深情。叹息中想到了自己，自己何尝不是如此？哪怕十二年光阴飞逝，自己早已不是当初懵懂少女，可再次重温倚天屠龙记依然为那个亦正亦邪桀骜不驯的男子如痴如醉。

和很多女孩不同，看这版倚天之前我已将金庸武侠读遍，小学四年级看射雕英雄传开始，到初一寒假把天龙八部与倚天屠龙记看完为止，倚天屠龙记恰好作为一个终结的句号。不过这个句号在我眼里算不得精彩绝伦，平心而言，在全部金庸小说中，此书水准只属中等偏上。
初看此书时只觉故事情节颇吸引人，书中人物却没有能让我为之倾倒的，无论是张无忌赵敏周芷若还是明教诸豪。明教两位光明使者，开始我倒更注意范遥多点，一句俊貌玉面甘毁伤让我浮想联翩——要怎样的美貌怎样的决绝才配得起这句评断？至于逍遥二仙的另一位，不深的印象仅停留在虽才识过人武艺高强，却与公不能统合教众于私无法保护心爱女子，失败的男人。直看到《百尺高塔任翱翔》一回，看到灭绝师太对芷若回忆起当年杨逍与孤鸿子一战：名震江湖的峨眉高手败在明教少年手下，倚天宝剑尚未出鞘便被夺去，少年杨逍冷笑声声，说道：“倚天剑好大的名气！在我眼中却如废铜烂铁一般！”随手将武林中人奉为至宝的宝剑抛在地下，扬长而去。

看到此处我只觉脑子里嗡地一声，一个少年以讯雷不及掩耳之势闯近我心里——白衣胜雪，飘然若仙；眉目秀雅，宛然如画，眼角眉梢不见一丝阴霾与戾气，却带着五分冷峻六分狂气十分傲气

“倚天剑好大的名气！在我眼中却如废铜烂铁一般！”

他的声音，定然清朗澄澈，犹如破冰溪水
他的目光，定然明亮锐利，就好象眸子里揉进了寒星的光辉与利刃的锋芒
他的笑容，定然骄傲中带着霸道，宛似盛夏骄阳般耀眼到刺眼的地步

我怦然心动，飞快地把书翻到杨逍名字第一次出现的地方，我仔仔细细一遍又一遍品读书中所有关于杨逍的文字，最终失望地发现自己为之心动的杨逍只存在峨眉掌门对得意弟子的一次回忆里。

纪晓芙对师父所说的杨逍，以暴力强占她，她在与之相处的数月里虽一心寻死却苦于监视极严而求死不得。尽管有不悔仲子逾我墙的回目提点在前，有纪晓芙宁死不愿伤他的回护在后，我还是无法将一个用武力侵犯女性的男人与我心中的骄傲少年联系在一起。
张无忌初见的杨逍，一句“你要什么，尽管开口便是，我杨逍做不到的事、拿不到的东西，天下只怕不多”依稀可见往昔狂气，然则从那张衰老凄苦、神驰远处的脸庞上，我找不到半点往昔的飞扬神采
奉张无忌为教主后的杨逍，深沉远虑，尽管言行举止带着几分洒脱，可是终究还是持身于臣子之道辅弼之责，教主面前俯首听令的光明左使，从他身上我看不见叫人顿生“几曾着眼看侯王”之感的少年的影子……

于是让我心动的少年，成了一片单独存在的碎片，轻易便被冲刷进记忆河床的泥沙下，而书中存在感本就不甚强烈的杨逍，于我心中压根没留下过什么痕迹。

直到有一天，我打开电视，看到一个傲岸男子冷然一笑，一声杨逍唤醒曾经的心动，瞬时间深埋在记忆泥沙下的少年霍然起身走到我眼前。其实眼前男子与我心中少年并不尽相同——眉眼间多了几分俊朗少了几分清雅，气度上多了几分霸气雄浑少了几分文秀飘逸，穿着墨绿罩袍而非如雪白衣——然而窒息于男子淡淡一笑中，我无暇计较这些不同，五分冷峻六分狂气十分傲气张扬在他唇边浅弯，使得我脑海一片空白丧失质疑的能力，认定那个少年长成后就是这个样子。

我定定看着他

我看着他刚愎跋扈，强令鹰王解散天鹰教；我看他英雄落难美人垂怜，看他用尽真情真意温柔且霸道地去爱一个爱他却始终拒绝他的女子，看他吹遍坐忘峰落叶不愿承认爱人已逝；我看他为免女儿遭受伤害而几近专横最后却为了爱女幸福放手；我看他待张无忌亦臣亦父，看警告教众谁若敢对教主不敬便让谁死无葬身之地的他痛斥张无忌后，狠狠一掌拍在自己胸口，欲以一死以践己言……

看到他被朱元彰毒死之时，我心痛我愤恨，我却不惊异，因为我心中早明白他逃不过这般结局

“情深不寿，强极则辱”
岁月磨不平他骨子里的棱角，温润如玉的谦谦君子，他永远做不了也永远不屑做，于是他的爱情、他的生命便成了一阙慷慨跌荡的华美悲歌，于最激昂而非最美妙的音符上终结或许是最好的、也是唯一的选择

我极喜爱孙兴这个演员，虽然我对再出色的演员都仅停留在欣赏其演技的限度不会为之多付出一点感情，可是孙兴却是个例外，只因为杨逍。那个只是让我微微心动的少年，从碎片般断裂的存在延伸成令我终身难忘的至爱，其间介质便是孙兴出神入化的演绎。十二年前初看94版倚天会被杨逍颠倒痴狂，十二年后再看此版依然禁不住发出“一见杨逍误终身”的慨叹。

十二年间我也看过其他版本的倚天屠龙记剧集，看过被剧中人称为杨逍的不同男人，其中一个白色轻衫，俊美秀雅，颇有翩翩佳公子之态；另一个青色华服，倜傥风流别有韵致；还有一个，挺着硕大肚皮睁着铜铃巨眼，生生辱没我心爱男子的名号。

我看着，看着这些不是杨逍的男子表演着不是杨逍的杨逍

我知道自己这番话定会引来其他版本杨逍迷的不满，其实在我眼里，便是金庸原著中的杨逍也非真正的杨逍，我明白自己此话一出定会引人发笑，只是再多人笑我我亦不会改口。在看过沧海的人眼中，其他地方的水难以被称之为水，见过孙兴的杨逍，只觉数百年前元末乱世里真真存在过这么一个男子，他爱过他恨过他笑过他哭过，斯人已逝，时光飞逝如流水，所有的爱恨情仇皆已被冲洗得渺无踪迹……
数百年后，这个男子的灵魂附在一个名叫孙兴的演员身上，借由他的躯壳重现了曾经存在过的一个人曾经发生过的一段往事，如此而已。

曾经沧海难为水
从此再无第二个杨逍

只是若我以后有了女儿，我绝不许她看杨逍，宁可她指着猥亵不堪的张某人笑道：“我若是纪晓芙，早一头撞死”。也胜过了误她终身。
                                            

显而易见，这部是众多大牌堆砌起来的片子。比起新艺城，洪金宝这边自然发挥了自己的特色：武打。其实负责打人的都只是成龙、元彪等，其他五福星光顾着整蛊单纯的妹子关之琳了……话说，关之琳在浴缸里漏点的镜头，看得几个色狼脸全红了……关之琳借此可以稍微扬名一阵。总体感觉故事性不是很强，跟黑帮势力斗争和五福星的在宾馆的活动联系不是很紧密，似乎有意为了分别表现打斗的精彩和整蛊人的滑稽。殊不知可能会削弱整个故事的叙述力。这类喜剧情节不要去深究，且轻松放过它吧，O(∩_∩)O

这篇影评可能有剧透 Old soldiers will never die, they just fade away. 老兵永远不死，他们只是渐渐凋零。这是麦克?阿瑟曾经在美国国会演讲时的一句名言，据说还是引自他的母校西点军校的校歌。语感苍凉，内含深意，一时间感染鼓舞了很多人。 老兵既然如此，那么一个老混蛋又是如何炼成的？ ...  (展开)

一、多个时空


《纯粹理性批判》中的第一经验类比（Analogies of Experience）要求在现象中有一个恒定且唯一之物来表象意识中的时间本身。恒定，或永恒，因为作为总体的时间本身是始终在那的；惟一，因为只有一个时间。这个惟一且永恒的东西，即现象中的实体（Substance）。康德明确把这个实体与洛克的托子（Substratum）区分开来，认为实体是以各种方式显现于人的，而不是像托子那样不可知，也不显现。

我要说，洛克的托子的作用是保证物的个体化与同一性。这个作用在康德那儿，似乎是由物自体和先验范畴共同完成。先验范畴组织现象，在使意识对现象的认识成为可能的同时，也使同一的意识本身成为可能——对先验对象的构成即对自我的构成。而物自体在这个过程中究竟如何起作用，不详。康德的物自体与洛克的托子一样，是个让理论显得尴尬，却又不得不进行的假设。

尽管康德反复说现象中的实体不是洛克的托子，但这个实体究竟是什么，他又语焉不详。出于他对牛顿力学的接受，有人尝试将其理解为牛顿意义上的质量。我论证过，这样的解读将面临一个两难困境：如果实体是个体化了的质量，时间便不是惟一的；如果实体是现象世界中的总质量，基于二律背反的理由——这个总体无法成为经验对象——我们便无法经验到它。（详细论述见篇末附录）

若是跳出康德阐释，取前一个困境：时间不是惟一的，每个作为现象的物都意味着一个独立的时间体系，我们就科幻了：空间中的一个一个的物，奠基着意识中的一个又一个时间系，我们可以生活在不同的时空中，当我们经验不同的物。甚至，对应地说，我们总在成为另一个人，当我们来到不同的时空。

于是，我情愿把亨利的生活看作对康德的一次失败却有趣的解读。与其说他是一位时间旅行者，一位不停地穿越时空的超人或可怜人，不如说，他的意识中并没有一个绝对惟一的时间，他所来到并离开的每一个时空，都是一个独立自在的世界，尽管这些世界看上去很像，但哪个都不依赖于另一个——从理念的意义上说。


二、沉默，或消失


影片的前半部分，亨利的突然消失被解释为一种不治的遗传疾病。没有理由地，他时不时就去了另一个时空，赤身裸体地寻找可以穿上的衣服。仿佛常人来到一个新的环境，总是迫不及待地寻找一个身份，穿到自己身上。
亨利总会在一个无从预料的时刻消失，克莱尔生活在一个不确定的世界中。她的爱情是确定的，但她爱的人不确定地存在着。她的生活中弥漫着不确定性，而这恰好让她格外珍惜亨利在她身边的每一分钟。

克莱尔一次次怀孕又一次次流产，因为胎儿也有穿越症，莫名其妙地，便在某个时刻，出离了子宫。但克莱尔最后一次怀孕时，对亨利说，你每次消失都是因为感觉到了压力。所以，从现在开始，我要保持绝对地平静，这样胎儿就可以顺利出生了。
看到这里，我恍然大悟，原来亨利的穿越症是个隐喻，关于男人的隐喻：面对压力，便会沉默与回避，这不正是男人的本能反应么——而这在女人看来，仿佛爱人去了另一个时空，不知何时才能回来，甚至，会不会回来。

我查了查，电影改编自一位女造型艺术家的首部小说，写于一段失败的恋情之后。原来如此。

很多年前听到过一个说法：爱情，对男人来说，是挂在墙上的一幅画，你并不总是去看它；但对女人来说，则是房间里音乐，你想不听都不行。所以，男人需要时不时地呆在纯然属于自我的世界里，在沉默中成为自己。女人却要认为这是对她的疏远、对亲密的疏离，并因此而坐立不安，想方设法闯进那份铁一般的沉默。结果，要么把自己撞疼，要么把爱情撞碎。
这是对小儿女情态的描述。若成年点，便会更同情于另一个说法：人生在世，无非是男人讨慰藉，女人讨生活。人并不总是需要慰藉，尤其在得意之时。人却总在生活，就算你不想。


三、看着，却无法改变


在一次穿越中，亨利来到母亲身边，在地铁里，母亲在看报，他们作为陌生人简短却亲切的交谈了一会儿。亨利告诉母亲，他要结婚了，这个女孩让他感到安全。
克莱尔问他：你什么不去阻止那场车祸，既然你可以回到车祸发生之前。“我无法阻止。无数次我回到过去，回到母亲还在的时候，但每次我都无法改变发生着的一切。”——这话让人特别难过。我们并不能改变过去，就像不能重新雕刻一座已然完成的塑像。

不是么？很多时候，我们从自己当下的境遇中抽身而出，试图站在一个更开阔的角度，超脱地看现在的纠结、焦虑，或苦闷，并自嘲这些都没什么的。但当你身在当下，你知道未来的自己就坐在对面，笑着，看着自己，慈悲地。但你还是无法因此脱身而出。你仍然只能呆在你当下的处境中，无论是过分的快乐，还是仿佛无法挣脱的哀伤。

每一个时刻都是三维的，它包含着过去、现在，和未来这三个维度。我们在回忆中编辑时间，编辑自己，有意无意地遗忘一些，并把另一些反复摩挲。过往明明灭灭，像晴天里，随风晃动的百叶窗投在墙上的影子。每次回忆之后，我们都成为另一个人。
未来也是。未来无数次作为想象呈现于当下，各式各样地，仿佛清晰的回忆。回忆与憧憬，如同天平的两臂，对称着，平衡着，在现在这个支点上。所以，现在这个时刻，最重。


四、期限


有天聚会时，亨利中枪后痛苦挣扎的裸体突然出现在他们的门厅里。又消失了。克莱尔说，我从没见过四十岁之后的你。我见过的你总是很年轻。从这个时候起，死亡就成了他们中的另一个在场者，尽管它总是沉默着。

亨利穿越到未来，遇见了自己的已经十岁的女儿。女儿告诉他，他死于自己五岁那年。她们一直很想念他。那时他们的女儿还没出生。那时克莱尔还一如既往地希望与亨利白头偕老，就像她还没长大时那样，就像她长大之后第一次遇到亨利时那样，就像亨利死后，她仍然留着亨利所有的衣服，等着亨利回来那样。

于她而言，亨利是不会死的。他无非是走远了一下子回不来，他无非是在时空中迷了路，找不到一件让他温暖的衣服。

女儿五岁那年，亨利和克莱尔都已知道，亨利即将死去，中弹而死。期限降至，可能在任何一天，任何一个时刻。在它到来之前，所有相聚的时光都是铭刻，都是用最日常的方式来进行的一次祭奠，一次追忆。当这个期限还不确定，他们相爱着，仿佛一对最平凡的恋人；当这个期限已然确定，他们相爱着，装作不知道他们即将分离。

一个期限并不见得让期限到来之前的一切都显得美好。但，美好的东西都有一个期限。确定的期限，或不确定的期限。你不能试图挽留，那会犹如握紧手中的细沙，握得越紧，便流失得越快，宛如时间，从指缝间悄然流走。
这个期限是否到来，何时到来，都不是你能选择的。你能做的，仅仅是在它到来之前的每一刻，不让自己在未来后悔——克莱尔明白这些，并且，她做到了。

而，这不正是人生么。


——————
附录：On Understanding Substance as Mass

Introduction

In the First Analogy of Experience, Kant argues that there must be some permanently persistent substance in the appearances which represents the persistence of time. Given Kant’s endorsement of Newtonian physics, commentators such as Eric Watkins suggest that such permanently persistent substance can be understood as Newtonian mass. In this paper, however, I argue that we face a dilemma when we try to cash out the notion of substance in terms of Newtonian mass.
The paper proceeds in three steps. In the first section, I present the reason why there needs to be a permanently persistent substance in the appearances, and discuss why it seems to be compelling to conceive of the permanently persistent substance as Newtonian Mass. Then, in the second section, I argue that there are (only) two ways of conceiving of the permanently persistent substance as Newtonian mass, namely, to conceive of substance as individuated mass and to conceive of substance as the sum total of mass in the world of appearances. I show that there are textual indications as well as philosophical reasons to support each option. In the third section, however, I argue that both ways suffer from inescapable problems. Thus, conceiving of the permanently persistent substance in terms of Newtonian mass is not viable.

    
Section I. The Permanently Persistent Substance

In this section, I shall first present the reason why Kant thinks that there must be a permanently persistent substance in the appearances. I then discuss why it is compelling to conceive of such substance as Newtonian mass.
In the chapter “System of all principles of pure understanding,” Kant discusses what makes possible the applications of the categories, i.e. the pure concepts of understanding, to objects, i.e. appearances that are given to sensible intuitions. That is, he discusses what it is that makes the categories have objective validity. Kant’s claim is that the applications of the categories are only possible under certain conditions, and these conditions are spelled out by the principles. For instance, the applications of the relational categories (substance-accidents, cause and effect, and mutual interactions) are possible if they are applied to objects according to the principles of Analogies of Experience. In addition to the three specific principles that correspond to each of the three relational categories, Kant also provides a general principle overarching all three Analogies. The general principle is stated in the second edition as follows: “Experience is possible only through the representations of a necessary connection of perceptions” (B 218). Watkins provides a helpful interpretation of this general principle:
“The general idea is that each of the three relational categories represents a necessary connection that is required for experience of a single time and of objects existing and being temporally related to each other within a single time to be possible.” (My emphasis)
Since this paper is focused on the notion of substance in the first Analogy, I shall ignore the second and third Analogies. So I now turn to a close examination of the first Analogy.
The first Analogy, i.e. the principle of the persistence of substance, is stated in the second edition as follows: “In all change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature.” (B 224) Watkins summarizes Kant’s argument for the first Analogy as follows (which I take to be a correct interpretation):
Premise 1: Appearances, i.e. objects of experience, are made possible by time’s persistence.
Premise 2: We do not perceive time itself.
Therefore, In order to have experience of appearances, there must be some permanent substance in the appearances which can represent time or time’s persistence.
While the appearances, as the objects given to our intuitions, are changing, the substance in appearances always stays the same and is permanent. So, Kant calls the permanent substance “the substratum of everything real” (B 225). But, some clarifications about Kant’s use of the term “substratum” are needed to prevent potential confusions. Substratum in Kant’s text does not mean what Locke uses this term to mean, namely, the bearer of properties which is unchanging and about which we can have no knowledge. For, according to Locke, we can only know what is given to our senses, but since the underlying substratum cannot be given to our senses, we have no access to it and therefore cannot know it.
Kant, by constrast, does not think that there is any Lockean substratum in the world of appearances. For Kant, the fact that the states of the substance are changing and the substance stays the same does not mean the states are separable from the substance. Rather, the changing states of the substance are simply the ways in which the substance is given to us. Thus, we can know the substance, that is, we know the substance through its states. In order to avoid the Lockean implication of the term “substratum,” I shall only use “substance” to refer to the permanently persistent thing in the appearances despite Kant’s own use of “substratum” to talk about what is permanent in the appearances.
Since I have argued that Kant’s notion of substance is not the Lockean substratum, then what is the Kantian notion of substance? We need a positive account of what the substance is. It is obvious that such a permanently persistent thing cannot be captured by ordinary physical objects, no matter whether they are natural objects (say, rocks) or artifacts (say, ships), for neither artifacts nor natural objects always stay the same such that in principle they can never suffer changes. So, it seems no ordinarily construed physical things can be qualified as substance that is permanently persistent. On the other hand, it is very hard to imagine that anything non-physical could play the role the substance is supposed to play. For it is hard to imagine how a non-physical being could be given to our sensible intuition or could be spatiotemporally organized by our a priori intuitions. So, it is unlikely that Kant means something non-physical by “substance.” Thus, there are two constraints on spelling out what substance is. First, it is something physical. Second, as I have shown, the physical being that can be understood as substance cannot be ordinarily individuated physical things such as planet or rock.
In order to meet the above two conditions, Watkins suggests that, given Kant’s commitment to Newtonian science, it is likely that Kant has Newtonian mass in mind when he talks about the substance, since no matter how a physical object changes, its mass always stays the same. Since Newtonian mass is physical and is not an ordinarily individuated object, it seems quite compelling that the substance, which is permanently persistent, just is Newtonian mass. According to common sense, Newtonian mass is understood to be underlying objects such that we cannot directly perceive mass but can only perceive mass through the way it is given to our intuition, namely, through the perception of the objects that have mass. Thus, mass is neither unknowable nor directly perceivable, which seems to fit the description of the substance perfectly.
Moreover, there are many textual indications that suggest the identification of substance with mass. Let me note two examples. First, recall the general principle overarching the three specific Analogies, namely, “In all change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature.” (B 224) It seems that “quantum” is most naturally to be understood as mass, for mass seems to be the only thing in nature that is neither increased nor diminished on Newtonian physics.
The other indication is Kant’s example to illustrate his claim that “he <a philosopher> thus assumed that as incontrovertible that even in fire the matter (substance) never disappears but rather only suffers an alteration in its form.” (B 288, my emphasis):
“A philosopher was asked: How much does the smoke weigh? He replied: If you take away from the weight of the wood that was burnt the weight of the ashes that are left over, you will have the weight of the smoke.” (B 288)
We can see that here Kant explicitly identifies substance with matter. And it is quite plausible to think that “matter” is just another way of saying “mass”. That is, “mass” seems to be the theoretical analog of the term “matter.” This hypothesis is supported by the example of the weight of smoke. For, in the example, the way to calculate the weight of smoke just is to calculate the mass (multiplies the gravitational constant).
However, despite the compelling reasons for the identification of substance with mass, in the next sections, I shall argue that the substance cannot be understood as Newtonian mass, for when we try to work out the details of understanding the substance as mass, we face an unavoidable dilemma.


Section II. Some Mass or the Sum Total of Mass

In this section, I shall argue that there are two ways of conceiving of substance as Newtonian mass, and then show that both ways have some support from the text and are to some extent philosophically plausible. So, both ways deserve detailed considerations. But, in the next section, I shall argue that both ways face insurmountable problems.
In identifying substance with mass, we need to settle an ambiguity: Is the mass meant to be some mass, say the mass of a rock which is 7 kilograms (a randomly chosen weight), or to be the sum total of mass in the world of appearances which is a very large but nonetheless definite amount? Since both some mass and the sum total of mass are permanently persistent, we cannot tell which way of identifying is more plausible with respect to the permanent persistence of substance. So, we must appeal to some other philosophically and/or textually interesting points to ground a preference in choosing one over the other.
Let us first consider identifying the substance with some or individuated mass. First, the first Analogy is the principle according to which the relational category substance-accident is to be applied. Kant defines accidents to be “the determinations of a substance that are nothing other than particular ways for it to exist.”(B 229) Many commentators interpret the relation to be between object and its properties or states. Thus it makes more sense to think that the mass, which is the underlying bearer of properties, is the individuated mass of some object, instead of the sum total of mass in the world of appearances. For instance, in the example of the weight of smoke, Kant seems to conceive of substance as the matter, i.e. mass, of an individual object. Moreover, if we conceive of substance as the sum total of mass in the world of appearances, it is very hard to imagine how substance can be the bearer of properties or what kind of properties of which substance is the bearer.
One might argue that, on the interpretation according to which substance is the sum total of mass, even though we could imagine no properties of which substance is the bearer, we can still conceive of substance as the bearer of (changing) states, i.e. the successive states of the world of appearances. I reply that Kant cannot accept such an idea because the states of the world are not objects of possible experience, for it is at least empirically true that no one could have the whole world of appearances as his object of experience. I will return to this point later on in the paper and use it to argue that conceiving of substance as the sum total of mass is untenable given Kant’s theoretic commitments.
The above discussion is about reasons to prefer the identification of substance with some mass. I now turn to the reasons to prefer the identifications of substance with the sum total of mass. There are some textual evidences in the first Analogy that suggest this latter identification. For instance, the following passage:
“…here the issue is only appearances in the field of experience, the unity of which would never be possible if we were to allow new things (as far as their substance is concerned) to arise. For then everything would disappear that alone can represent the unity of time, namely the identity of the substratum in which alone all change has its thoroughgoing unity. This persistence is therefore nothing more than the way in which we represent the existence of things (in appearances).” (B 229/A186, my emphasis)
In this passage, Kant seems to identify the permanent persistent substance that represents the persistence of time with the unity of appearances, which seems to be the sum total of mass in the whole world of appearances. Let me argue for my understanding of this passage that it indicates that Kant identifies substance with the sum total of mass. I shall argue by reductio: Suppose Kant identified substance with individuated mass in the above passage. Then, it would make no sense to think that the arising of new substance could make the representation of the unity of time impossible. For the arising of new substance in no sense affects the substance, i.e. the mass, of the original objects. Let me use an example to illustrate. Suppose there is a rock whose mass is 7 kilograms and there arises a new object out of nothing, whose mass is 5 kilograms. Insofar as the rock’s mass remains the same, whether or not there are new masses arising out of nothing does not affect the unity of the rock’s mass, which is 7 kilograms. Therefore, in this passage, Kant conceives of substance as the sum total of mass in the whole world of appearances.
So far I have shown that there are compelling reasons to identify substance with some mass or with the sum total of mass respectively. In the next section, I shall argue that there are also devastating reasons to each identification such that either way we go, we face unsolvable problems.


Section III. One Single Time and the Limit of Possible Experience

I now turn to the problems from which the each identification suffers. In this section, I shall argue that these problems make both identifications untenable. Let us first consider the identification of substance with individuated mass (i.e. some mass). I argue that the reason why individuated mass cannot be identified with substance is that individuated mass cannot represent the oneness of time. Recall Kant’s argument for the principle of the first Analogy: in order to have experiences of objects as temporal, we must identify a permanently persistent substance that can represent time in objects. While the states of the substance change, the substance persists so that the substance can represent time that persists. It is important to notice that time, which is supposed to be represented by substance in appearances, is one single time. But, individuated mass cannot represent one single time. For there are many individuated masses, for instance, the mass of a rock which is 7 kilograms, the mass of a cup which is 0.5 kilogram, and the mass of a table which is 3 kilograms, each of which is permanently persistent and undergoes changes. If one of them can represent time, any other also can. In that case, we do not have one single time. Rather, we have many times or time-series, each of which is persistent.
Let me explain in details why multiply individuated masses cannot represent on single time. If these individuated masses can represent one single time, there must be some one single thing that is shared by these individuated masses that serves to represent the singularity of time. Whatever this shared thing is, it is not any of these individuated masses. Therefore, individuated mass cannot present one single time. However, on the other hand, time has be to singular. Here is a passage in the first Analogy which explains why time has to be one single time rather than a plurality of times:
“Substances (in appearances) are the substrata of all time-determinations. The arising of some of them and the perishing of others would itself remove the sole condition of the empirical unity of time, and the appearances would then be related to two different times, in which existence flowed side by side, which is absurd. For there is only one time, in which all different times must not be placed simultaneously but only one after another.” (B 232/A189)
One might argue that it does not matter how many individuated masses can represent time, it only matters that there is an individuated mass that represents time. Insofar as there is such a substance, which is permanently persistent, it suffices to represent one single time. I reply that, in that case, we still do not know which individuated mass is suppose to be the representer of the one single time in appearances. For there is not reason to think that the mass of one object is more suitable to represent time than the mass of another object is, insofar as both of the individuated masses are permanently persistent. Any choice of one over the other is arbitrary. But the unity or singularity of time is not arbitrary, for there can only be one time-series which persists, and any other time-series or temporal relations are just temporal parts of this unique time-series. Thus, I conclude that individuated mass cannot be the representer of time in appearances.
I now turn to argue that the sum total of mass cannot represent time either. The idea of my argument is to make use of Kant’s solution to the Antinomies to show that the permanently persistent substance that represents time in the appearances cannot be the sum total of mass because the sum total of mass is not an object of possible experience. Let me lay out my argument in detail.
In “The Antinomy of Pure Reason” chapter, Kant presents four pairs of arguments concerning four cosmological ideas about the world-whole, namely, whether there is a beginning of time, whether there is indivisibly simple substance, whether there is a first cause, and whether there is a necessary existent. As Allen W. Wood argues, the four antinomies share a general form, namely, the thesis of each antinomy claims that there must be a first member of the conditioning-conditioned chain, while the antithesis of each antinomy claims that there is no first member of such a chain and that the chain goes back into infinity. Kant argues that there are valid arguments for each of the four theses as well as valid arguments for each of the four antitheses, so we need a solution to such contradictions.
Kant’s solution to the contradictions, as Wood argues, relies on his doctrine of transcendental idealism. As for the first two antinomies, Wood argues
The mathematical antinomies are generated by mathematical principles that apply to things only insofar as they are given in sensible intuition…But these [the first two] series of conditions are never given to intuition as a whole...The theses are false because the principles of possible experience make it impossible for objects corresponding to the cosmological ideas of a first event, a largest extent of the world or a simple substance, ever to be given to intuition.”
Thus, the reason why Kant thinks that the claims made by the theses of the first and second antinomies are false is that neither the beginning of time nor the spatial boundary of the world or an indivisible substance can ever be given to our sensible intuition. If something cannot be given to our sensible intuition, according to Kant, we cannot have experience of it. Let me call this principle the object-of-sensible-intuition principle, namely, if something cannot be given to our sensible intuitions, then it cannot be object of our possible experience. And we can apply this principle to an object to determine whether that object can be object of possible experience. That is, if the object in question can be given to our sensible intuition, then the object can be object of our possible experience, but if the object cannot be given to our sensible intuition, then it cannot be object of our possible experience.
Now, let me apply the object-of-sensible-intuition principle to the idea of the sum total of mass. We can see that the sum total of mass cannot be given to our sensible intuition, so, the sum total of mass cannot be object of our possible experience. For the world of appearances seems to mean the whole universe or cosmos (because everything in the universe stands in causal relations to each other), there is no way for all of the mass in the whole universe to be given to our sensible intuition. Actually, we do not even know whether there are spatial boundaries of the universe, so we do not even know whether the sum total of mass in the all universe is finite. Thus, the sum total of mass cannot be object of possible experience. So, the sum total of mass cannot be that which represents time in appearances. For the reason there must be a permanently persistent substance in appearances which represents time is to make our temporally connected representations of objects possible. But, if the sum total of mass cannot be object of experience, it cannot make our experience of object possible. Thus, the permanently persistent substance in appearances cannot be the sum total of mass.
One might object that in the antinomies, the cosmological ideas at issue are condition-condition series. (B 436/A410) But the sum total of mass is not a series. Rather, it is an aggregate about which the question of conditioning and conditioned does not arise at all. Thus, Kant’s remarks on the antinomies have no bearing on whether the idea of the sum total of mass has any objective validity or significance. Moreover, the first two antinomies concern whether the conditioning-conditioned series go on into infinities. And it seems that it is impossible for us to experience infinity, for no matter what we experience it is finite insofar as we have experienced it. But, the quantum of the sum total of mass seems to be a definite and finite amount. By virtues of what can we claim that the sum total of mass cannot be object of experience? Is this “cannot” an empirical cannot, or an In-Principle cannot? If the answer is the former, the empirical “cannot” does not seem to be strong enough to show that the sum total of mass cannot be experienced, because we cannot know or predict whether in the future empirical sciences and technologies will make the sum total of mass possible object of experience. If the answer is the latter, at least further explanations of why the sum total of mass, which is a finite and definite amount, cannot be object of possible experience in principle are needed.
To the first objection I have two replies. First, in the first antinomy, Kant also discusses whether there is boundary or the largest extent of space. It is not obvious that there is a spatial series in the sense that it is obvious that there is a temporal series in which one moment succeeds its previous moments. However, according to Kant, we can think of the space acquiring its quantum through repeatedly or successively adding spatial units to the previous spatial units. (A 428/B 456) That is, the way of conceiving of space as a spatial series depends on the way of conceiving of time as a temporal series, which is naturally serial. Then, by the same token, we can also think of the sum total of mass acquiring its quantum by successively adding massive units to previous massive units. Thus, if the object-of-sensible-intuition principle applies to the idea of the boundary of space, it should also apply to the idea of the sum total of mass of the whole world of appearances.
Second, the fact that Kant applies the object-of-sensible-intuition-principle to the first two (or three) cosmological ideas to solve the contradictions does not mean that the principle can only be employed to deal with the antinomies. If the principle is applicable to other ideas, we can also use the principle to deal with other ideas. Since the object-of-sensible-intuition principle is derived from transcendental idealism, which is an important element in the whole Critique, there is no reason why the principle cannot be applied to other ideas than cosmological ideas. Thus, it is legitimate to use the object-of-sensible-intuition principle to show that the sum total of mass of whole world of appearances cannot be object of possible experience. So, the sum total of mass cannot be what represents time in appearances.
My reply to the second objection has two steps. First, it needs to be clarified that, although the first two antinomies concern whether the conditioning-conditioned series are infinite, Kant’s solution by the object-of-sensible-intuition principle does not rely on the whether the series are infinite. The principle only concerns whether the things to which the cosmological ideas refer can be given to our sensible intuition. It does not concern whether the things are infinite. It seems true that infinity cannot be object of sensible intuition. But this does not mean that all finite things can be given to our sensible intuition. Actually Kant rejects the claim that all finite things can be given to our sensible intuition. For Kant thinks the thesis of the first antinomy is false, because the beginning of time or the boundary of space cannot be given to our sensible intuition so that it cannot be object of possible experience.
The second step of my reply is to spell out in which sense of “cannot,” the sum total of mass cannot be object of possible experience. It seems to me that the distinction between empirical “cannot” and In-Principle “cannot” is hard to cash out in the context of Critique. For, in the Critique, any legitimate claim to knowledge entails that the object of which the knowledge is can be experienced. Thus, it seems that the empiricality of the “cannot” entails the In-Principality of the “cannot”.
However, concerning the claim that we cannot predict whether in the future empirical sciences and technologies will make the sum total of mass possible object of experience, what would Kant say? Would Kant agree that future sciences and technologies might or could transform a transcendent idea into an idea which refers to object of possible experience? I do not think he would. For Kant thinks his Critique settles metaphysical questions once and for all by theoretical reason, which is static or a-historical. Future discoveries made by sciences and technologies should be able to do no damage to the doctrines in Critique. Moreover, it should be odd to Kant’s ear that progresses made by empirical sciences could have any bearings on the doctrines in the Critique, which he builds up from scratch employing only pure reason, which is absolutely a-historical.
Thus, I conclude that the above arguments show that identifying substance with the sum total of mass in the world of appearance is not tenable. Since I showed earlier in this section that identifying substance with individuated mass is not tenable either, I conclude that the general strategy of identifying substance with mass is untenable.


Section IV. Concluding Remarks

In this paper, I showed that a seemingly very promising way of understanding the permanently persistent substance discussed in the first Analogy, namely, conceiving of substance as Newtonian mass, is untenable. Then, I wonder whether there are other promising ways of providing a positive account of substance or actually it is the case that the notion of substance in the first Analogy is itself untenable. At this stage, maybe I could follow Kant’s stance on the things of themselves, namely, they exist, but we can have no knowledge about the way of their existence. But, at the same time, we need to have this minimal conviction that they exist. Similarly, concerning substance, we can have no knowledge about what the permanently persistent substance is, but we need to have the minimal conviction that it exists in the world of appearances and it serves to represent time.

随着影片题材和故事的变化，张艺谋找到了新的视觉形式和影像风格，从仪式化走向另一个极端——纪实化，于是诞生了《秋菊打官司》以及后来的《一个都不能少》。《秋菊打官司》中大部分镜头通过偷拍完成并采用了众多非职业演员，这对张艺谋来说是一次新的挑战。其实，《秋菊打官司》这部片子从原著改编到拍摄手法的确都是带有很多偶然性：首先，原计划拍摄的影片《一地鸡毛》已经纳入了拍摄进程而因种种原因临时改为《秋菊打官司》；其次，编剧刘恒最先是将《秋菊打官司》写成了生活轻喜剧，后来张艺谋又突然决定改为纪实风格。虽然看似偶然，但其中有着必然的决定因素。



前三部作品已名扬海外，但电影套路和风格形式大致相同，不断求变的张艺谋这次尽量避讳造型写意之势，将视角投向当今农村老百姓的生活。通过纪实方法，最大程度地淡化技巧和戏剧性，以求最大限度地贴近生活，使观众把注意力集中到对人的关注上来。为了追求真实的效果，张艺谋借鉴了很多纪录片的创作手法。首先在设备上全部使用16毫米的摄像机和胶片。从而大大增强了影片的纪实感。



其次在景别上，张艺谋舍弃了之前突出演员脸部的近景甚至特写镜头，多使用与人眼相类似的中景和全景，从而突出了客观的感觉，很好地还原了人物与周围环境的状态，给观众呈现一种真实的时空关系，营造出整个影片粗粝的质感。



不过，张艺谋也没有丢弃对传统民俗造型的偏爱，从影片中一



串串红彤彤的辣椒以及结尾给小孩过满月时的场面，我们依稀可见他惯用的手法。

一部旨在刻画美国政治反面的剧，绵亘了整个美国大选的过程，从奥巴马拍到了特朗普，并最终在现实政治的奇峰突起面前，黯然沦为自说自话的平庸的作品。

在第三季狗尾续貂、第四季力挽狂澜之后，《纸牌屋第五季》在叙事上基本失败了：主轴线的情节理所当然（Will败得实在是轻佻且不知所云）、男女主角故作深沉、主要配角或隐退或失去活力，而引入的新配角如Patricia饰演的Davis等人，气质乖张台词做作，与本剧一直来营造的严肃氛围格格不入。

我已经失去了对本剧进行评论或重新观看的任何兴趣，直到在剧的最后，我听到Underwood在筋疲力尽的时候再次说出了如下的台词：

There is no right or wrong, not any more. There is only being in, or being out.
（这世上已不再有是非对错。只有局内人，和出局的人）

听到这句话后有感慨，并回忆起本剧从万人空巷的2013年拍到了今天，如同古龙自叙武侠小说之短，已经出现了许多“太荒谬的情节，太陈旧老套的故事，太散漫的结构，太轻率的文笔”。然而，本剧的三四五季作为一个整体，仍有些许可观可谈之处：
（以下台词有些是根据回忆写出，或有偏差）

(1). 权力：Frank Underwood有错吗?

我问从政的大哥，官员心理到底怕什么。答曰：他们只怕权力。

整个《纸牌屋》系列中，Frank Underwood口中说出的最高频词汇是什么？

是Power，是权力。

什么是权力？

Power, such a seductively simple thing. Either you have it all, or you have nothing.

权力是支配，是控制，是规训，是人身依附，是对政治、经济、文化资源乃至知识的掌握程度。权力是胡亥之流因为防备就可以“斩杀兄弟姐妹二十八人于闹市”，是斯大林对待饿殍遍野之时说的“死亡可以解决所有问题”，是毛主席在游泳池边说“我动一个小指头就可以把你打倒”。

权力也是位置（第一季与第五季都出现的台词：Power is a lot like real estate. It's all about location, location, location），是你与谁握手，是你的电话通讯录。是你出行之时有多少辆车为你开道抑或你是被限行被封站，是你站着的时候，全场有几个人可以坐着。

我们都不是饱历世事的老年人。看完本剧任何一季的年轻观众，如果不对“权力”一词有更深的体会，无论是对其更热衷、更警惕、更困惑、更震惊，那么本剧算是白看了。

君不见，Frank Underwood在第一季中为当选总统Walker的选举立下汗马功劳。Walker在白宫的位子还没有坐热，即撕毁Frank Underwood担任新政府国务卿的承诺、将其清出内阁名单。Frank Underwood去白宫找当时的幕僚长Linda争执之时，Linda面露苦色，虚伪地说：

Now, we have to lead.

Walker为什么可以这样做？

因为他有这样的权力，他想金瓯永固地当上八年总统，想在自己留下无数载入史册的政治遗产的同时把Frank作为自己安插在国会山的永远棋子。

Frank陷入了从所未有的孤立无援境地，在一夜未眠之后启动了稳扎稳打的复仇活动。他对Doug说：
From this moment on, we are no longer bound by allegiance. We serve no one. We live by one rule and one rule only: never again will we allow ourselves to be put in such position.
（从此刻起我们不再受制于政治忠诚。我们不再效忠任何人。我们只受一条规则制约：再也不能允许自己被置于这样的处境）

Frank有错吗？追求权力有错吗？当你觉得他近乎病态地热衷权力之时，想想《纸牌屋》整个故事的起源，想想一个原本有着政治忠诚的Frank是如何被人摆布和抛弃的。

这就回到了Frank在剧中反复出现的台词，这也是整个《纸牌屋》的精髓：

Hunt, or be hunted.

从Frank到《亿万》中的Bobby（Bobby在第二季中反复说过类似的台词），政治精英和商业精英看穿了权力的食物链本质：大鱼吃小鱼，小鱼吃更小的鱼。而更小的鱼成为食物链的供给源头，如同屌丝用户撑起互联网公司的巨额市值、如同中产阶级撑起天朝上国的房价GDP、如同落后国家竭泽而渔式开发资源撑起发达国家的繁荣富强。

是的，你要么成为开炮的人，要么成为炮灰。几乎没有中间地带。

(2). 人性：耶和华会毁灭华盛顿吗？

在圣经中，耶和华和亚伯拉罕说，这城中如有一个好人，我就不毁灭这城。

创世纪18:32-亚伯拉罕说，求主不要动怒，我再说这一次，假若在那里见有十个呢。他说，为这十个的缘故，我也不毁灭那城。
And he said, Oh let not the LORD be angry, and I will speak yet but this once: Peradventure ten shall be found there. And he said, I will not destroy it for ten's sake.

如果追求权力是必须的、是被迫的、是无罪的，那么，Frank不择手段地追求权力有错吗？
是的，考虑到Frank手上斑斑的鲜血。

中国从刘邦之前，就开始说“杀人者死,伤人及盗抵罪”。Frank直接间接杀死的人无需再一一列举。

从法律的意义上说，他该死该坐牢。然而我的问题是：

《纸牌屋》的世界中有一个好人吗？

Michael Kern？这个在第一季前两集就被Frank干掉的国务卿，成长于越战一代，政治低能、推卸责任，在激起众怒后失去到手的国务卿职位，并在第三季对Walker总统施加报复，联合两党进行弹劾；
Zoe Barnes？一个苦心要上位的新闻女，为搏信任不惜献身。所作的一切无非是为了博得眼球、流量和名誉；
Jackie Sharp？服役过军队、面容姣好的政客罢了。出轨并利用Remy，公私不分，仅仅因为对所谓军队权威的看重即否决Clair的反性侵法案；
Donald？第一季中信誓旦旦要坚守政治理想的左派卫道士Donald，在第三季中加盟成为了一个跟在Frank屁股后面索要廉价政治资本的二流政客的副总统，还想在Frank中枪昏迷不醒期间趁火打劫，分一杯羹；
Seth Grayson？两面三刀、出卖旧主的三姓家奴；
Walker总统和Peter Russo的人性或许好一点，一个受控于资本家的幼稚领袖，一个酗酒宿娼出轨的政界文艺青年。

国会山上其他獐头鼠目的人物，实在不足以一一例数。事实上，第五季的人性的阴暗刻画上几乎是本季唯一成功的地方，我们能够见到的所有人物都如此肮脏，以致于民主党的实权派人物Bob Birch在办公室内向Frank说自己要辞职了，而后慨然道：

Was it always this dirty?

他同时真诚地说：

I will miss you, Frank.

因此，Frank在最后的委员会质询下发挥了自己的演讲功底，就此问题长篇大论（感兴趣的可以看看Kevin Spacy在《政客杰克》中饰演的Jack，结尾的申辩演讲高度相似）。我相信作为民主党的实权派人物，见惯了几十年风风雨雨的Birch说这话是真诚的。弹劾Frank的人有哪个干净？哪个不是因为政治交易失败或不满，或为了谋求曝光率或为了升迁？

所有人的手几乎都一样脏。被Frank打败的人只是没有他狠辣、没有他聪明或没有他坚决而已。如果说Frank脏，那么也只是因为他在华盛顿的污泥中陷得更深一点。但污泥从来都不是Frank浇灌的。如他自述，他只是从美国南部一个鸟不拉屎地方起家的白人垃圾。

就像菲律宾奇葩总统杜特尔特说的：“这个世界真虚伪,在座各位谁没有情妇?”

(3). 人民及新闻

精英腐败，那么人民呢？

脱离现实的《纸牌屋》第五季中唯一和现实高度贴近的，是对两党彻底分崩离析以及人民彻底分裂的刻画。

支持Frank夫妇的人和反对Frank夫妇的人，整夜守在白宫外。古斯塔夫?勒庞的《乌合之众》，一言以蔽之：永远不要相信人民。

人民是分裂的、脆弱的、惊恐的而又软弱的。人民想选Will当总统，听了一段录音后就改主意了。难道这个性格暴躁的战争英雄，不是他们一开始呼喊的吗？

所以，Frank在本剧中说，人民是满手泥浆的小孩。

在高度分化、碎片花的社会背后，是同样高度分化、低效无能的新闻媒体。这里面最值得道一声英雄的是Tom Hammerschmidt。

Tom Hammerschmidt，最终将新闻界的狂风暴雨引向白宫的人，也是唯一一位从第一季站到了第五季的新闻主编：作为Zoe的上司，他因为对不受控的Zoe骂了一句“cunt”后被解雇，在Lucas Goodwin被枪杀后开始独立追查，并最终小心翼翼地依靠多年积累的专业技能最大限度接近了事实真相。他踩着鲜血，完成了自己两任下属都没有完成的任务。

现在回忆起Tom和Zoe第一季中的最后一次争吵——那场争吵直接导致了Tom的失业——实在是感慨万千，那是一场生者与死者的对话：Tom要求Zoe踏实工作、一点点做起，而一心认为自己已飞上枝头当凤凰的Zoe对此不屑一顾，用一条微博害得政治不正确的Tom黯然辞职。

那时的Zoe认为自己是新媒体时代的宠儿，可以呼风唤雨地走入时代中央。然而，最终能与Frank代表的权力铁爪进行调查对抗的，正是她当年看不起的老一代新闻人。

我预计《纸牌屋》会有第六季，且第六季会是终结篇。从这个角度说，第五季作为更为明显的过渡其实不足评论，或者说第五季的最终口碑，应当取决于这个故事的结局。

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这个月新书出版，里面很多故事是从来没发在社交媒体上的，想拍出来，发出来，让更多喜欢野生动物保护事业的人看到。 希望能让更多人知道这个故事，对狼的印象有所改观，让更多的人加入或者支持野生动物保护和环境保护事业 12集的纪录片是对电影的一个补充，里面有很多画面是电...  (展开)

恶心??低俗 三观不正 建议下架 有内幕 TMD不要脸投票作弊 呵??为什么不能打负星 没实力就买网页 真TND不要脸 下架吧 真的不知道都是什么人在看 没实力买网页 投给师姐的票要不就投不上 要不就全给了什么冰公主（哎呦 还公主 真恶心????)没实力就没实力吧 你这也算作弊...  (展开)

电影《侗族大歌》
   个人影评：关于民族风情，景色建筑都较为原汁原味，以对唱为主，故事取材纯朴，也有侗族传统食物香糯米情节（百度了），讲述一段相知相守的感情，由真人真事而改编，比较感人，有重要现实意义，传递我们贵州大山中的爱和感动，让我们一面欢乐一面流露情感。
    电影简介：影片《侗族大歌》讲述了阿莲（王嘉饰）与千树（韦礼安 饰）以歌结缘、互相爱慕，然而富家少爷那福（萧浩冉 饰）也对阿莲情有独钟，对她展开猛烈的攻势。阿莲被逼嫁给那福后，与千树相约私奔，却因一场火灾意外导致精神失常，千树死亡，全寨被火烧毁。那福找到精神恍惚的阿莲，默默守护在她身边，但阿莲却一直忘不了此生挚爱的千树。三人经受着爱情与友情的煎熬，那福用六十载相守与陪伴（阿莲），诠释世间平凡却刻骨铭心的爱。
  
人物性格及遭遇
   阿莲：敢爱敢恨，为爱而疯，独养儿子加木，魔怔60余年，一朝终醒，那福已死。
   千树：沉静内敛，相爱相守，因救挚爱于火灾而亡。
   那福：花花公子，用情太深，父母遭土匪而枉死，散尽家财重情义，60年陪伴阿莲感人一生，未能情终人已逝。
   优点：总体故事设计合理，感情线和故事情节还不错，演员演技值得肯定。
   不足：（资金不足）化妆技术不算合理，年龄变化没有体现出来，时间层次有些模糊，男女主人公、加木样子变化也有些突兀，以及故事中阿莲和那树老年年龄样貌不统一，环境随时代更替也有些不合理。那树的生活来源也有些没交代清楚。
     六年时间拍摄，在国际引起影响，还是比较用心的一部传统民族电影，个人比较推荐，也衷心祝愿《侗族大歌》能够火卖。
  这是一部能够传承一个民族文化，树立民族自信，表达少数民族风情的电影。
    个人观点，合理之处还请采纳！

“想要抓住男人的心，先要抓住男人的胃。”

从古至今流传的这样一句“古训”，仅凭这一句话，就使得多少女人争先恐后地学着如何当一个优秀的厨子，如若身怀绝技，绝对是值得炫耀的事情，仿佛手中拥有虏获男人的法宝，成为了牌桌上拥有筹码最多的女人。所谓男人钟爱的贤良淑德型女人，首先要有比死心塌地还要多的东西，比如身段柔软可以摆出各种姿势，能歌善舞在熟人前赚回不少面子，既有功能性又有欣赏性，能出得厅堂还要下得厨房。既要有自己的思想和见地，还要能和男人达到默契统一。善解人意的类型是上品，能够毫无保留地奉献，全心全意地爱自己，并且对于自己的粗心大意不够体贴完全包容，像对待一个孩子一样宠爱到底。。。只是，就怕即使这样还是遇到了一个从来不懂得满足为何物的男人，到处拈花惹草吃百家饭仍口口声声说女人们其实爱的都是自己。

《双食记》中，印象最深的其实是一道道菜品。当它们热气腾腾色泽鲜亮地映入眼帘，简直让人垂涎三尺。女人端着它们上桌的时候，那一滴一滴汤汁其实都饱含着她们的心血。。。那必须是有足够的耐心才能够做出的美味，一个汤盅要用文火煲上好几个钟，杀鸡宰鱼剁螃蟹。。。你看到的美味佳肴背后，细想之下不免鲜血淋淋。。。而对于一个女人来说，你看到的她有多温柔，背后也许就能够有多狠毒。。。千万不要辜负了肯为你花时间的女人，因为时间就是她们的青春——只为了栓住一个男人的心，一个女人在厨房里消耗掉的时间有多久，她的感情势必就有多苍白。

我不是一个能够在厨房里扎几个小时只为做一盅汤的女人，所以我也不是一个可以用迂回的手段慢慢置负心男人于死地的女人。因为我没有那么长久的毅力来消磨掉一份爱使它变成恨，于是对于那种不动声色细细绵绵的女人始终怀有敬畏。一个吃两家饭的男人，是活该被毒死的。而唯一让人无法释怀的是，那恶毒中包含的却还是软弱的爱，无法割舍和离弃，有时所谓的报复并非是真的快意恩仇，只是因为心中始终有不甘心。

电影的结尾是男人当初的海誓山盟，那一句脍炙人口受到大众广泛使用的“你必须相信我，我今生只爱你”听到简直要笑起来。可是宽容一点地想，在该使用的时候就真的能因为它的可笑而避免不用了么？那恐怕又会生出“果然是不爱我，连一句谎话都不愿意说给我”的委屈。所以虚幻是必然虚幻的，如若真的不在意，那么其实连报复都不必；到底意难平，那么就手起刀落，千万不要在最后一刻白白搭上自己。我多么希望在三角关系中看到女人最终胜出的结局，就如同殳俏在小说《双食记》中描写的那般，在最后的最后，让颓唐的男人对着一盘榨菜肉丝大哭去。

男人说：“女人都是一样的，最后总是想着要结婚，她们总是搞不清楚，恋爱和结婚根本是两回事情。”这简直一下子就说中了我的心。
没有做好充分的准备，千万不要一时冲动就去当了黄脸婆，到时就只剩手中的食物作为武器。

这篇影评可能有剧透 [外婆的蓝色铁皮柜轮椅] [向着明亮那方] 以下是完整版的《外婆的蓝色铁皮柜轮椅》分镜头脚本。 导演/编剧：刘毛宁 “整理文件的时候，发现了很多标注在镜头旁边的文字和随意的画面，粗糙的笔触如今看来也显得非常有趣。希望这些图能给观众带来更多的信息，以及对创作的深入理解...  (展开)